IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 10–0193
Filed July 16, 2010
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
WILLIAM RAY MONROE,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme
Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission recommends thirty-day suspension of
respondent’s license to practice law. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, Des Moines, for
complainant.
William R. Monroe, Burlington, pro se. 2
TERNUS, Chief Justice.
The complainant, Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board,
filed charges against the respondent, William Monroe, alleging he engaged in
a sexual relationship with a client in violation of the Iowa Rules of
Professional Conduct. After a hearing before a division of the Grievance
Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa, the commission found the alleged
misconduct had occurred, and this misconduct violated the respondent’s
ethical duties as an Iowa lawyer. The commission recommended a thirty-day
suspension of the respondent’s license to practice law.
Upon our review of the record in this case, as well as the commission’s
report, we agree with the commission’s findings of fact and with its legal
conclusion Monroe’s sexual relationship with his client violated Iowa Rule of
Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j). We disagree, however, with the commission’s
conclusion Monroe’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice
in violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(d). More specifically,
we reject the board’s position that a sexual relationship between attorney
and client automatically prejudices the administration of justice, requiring
instead that there be proof the relationship actually hampered the proper
functioning of the court system. Notwithstanding our contrary conclusion
with respect to a violation of rule 32:8.4(d), we concur in the commission’s
recommended sanction and suspend the law license of William Monroe for
thirty days.
I. Prior Proceedings.
On July 14, 2009, the board filed an amended complaint against
William Monroe alleging that in 2007 Monroe entered an appearance for
Jane Doe in a dissolution-of-marriage action and thereafter began a sexual
relationship with her. The board further alleged Monroe represented Doe in
some criminal matters, including a charge of public intoxication, while they 3
continued to be intimately involved. The board charged Monroe with
violating rule 32:1.8(j) (“A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client
. . . unless the person is the spouse of the lawyer or the sexual relationship
predates the initiation of the client-lawyer relationship.”), and rule 32:8.4(d)
(“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”). 1 Monroe admitted the board’s
factual allegations, with the qualification that “the [sexual] relationship was
established before the public intoxication case began.” He also admitted this
conduct violated rule 32:1.8(j). As for the alleged violation of rule 32:8.4(d),
Monroe stated: “Admits that violating Rule 32:1.8(j) is per se prejudicial to
the administration of justice. Denies that any other actions of Respondent
on behalf of Jane Doe, the victim in this case, were prejudicial to the
administration of justice.” (Footnote omitted.)
At the hearing before a division of the grievance commission, the
division chair urged the parties to focus their evidence on an appropriate
sanction in view of Monroe’s admission of the operative facts and the ethical
violations. Notwithstanding Monroe’s limited admission to a violation of rule
32:8.4(d), restricting it to a “per se” violation of the rule, the board did not
challenge the commission’s view of the narrow purpose of the hearing. Similarly, in its report to this court, the commission accepted Monroe’s
concession that his conduct violated rule 32:1.8(j) and rule 32:8.4(d) and
made no additional finding that the board proved a violation of rule 32:8.4(d)
beyond the per se violation that Monroe admitted.
1Based on Monroe’s alleged violation of rule 32:1.8(j), the board also charged Monroe with a violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(a), which states: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate or attempt to violate the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .” As we have recently stated, rule 32:8.4(a) does not provide an independent ground for an ethical infraction when based solely on the violation of another rule. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Iowa 2010). Therefore, we give this claim no further attention. 4
The commission’s report, filed on February 1, 2010, focused on the
appropriate sanction for the admitted ethical infractions. The commission
noted several factors it considered as aggravating, including Doe’s
vulnerability, Monroe’s initial evasiveness when an opposing attorney
questioned his relationship with Doe, Monroe’s failure to withdraw from his
representation of Doe in the criminal matters despite his withdrawal in the
dissolution action, Monroe’s injection of himself in the pending dissolution
action after his withdrawal, and the resulting harm to Doe. The commission
cited the following circumstances it considered mitigating: Monroe’s clean
disciplinary record, Monroe’s service in the Marines, Monroe’s extraordinary
amount of pro bono work, Monroe’s cooperation with the board and during
the hearing, and Monroe’s acceptance of responsibility for his conduct. In
addition to these matters, the commission stated its belief that Monroe “is a
naïve person who genuinely wanted to assist Ms. Doe, and that [he] lost
sight of the ethical boundaries due to lack of education in the area.” The
commission recommended Monroe’s license to practice law be suspended for
thirty days, and suggested he be required to present evidence that he had
completed counseling “as to how to identify and avoid relationships with
vulnerable people” prior to reinstatement.
