IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 09–1074
Filed April 23, 2010
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
THEODORE R. HOGLAN,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme
Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission recommends attorney receive a public
reprimand. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Wendell J. Harms, for complainant.
Robert G. Tully, West Des Moines, for respondent. 2
PER CURIAM.
This matter comes before the court on the report of a division of the
Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.10.
The Iowa Supreme Court Disciplinary Board alleged the respondent,
Theodore R. Hoglan, violated ethical rules by neglecting several client
matters resulting in the dismissal of three appeals for failure to prosecute
and the dismissal of one claim for failure to perfect an administrative appeal.
The grievance commission found Hoglan violated the Iowa Rules of
Professional Conduct and recommended a public reprimand. Upon our
respectful consideration of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation of the commission, we find the respondent committed
several ethical violations and suspend his license to practice law for thirty
days.
I. Standard of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa 2009). The
commission’s findings and recommendations are given respectful
consideration, but we are not bound by them. Id. The board has the burden
of proving attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conrad, 723 N.W.2d
791, 792 (Iowa 2006). As frequently stated, “ ‘[t]his burden is less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance standard
required in the usual civil case.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004)). Upon proof of
misconduct, the court may impose a lesser or greater sanction than that
recommended by the commission. Id. 3
II. Factual Background.
The respondent has been practicing law in Iowa since 1983. During
this time, he has engaged in private practice of a general nature. Four
separate matters comprise the current disciplinary action. We will consider
each charge separately.
A. Viles Appeal. In November 2006, Hoglan filed a notice of appeal
on behalf of Joseph M. Viles, as Trustee of the Bear Creek Recreational
Trust, in a case involving an administrative search warrant. On January 5,
2007, a notice of default was issued for failure to file and serve the combined
certificate. The combined certificate was subsequently filed. On March 20,
2007, Hoglan filed an application for extension of time to file the page proof
brief and designation of appendix. The request noted, inter alia, that Hoglan
was suffering from serious back problems. On June 7, 2007, after two
notices of default and one extension, Viles’ appeal was ultimately dismissed
for want of prosecution.
As a result of the dismissal, the board alleged Hoglan violated the
following provisions of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct: 32:1.1 (“A
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.”), 32:1.3 (“A lawyer
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.”), 32:1.16(a)(2) (“[A] lawyer shall . . . withdraw from the representation
of a client if . . . the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs
the lawyer’s ability to represent the client[.]”), 32:3.2 (“A lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the
client.”), 32:8.4(a) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate
. . . the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct[.]”), and 32:8.4(d) (“It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”). 4
B. Kurth Appeal. In 2006, Hoglan represented plaintiffs James and
Peggy Kurth in a personal injury claim. After the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the defendant, the respondent advised the Kurths to appeal. Hoglan
filed a notice of appeal on October 27, 2006. On November 20, 2006, Hoglan
filed the combined certificate in which he certified he had ordered the
transcript, although he later stated he asked the court reporter to postpone
preparation of the transcript because negotiations were ongoing. Thereafter,
as in the Viles’ case, the appeal languished. A request for an extension was
denied, and on May 23, 2007, the clerk’s office issued a notice of default for
failure to file and serve the proof brief and to designate the appendix
contents. When the default was not corrected, the court dismissed the
Kurths’ appeal for want of prosecution. As a result of the dismissal, the
board alleged further violations of ethical rules 32:1.1, 32:1.3, 32:1.16(a)(2),
32:3.2, and 32:8.4(a) and (d). In addition, because it concluded Hoglan
failed to communicate to the Kurths that their appeal had been dismissed,
the board alleged Hoglan violated rule 32:1.4(a)(3) (“A lawyer shall . . . keep
the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter[.]”) and rule
32:8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation[.]”).
C. Keeler Appeal. On December 29, 2006, the respondent filed a
notice of appeal on behalf of his client, Kent Keeler. Keeler’s employment-
discrimination claim against his former employer had been dismissed by the
trial court on summary judgment. After a series of continuances, on
October 9, 2007, the appeal was ultimately dismissed for want of
prosecution. Based on Hoglan’s failure to prosecute his client’s appeal, the
board alleged he violated the same ethical rules enumerated in relation to
the Viles’ appeal. 5
D. Stanley Disability Administrative Appeal. In September 2003,
Patrick Stanley hired the respondent to represent him with regards to his
social security disability claim. After a series of denials of the claim, on
October 18, 2006, Hoglan prepared a request for a review of the latest
hearing decision. Although Hoglan asserted the document was delivered to
the local social security office in Marshalltown, he was unable to produce
any evidence the appeal had been perfected with the Appeals Council of the
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. Moreover, Hoglan did not look
at the client file again until January 2008 when Stanley filed his complaint.
The board concluded Hoglan’s failure to timely file Stanley’s appeal and his
failure to respond to his client’s subsequent inquiries violated ethical rules
32:1.1, 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(3), 32:1.4(a)(4) (“A lawyer shall . . . promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information[.]”), 32:1.16(a)(2), 32:3.2, and
32:8.4(a) and (d).
III. Prior Proceedings.
A hearing before a division of the grievance commission was held on
February 20, 2009. The respondent testified on his own behalf about each
of the four claims.
Hoglan testified he believed all four appeals to be meritorious. With
regards to the three appellate cases dismissed for want of prosecution,
Hoglan acknowledged that he failed to perfect the appeals. He also testified
that he did not attempt to get the appeals reinstated because he did not
believe, based upon his prior experience, that reinstatement would be
successful. Hoglan disputed, however, that he failed to timely appeal
Stanley’s social security claim, asserting he believed the appeal
documentation requesting the required transcript had been timely submitted
to the social security office. Nevertheless, he acknowledged the appeal had
not been processed. Because Stanley had obtained new legal representation, 6
Hoglan did not take any further action. Hoglan also disputed assertions that
he failed to adequately communicate with his client, stating that, while he
may not have returned every single phone call, he returned calls when it was
appropriate to do so. He further disputed that he failed to appropriately
pursue his client’s claim, noting the transcript request, a necessary
preliminary to the appeal, often takes more than a year. Because he believed
he had made this request, he could take no further action until the
transcript was received.
In an effort to explain his dilatory handling of these cases, Hoglan
testified to his chronic back problems and the effect these conditions had on
his legal practice. In 1973, while still in high school, Hoglan was diagnosed
with Scheuermann’s disease, a degenerative bone condition. This disease
affected his thoracic spine, causing spinal deformity and chronic pain. In
1997, Hoglan was diagnosed with a herniated disk of the lower lumbar
spine. Since then, Hoglan testified, he has undergone a series of back
surgeries, unrelated to the Scheuermann’s disease. From February 2007
through the summer of 2007, Hoglan underwent three back surgeries. It
was during this period of time that all four cases ultimately dismissed were
pending.
Hoglan also acknowledged that on January 2, 2007, he was publically
reprimanded for neglecting two client matters resulting in the dismissal of an
appeal to this court and the dismissal of an administrative appeal. Both
dismissals occurred in May 2006.
In addition to Hoglan’s testimony, the depositions of Joseph Viles,
James Kurth, Peggy Kurth, Kent Keeler, and Patrick Stanley were entered
into evidence. In pertinent part, Viles testified: (1) that he was not
disappointed in Hoglan’s representation, (2) that Hoglan notified him verbally
of the dismissal prior to the board’s letter to Viles informing Viles of the 7
board’s investigation, 1 and (3) that he—Viles—continues to use Hoglan’s
services. The Kurths’ testimonies were similar. Although James Kurth
could not be sure when Hoglan notified them that their appeal had been
dismissed, Peggy Kurth testified it was before they received the board’s letter.
Both testified they were not angry with Hoglan and that they continue to use
his services. Keeler’s testimony was also favorable to Hoglan. He testified
that Hoglan notified him of the dismissal of his appeal prior to the board’s
letter of inquiry and that Hoglan admitted the dismissal was his mistake.
Keeler also stated he was not angry with Hoglan.
Stanley’s deposition testimony was also provided to the commission.
In his deposition, Stanley testified he hired Hoglan in September 2003 to
represent him in his attempt to obtain social security disability benefits. At
that time, Stanley’s initial request for benefits had been denied. In August
2004, the Department denied Stanley’s requests for reconsideration of the
denial. Hoglan then filed a request for a hearing by an administrative law
judge (ALJ). The hearing was held in March 2006. After receiving the ALJ’s
denial on September 25, 2006, Stanley contacted Hoglan and asked him to
file an appeal. Hoglan, Stanley stated, told him it was already done. After
that, Stanley claimed Hoglan did little to communicate with him about his appeal, other than to tell him the appeal could take up to two years. Stanley
further asserted that his numerous attempts at communicating with Hoglan
in 2007 were, with the exception of two times, unsuccessful. In 2007,
through his own inquiry with the Social Security Department, Stanley
learned his appeal had not been processed, and the Department considered
1The Viles, Kurth, and Keeler matters were referred to the board pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.19(3) (now rule 6.1006(1)(b) (2009)), which required the clerk of court to forward certified copies of the docket of dismissed appeals to the attorney disciplinary board. In the case of the Stanley matter, Stanley filed a complaint with the board. 8
his disability benefits claim to be closed or inactive. According to Stanley,
his current attorney is trying to get the Department to waive the
noncompliance in the filing of the appeal.