II. Scope of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Iowa 2010). The
commission’s findings and recommendations are given respectful
consideration, but we are not bound by them. Id. Nonetheless, we give
special weight to the commission’s findings concerning the credibility of
witnesses. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d
682, 695 (Iowa 2006). The board has the burden of proving attorney
misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme 5
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 774 N.W.2d 496, 497–98 (Iowa 2009).
As frequently stated, “ ‘This burden is less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, but more than the preponderance standard required in the usual civil
case.’ ” Id. at 498 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conrad,
723 N.W.2d 791, 792 (Iowa 2006)). Upon proof of misconduct, the court
may impose a lesser or greater sanction than that recommended by the
commission. Id.
III. Factual Findings.
Monroe was admitted to practice law in Iowa in 1998. In 2007 he was
retained by Doe to represent her in a dissolution proceeding that included a
child custody issue. Monroe was acquainted with Doe, having represented
her in a prior legal matter. In late May 2007, Monroe and Doe commenced a
sexual relationship. Monroe continued to represent Doe, and after various
misdemeanor criminal charges were filed against Doe in the summer of
2007, Monroe represented her in those matters as well.
The intimate relationship between Monroe and his client ended in mid-
August 2007 by mutual agreement. Doe decided she was not interested in
having a serious relationship at that time. In addition, they both recognized
that their relationship might be detrimental to Doe in the dissolution action
and may interfere with Monroe’s representation of Doe.
Doe testified at the hearing before the commission, and we find, that
she was not coerced by Monroe to engage in an intimate relationship with
him, that there was no understanding or anticipation that her attorney fees
would be reduced by virtue of their relationship, and that she felt it was her
own decision to be in or out of the relationship. Doe harbors no ill will 6
toward Monroe and continues to regard him as a good friend upon whom she
can call in times of need. 2
Eventually, Doe’s husband became aware of his wife’s relationship
with Monroe. He told his attorney who then reported the situation to the
disciplinary authorities in the fall of 2007, resulting in the filing of the
charges at issue here.
The attorney representing Doe’s husband also contacted the assistant
county attorney to share his concerns regarding Monroe’s relationship with
Doe. The assistant county attorney told Monroe what she had heard and
suggested that Monroe should not represent Doe in the criminal matters.
Although Monroe withdrew from the dissolution case in early fall 2007, he
continued to represent Doe in the criminal matters until they were resolved
in October 2007. Even though Monroe no longer represented Doe in the
dissolution matter, he periodically injected himself into that case through
phone calls to Doe’s new attorney regarding suggestions and information
pertinent to the dissolution proceeding. After Doe was billed for her new
attorney’s conversations with Monroe, Doe asked Monroe to refrain from
contacting her new attorney.
As previously stated, Monroe admitted in the disciplinary case that he
had a sexual relationship with Doe and that his conduct violated rules
32:1.8(j) and 32:8.4(d). Consequently, the hearing before the commission
focused on the appropriate sanction for this misconduct. As noted above,
after considering various aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
commission recommended a one-month suspension.
2Doe testified that she and Monroe “were friends before, friends during, and friends after—now.” 7
IV. Ethical Violations.
A. Rule 32:1.8(j)––Sexual Relationship with Client. We conclude
Monroe’s intimate relationship with his client violated Iowa Rule of
Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j). Monroe seems to suggest in his answer that
his relationship with Doe was not improper with respect to the public
intoxication case because their intimate relationship predated his
representation of her on that matter. This suggestion indicates Monroe may
misperceive the charges against him. Monroe was not charged with an
ethical violation based on his representation of Doe after their intimate
relationship began. The ethical charges against him were based solely on
the fact he had a sexual relationship with his client, and the board relied on
Monroe’s continuing representation of Doe only as an aggravating
circumstance. Consequently, whether Monroe’s continuing representation of
Doe was itself ethical misconduct is not at issue here. Nonetheless, we will
address the impact of his continued representation on the charge that was
made by the board, that Monroe’s sexual relationship with Doe violated rule
32:1.8(j).
Monroe’s sexual relationship with his client was not legitimized once
he withdrew from representing her in the dissolution matter. Rule 32:1.8(j)
provides: “A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client . . . unless
the person is the spouse of the lawyer or the sexual relationship predates the
initiation of the client-lawyer relationship.” (Emphasis added.) Monroe’s
client-lawyer relationship with Doe commenced in the spring of 2007. He
did not have sexual relations with her until late May 2007. Therefore, the
rule’s exception for sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer
relationship does not apply here. Monroe’s intimate relationship with Doe
violated rule 32:1.8(j) for the entire period it existed because their client- 8
lawyer relationship predated their sexual relationship and Doe continued to
be his client during the time they were intimately involved.
B. Rule 32:8.4(d)––Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of
Justice. “Whether conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice is
not subject to a precise test.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Buchanan, 757 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Iowa 2008). “Generally, acts that have
been deemed prejudicial to the administration of justice have ‘hampered the
efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon
which the courts rely.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth,
728 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1999)). Based on
these principles, we reject the proposition that a sexual relationship between
client and attorney is a per se violation of rule 32:8.4(d).
The prohibition of sexual relationships between client and attorney
rests on the belief that a conflict between the client’s interest and the
attorney’s personal interests is inherent in such situations. See Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:1.8 (entitled “Conflict of interest: current clients: specific
rules”); 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., The Law of Lawyering § 12.2, at 12–
8 (3d ed. 2004 Supp.) [hereinafter “The Law of Lawyering”] (noting rule
regarding sexual relationships regulates “a troubling situation implicating
conflict of interest concerns”). The proposition that a sexual relationship
between client and attorney is a per se violation of rule 32:8.4(d) would
necessarily rest on a similar belief: that an intimate relationship between
client and attorney automatically prejudices the administration of justice.
There are at least two flaws in this reasoning.
First, rule 32:8.4(d) does not prohibit a particular act or conduct in
isolation. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784
N.W.2d 761, 768–69 (Iowa 2010). It prohibits conduct that has an 9
undesirable effect: prejudice to the administration of justice, i.e., some
interference with the efficient and proper operation of the courts through a
deviation “from the well-understood norms and conventions of practice.” Id.
at 769. See generally 2 The Law of Lawyering § 65.6, at 65–15 (3d ed. 2009
Supp.) (noting with disapproval that some courts have applied rule 8.4(d) “to
conduct that, while reprehensible, seems quite far from prejudicing the
‘administration’ of any particular proceeding or of ‘justice’ generally”).
Clearly, a client-attorney relationship compromised by a concurrent intimate
relationship could prompt acts or omissions by the attorney or client that
would impede the proper functioning of the court system for purposes of the
client’s case. Nonetheless, we think such a result is not inevitable, as the
subject of many client-attorney relationships does not involve court
proceedings at all.
The second reason we think a violation of rule 32:1.8(j) does not result
in a per se violation of rule 32:8.4(d) is the inconsistency between this
conclusion and our allowance of exceptions to the prohibition of sexual
relationships between client and attorney. If sexual relationships between
client and attorney always compromise the administration of justice, there
would be no sound basis for allowing a client-attorney relationship to exist
between spouses or for accommodating a client-attorney relationship when
the sexual relationship predates the client-attorney relationship. Moreover,
if sexual relationships between client and attorney automatically prejudice
the administration of justice, an attorney relying on the rule 32:1.8(j)
exceptions as a safe harbor would find their protection illusory because he or
she would still face charges under rule 32:8.4(d), which does not contain
comparable exceptions.