IV. Ethical Violations.
We agree the board has proven Hoglan’s conduct violated ethical rules
32:1.3 (requiring reasonable diligence and promptness), 32:1.16(a)(2)
(requiring lawyer to withdraw from representation if the lawyer’s physical or
mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the
client), 32:3.2 (requiring lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with his client’s interests), 32:8.4(a) (finding it
misconduct to violate an ethical rule), and 32:8.4(d) (finding it misconduct
for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice). In all four cases, the board has proven by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence that Hoglan’s failure to prosecute the
aforementioned appeals evinces neglect. As we have frequently stated,
neglect involves “a consistent failure to perform those obligations that a
lawyer has assumed, or a conscious disregard for the responsibilities a
lawyer owes to a client.” See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct
v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa 2004).
We disagree, however, that the board has satisfactorily established
that Hoglan failed to provide competent representation in the four cases.
Under Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.1, a lawyer is required to
provide competent representation to a client. The rule further defines
“competent representation” as a requirement the attorney possesses “the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.1. A review of the
comment to this rule reveals the focus of the rule is twofold: first, it
addresses whether the lawyer has the requisite knowledge and skill to 9
handle the matter in question (legal knowledge and skill); and second, it
concerns whether the lawyer has competently handled a matter through his
inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem
(thoroughness and preparation). See id. cmts. [1], [5].
Although the board has established that Hoglan’s handling of all four
matters was dilatory, no evidence was presented that Hoglan did not possess
the necessary legal knowledge and skill to complete the tasks or that he had
not made a competent analysis of the factual and legal elements of the
problems. Compare Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wagner, 768
N.W.2d 279, 286 (Iowa 2009) (holding board failed to establish attorney did
not provide competent representation when there was no evidence the
attorney did not possess the necessary legal knowledge and skill to complete
the task, only evidence that the representation had been slow), with Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis, 749 N.W.2d 694, 700–01 (Iowa
2008) (finding attorney’s improper preparation of probate matters and
acknowledgment that she knew little about probating an estate and less
about taxes, combined with procrastination and failure to communicate with
her client, evinced incompetence under the Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers and the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct).
Therefore, we cannot conclude Hoglan violated rule 32:1.1.
We also agree with the commission that the board failed to establish
Hoglan violated rules 32:1.4(a)(3) and 32:8.4(c) in his handling of the Kurth
matter and rule 32:1.4(a)(4) in his handling of the Stanley matter. As
previously noted, rule 32:1.4(a)(3) requires an attorney to keep his clients
reasonably informed about the status of their matter, rule 32:1.4(a)(4)
requires a lawyer to promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information, and rule 32:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 10
misrepresentation. See Iowa Rs. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(3), .4(a)(4);
32:8.4(c).
The board contends Hoglan failed to keep the Kurths informed
regarding the status of their appeal in violation of rule 32:1.4(a)(3) and that
this failure was deceitful in violation of rule 32:8.4(c). The Kurths’
depositions do not, however, support this claim. James Kurth testified that
he could not remember when Hoglan notified them their appeal had been
dismissed. However, Peggy Kurth testified Hoglan informed them before they
received notification from the board. Moreover, neither Kurth complained
Hoglan had not kept them reasonably informed about the status of their
appeal. The board failed, therefore, to establish violations of these rules.
The board also contends Hoglan failed to promptly reply to Stanley’s
requests for information in violation of rule 32:1.4(a)(4). While it is clear
Hoglan did not respond as frequently to his client’s inquiries as his client
would have liked, there was also credible evidence Hoglan did reply to
reasonable requests for information. Therefore, we cannot conclude there is
clear and convincing evidence Hoglan violated rule 32:1.4(a)(4).
V. Sanction.
“There is no standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct,
and though prior cases can be instructive, we ultimately determine an
appropriate sanction based on the particular circumstances of each case.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___
(Iowa 2010). In determining an appropriate sanction, we look to several
factors, including “the nature of the violations, the need for deterrence,
protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the Bar as a whole,
and the violator’s fitness to continue to practice law.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd.
of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ramey, 639 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 2002). We 11
also consider mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 774 N.W.2d 301, 308 (Iowa 2009).
The essence of the respondent’s ethical violations is neglect of client
matters. When attorney misconduct involves neglect, sanctions have
typically ranged from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension. Casey,
761 N.W.2d at 61. “ ‘Often, the distinction between the punishment imposed
depends upon the existence of multiple instances of neglect, past
disciplinary problems, and other companion violations.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 759 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 2009) (quoting
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d 101, 106
(Iowa 2006)). Another important consideration in determining the
appropriate sanction is the resulting harm to the clients. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa
2001) (noting “harm to a client is an aggravating circumstance that warrants
a more serious sanction”).