The commission accepted Monroe’s admission that his violation of rule
32:1.8(j) is “per se prejudicial to the administration of justice.” For the 10
reasons we have discussed, we do not. As noted, the board was satisfied to
rely on Monroe’s admission and did not seek to prove specific ways in which
this relationship “hampered the efficient and proper operation of the courts
or of ancillary systems upon which the courts rely.” Steffes, 588 N.W.2d at
123. We conclude, therefore, that the board has failed to prove a violation of
rule 32:8.4(d). This conclusion does not, however, preclude consideration of
the effects of Monroe’s misconduct on his representation of Doe in
determining the appropriate sanction, a matter we now address.
V. Sanction.
“There is no standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct,
and though prior cases can be instructive, we ultimately determine an
appropriate sanction based on the particular circumstances of each case.”
Johnson, 774 N.W.2d at 499. In determining a suitable sanction for an
attorney’s ethical violations,
we consider the nature and extent of the respondent’s ethical infractions, his fitness to continue practicing law, our obligation to protect the public from further harm by the respondent, the need to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct, our desire to maintain the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Kallsen, 670 N.W.2d 161,
164 (Iowa 2003). We think two of these considerations mandate a
suspension here: the nature of the ethical infraction and the need to deter
other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.
Monroe had a sexual relationship with his client that spanned several
weeks. Cf. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280,
285–86 (Iowa 1979) (publicly reprimanding attorney who had inappropriate
physical contact with client during prison visit with client). There is no gray
area with respect to the prohibition of such conduct, no nuance subject to
differing interpretations. See Marzen, 779 N.W.2d at 767 (“Our ethics rules 11
are clear, and our cases have consistently and explicitly condemned sexual
relationships between an attorney and a client.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Furlong, 625 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 2001)
(“Professional responsibility involves many gray areas, but sexual
relationships between attorney and client is not one of these.”). Therefore,
the ethical violation is obvious and should have been obvious to Monroe
before he engaged in sex with his client.
This type of misconduct also clearly jeopardizes the client’s interests.
See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.8(j) cmt. [17] (discussing dangers posed by
attorney’s sexual relationship with client). The fact that the misconduct
occurred while Monroe represented Doe in a dissolution action and in
criminal matters is an aggravating circumstance because clients are
particularly vulnerable under these circumstances, and the possibility of
harm, especially when child custody matters are at stake, is high. 3 See Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morrison, 727 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa
2007) (stating “a sexual relationship between attorney and client may be
harmful to the client’s interest,” particularly when client is dealing with a
divorce or criminal charges); 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 16, cmt. e (1998) (“A lawyer may not . . . enter a sexual relationship with a client when that would undermine a client’s case, abuse
the client’s dependence on the lawyer, or create risk to the lawyer’s
independent judgment, for example, when the lawyer represents the client in
a divorce proceeding.”). Moreover, Monroe failed to recognize the potential
for harm as evidenced by his continuing representation of Doe after their
sexual relationship commenced. Finally, Doe suffered from situational
3We note there was no proof Monroe’s sexual relationship with Doe impacted the
child custody dispute between Doe and her husband. The board merely argues “the relationship could have had negative repercussions on Ms. Doe’s custody of her child.” (Emphasis added.) 12
depression in reaction to her marital situation, further affecting her capacity
to make good choices for herself. 4 It is important to deter other attorneys in
similar circumstances from putting their own self-interest ahead of those of
the client, the very antithesis of a lawyer’s professional duty.
On the other hand, the situation presented by the facts of this case is
less egregious than we have encountered with respect to other violations of
rule 32:1.8(j). See, e.g., Marzen, 779 N.W.2d at 768–69 (finding attorney’s
sexual relationship with extremely vulnerable client, whom he represented in
an involuntary commitment proceeding, warranted six-month suspension);
Morrison, 727 N.W.2d at 119–20 (imposing three-month suspension on
attorney who engaged in sexual relationship with client after he had been
previously admonished for making sexual advances toward another client);
McGrath, 713 N.W.2d at 703–04 (concluding three-year suspension was
warranted for attorney who preyed upon dissolution client’s vulnerability by
obtaining sex in exchange for legal services and who had attempted to do so
with another dissolution client); Furlong, 625 N.W.2d at 713–14 (imposing
eighteen-month suspension on attorney who performed “uninvited and
unwelcome” sex acts on client and sexually harassed at least two other
clients by making unwanted sexually motivated physical contact with them).
In the present case, the misconduct appears to be an isolated occurrence,
there being no evidence that Monroe had engaged in similar transgressions
in the past. In addition, Monroe’s conduct was not predatory, Doe felt she
entered the relationship voluntarily and that Monroe had not taken
advantage of her, and Doe has seemingly suffered no emotional harm from
4Doe had been treated in the past for other mental health problems, but there is no evidence these past problems were active at the time in question or had any influence on Doe’s capacity for good decision-making. 13
the relationship. 5 We agree with the commission’s observation that Monroe
“genuinely wanted to assist Ms. Doe, [but] lost sight of the ethical
boundaries” governing his relationship with his client. In addition, as the
commission noted, Monroe had his own “emotional/personality
weaknesses/vulnerabilities.”
We also consider Monroe’s “fitness to continue practicing law” and
“our obligation to protect the public from further harm” by this attorney.
Kallsen, 670 N.W.2d at 164. Clearly, Monroe needs a better understanding
of his ethical obligations, the vulnerability of clients under the stress of a
dissolution or facing criminal charges, and the impact a sexual relationship
between him and his client has on his client and his own ability to
professionally represent that client. Without this knowledge, Monroe poses a
risk to the public. We also note, however, that Monroe has contributed a
significant amount of time to the representation of clients on a pro bono
basis. In addition, members of the bar and of the judiciary testified at the
hearing that, other than the matter that brought Monroe to the attention of
the disciplinary authorities, he has practiced in an ethical fashion. Taking
all of the pertinent factors into consideration, we concur in the commission’s
recommendation that Monroe’s license to practice law in this state be
suspended for thirty days.
The commission also recommended that Monroe’s license not be
reinstated until he has furnished “evidence that he has completed
counseling (at his expense), which counseling is focused on [his] current lack
of appreciation for how his behavior with Jane Doe was wrong.” Shortly
5Doe was being treated for her situational depression during the time in question, but the board introduced no evidence from Doe or her therapist that Doe’s relationship with Monroe adversely affected Doe’s mental or emotional state. The only harm shown in the record was attorney fees incurred by Doe that were attributable to Monroe’s contact with Doe’s new attorney. 14
before submission of this matter to our court on May 19, 2010, Monroe filed
a report from a mental health counselor whom he has been seeing on a
weekly basis since February 2010. 6 (Monroe had previously been a client of
the same professional when he suffered from depression in 2004.) The
counselor stated that she has “identified and processed at length” with
Monroe “the issues of unequal power in a relationship with a [p]rofessional,”
including “the serious repercussions and the risk of harm, both mentally
and emotionally, to a client who is in a vulnerable state.” The counselor
opined that Monroe was keenly aware of the ramifications of such a
relationship and had resolved not to let it happen again. She stated she has
worked with Monroe to “set up guidelines within his thinking and also within
his office to prevent any future reoccurrence.”
We are satisfied the May report from Monroe’s counselor provides
sufficient verification that Monroe has addressed the matters leading to his
unethical behavior. Therefore, we decline to require any additional
counseling prior to reinstatement. If the board has a basis to challenge the
accuracy of the report submitted by Monroe, it has an opportunity to object
to Monroe’s automatic reinstatement under Iowa Court Rule 35.12(2).
VI. Disposition. We suspend Monroe’s license to practice law for thirty days. This
suspension shall apply to all facets of the practice of law as provided in Iowa
Court Rule 35.12(3) and requires notification of clients as outlined in Iowa
Court Rule 35.22. Costs are taxed to Monroe pursuant to Iowa Court Rule
6The board objected to Monroe’s late submission of this report. In an order dated March 19, 2010, this court invited the parties to submit statements addressing the propriety of the commission’s recommended sanction. These statements were due on May 10, 2010. Because Monroe did not submit his counselor’s report by May 10, 2010, we conclude he did not intend that we consider his rehabilitative efforts in determining the appropriate length of any suspension, and we have not done so. 15
35.26. Automatic reinstatement shall not be ordered until all costs are paid.
Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(2).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.