In this case, the commission recommended Hoglan receive a public
reprimand. In support of this sanction, the commission noted Hoglan’s prior
excellent professional record and his recognition of his current wrongdoing.
It also concluded the acts that resulted in Hoglan’s prior public reprimand
occurred during the same period of time as the current claims. The
commission found that, had it been aware of the current matters that
comprise the present complaint at the time of the commission’s
consideration of the prior matter, the result would most likely have been no
different. Under these circumstances, the commission concluded a public
reprimand was an appropriate sanction.
We do not agree that a public reprimand is the proper sanction in this
case. Hoglan engaged in multiple instances of neglect. Even though three of
Hoglan’s clients do not hold his actions against him, all four clients were 12
harmed by the dismissal of their appeals. Moreover, with regard to Stanley’s
claim, Hoglan admitted that, even if Stanley can reapply for benefits, if
successful, the date of onset of disability would be from the date of
reapplication and not the initial application date. In other words, a failure to
timely appeal could result in a loss of back benefits, thus resulting in
additional harm to Stanley.
We also do not concur that a public reprimand is warranted because
the current acts of neglect occurred within the same two-and-one-half-year
time period that included the two acts of neglect that were the subject of the
prior public reprimand. As noted previously, the prior public reprimand
involved the respondent’s disregard of default notices resulting in the
dismissal of two appeals. In pertinent part, the reprimand advised the
respondent:
Your explanation that you suffered medical problems during the relevant time period was not an excuse, since Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.[16](a)(2) requires withdrawal from representation when “the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client.”
The prior public reprimand was dated January 2, 2007, and filed March 21,
2007. Therefore, Hoglan was on notice of his obligation to withdraw from
representation from at least March 21, 2007, when he knew he could not
adequately represent his client due to a physical impairment. Yet, he
thereafter allowed the Viles, Kurth, and Keeler appeals to be dismissed
without withdrawing from his representation of these clients. The goal of
deterring other lawyers from similar conduct would not be advanced if we
ignore this fact.
We also consider Hoglan’s health problems in formulating an
appropriate sanction. While illnesses do not excuse misconduct, they can be
mitigating factors and can influence our approach to discipline. See Curtis, 13
749 N.W.2d at 703 (holding depression a mitigating circumstance in a
disciplinary case that resulted in a one-year suspension for neglect, client
trust account violations, and dishonesty to client); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. McCann, 712 N.W.2d 89, 96 (Iowa 2006) (holding severe
depression and anxiety constituted mitigating circumstances considered in
disciplinary action resulting in two-year suspension for multiple acts of
misconduct, including neglect, misrepresentation, and client trust account
violations). Therefore, we take Hoglan’s severe back problems into account
when imposing discipline.
Based upon all of these circumstances, we conclude suspension of the
respondent’s license, rather than a second public reprimand, is warranted
and suspend Hoglan’s license for thirty days. We will reinstate the
respondent's license to practice law upon the expiration of the thirty-day
suspension, subject to the limitations of Iowa Court Rule 35.12(2). See Iowa
Ct. R. 35.12 (allowing for automatic reinstatement for suspension period not
exceeding sixty days). However, given Hoglan’s severe back problems, we
conclude it necessary that Hoglan provide this court with evidence of his
physical competency to practice law. Therefore, prior to any automatic
reinstatement, Hoglan must provide an evaluation from a licensed health
care professional verifying his fitness to practice law. See McCann, 712
N.W.2d at 97 (requiring evaluation of respondent who suffered from
depression and anxiety).
Finally, we decline to impose a commission recommendation that we
restrict Hoglan’s practice by requiring him to have cocounsel of record in all
appellate matters for a period of three years. As we have previously noted in
prior cases, “neither the court nor the bar has effective machinery in place
for such supervision.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kirlin, 741
N.W.2d 813, 819 (Iowa 2007). It was not established that Hoglan’s dilatory 14
handling of these appellate matters was related to his competence in
appellate practice, but rather was, at the time, a result of his inability to
handle legal practice in general due to his incapacitating back problems.
Requiring Hoglan to provide medical verification of his fitness to practice law
more appropriately addresses this issue.
VI. Conclusion.
We suspend Hoglan’s license to practice law for thirty days. This
suspension shall apply to all facets of the practice of law as provided in Iowa
Court Rule 35.12(3) and requires notification of clients as outlined in Iowa
Court Rule 35.22. Prior to any automatic reinstatement, Hoglan must
establish his physical competency by providing this court with an evaluation
from a licensed health care professional verifying his fitness to practice law.
Costs are taxed to Hoglan pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.26. Automatic
reinstatement shall not be ordered until all costs are paid. Iowa Ct. R.
35.12(2).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.
All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who takes no part.
This opinion shall be published.