IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 14–0426
Filed September 5, 2014
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
RICHARD CLAY MENDEZ,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission recommends attorney be ordered to cease
and desist practicing law in Iowa for sixty days. ATTORNEY ORDERED
TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN IOWA FOR
SIXTY DAYS.
Charles L. Harrington and Nicholas Tré Critelli, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Jeffrey David Norris of Law Office of Richard Mendez, Des Moines,
and Valerie Lynn Hanna of Law Office of Valerie Lynn Hanna, Glendale,
California, for respondent. 2
WATERMAN, Justice.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a
complaint against Richard Clay Mendez, charging numerous violations of
Iowa’s disciplinary rules. Mendez is not licensed to practice law in Iowa
but acquired a Des Moines-based immigration practice and represented
Iowa residents in federal immigration proceedings. A division of the
Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa determined Mendez
violated certain rules governing trust accounts, fees, referrals, conflicts of
interest, and neglect. The commission, with one member not
participating in its deliberations, recommended we order Mendez to cease
and desist from the practice of law in Iowa for a period of not less than
sixty days, the period recommended by the Board. On our de novo
review, we find Mendez violated our rules and order him to cease and
desist from practicing law in Iowa for sixty days.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Mendez has been licensed to practice law in California since 1998,
but is not admitted to the Iowa bar. He practices chiefly in California,
most recently from an office in Burbank. His practice is primarily
immigration law, with some criminal defense work. Mendez began
practicing in Iowa in July 2011, when he took over two branches of an
immigration practice, ASESAL Immigration Services. One branch of
ASESAL was located in Des Moines and the other in Grand Island,
Nebraska. Mendez assumed representation of ASESAL’s clients and
retained the majority of ASESAL’s staff. He renamed both branches “Law
Office of Richard Mendez.”
Mendez stated that his Iowa practice is limited to providing legal
services to Iowa residents on federal immigration matters, which is
permitted by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. See Iowa R. Prof’l 3
Conduct 32:5.5(d)(2) (“A lawyer admitted in another United States
jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any
jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that . . . are
services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other
law of this jurisdiction.”). Federal law allows a member in good standing
of any state’s bar to practice before the federal immigration court. See 8
C.F.R. §§ 1001.1(f), 1292.1(a)(1) (2011).
Mendez’s handling of his Iowa immigration practice resulted in
ethics complaints by clients, successor counsel, and ultimately the
Board, arising out of the following matters.
A. Trust Account Practices. Shortly after purchasing the
ASESAL offices, Mendez opened a client trust account, as required by the
Iowa Court Rules and the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. See Iowa
Ct. R. 45.10(2) (“Funds a lawyer receives from clients or third persons for
matters arising out of the practice of law in Iowa shall be deposited in
one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts located in
Iowa.”); see also, e.g., Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(c). On August 31,
Mendez and his Iowa counsel met with the director of the Office of
Professional Regulation, the assistant director for boards and
commissions for the Office of Professional Regulation, and the client
security auditor. One of the purposes of the meeting was to discuss the
need for Mendez to comply with Iowa’s rules governing client trust
accounts. Mendez was provided with a copy of the trust account rules.
Those rules included requirements that an attorney provide notice and
an accounting to clients upon withdrawing funds. Mendez concedes he
failed to provide notices and accountings to forty-three clients upon
withdrawal of funds. 4
B. Nonrefundable Fees. Mendez’s written contracts with two
clients, Rigoberto Flores and Miguel Angel Arechiga Cuellar, provided
that Mendez could charge a $300 minimum fee merely for opening the
file, regardless of whether any legal services were provided. The
contracts stated: “ATTORNEY reserves the right to charge the minimum
fee of $300 by opening the file, if that customer decides to end the
contract before accumulating legal fees.”
C. Rigoberto Flores Representation. In September 2011,
Rigoberto Flores was charged with fraudulent practices in the third
degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 714.11, and identity theft, in
violation of Iowa Code section 715A.8. These offenses are aggravated
misdemeanors. On September 16, Flores engaged Mendez to represent
him and paid Mendez $1000 of their agreed $1500 flat fee for the
criminal representation.
Mendez engaged an Iowa-licensed criminal attorney, John D.
Hedgecoth, to enter an appearance on Flores’s behalf. Mendez stated,
“[I]t would have been easier to just refer him, but I facilitated the
agreement for Mr. Hedgecoth to represent Mr. Flores in the criminal
matter.” Mendez and Hedgecoth orally agreed that Hedgecoth would be
paid an hourly rate for his services from the $1000 Flores advanced to
Mendez. When asked if he could give legal advice on criminal matters,
Mendez responded, “Not on criminal matters as pertains to Iowa, but if it
was criminal matters relating to immigration consequences, then yes, I
believe so.” Mendez testified he never told Flores that he was an Iowa-
licensed attorney.
Mendez admits that he did not seek or receive Flores’s written
approval of the fee-splitting arrangement with Hedgecoth. He likewise
failed to give Flores written notice of the withdrawal of any fees paid to 5
his firm or to Hedgecoth’s firm. Hedgecoth’s billing records show that he
ultimately provided Flores with $558 of legal services, but Mendez’s
records reflect that he paid Hedgecoth $808 out of Flores’s account. On
top of the $558 paid to Hedgecoth, Mendez billed Flores $1370 for
“administrative support.” Flores paid Mendez a total of $1250, making
Mendez’s net on the case $442 after payments to Hedgecoth.
Flores ultimately entered guilty pleas on both charges. The Board
asserts Mendez never personally spoke with Flores or Hedgecoth about
the immigration implications of Flores’s criminal case, and that Mendez
did not advise Flores of the immigration consequences of entering a
guilty plea to the charged offenses. Mendez asserts the disposition of
Flores’s case was unavoidable and denies the allegations that he never
personally spoke with Flores and Hedgecoth about the immigration
consequences of Flores’s guilty pleas. A postconviction court later
granted Flores relief, finding that his guilty pleas were not intelligent,
knowing, and voluntary because Flores was not informed in Spanish of
each guilty plea’s potential impact on his immigration status.
When asked if he could explain his fee for administrative support,
Mendez stated, “Mr. Flores came to the . . . office on, almost on a daily
basis asking about his case . . . . I think we even sent interpreters to
interpret for him . . . . And there was a lot of assistance there.” These
services were not itemized or noted in Flores’s file. However, the
postconviction relief ruling found that a legal assistant from Mendez’s
office attended Flores’s initial meeting with Hedgecoth at the jail to act as
a translator.
D. Sergio Guaillas Representation. Sergio Guaillas is a non-
United States citizen who was initially represented by another attorney
on a visa petition. Guaillas’s petition was denied on September 8, 2011. 6
His letter of denial informed him that he had thirty-three days from the
date of the letter, or until October 8, to file his notice of appeal.
On September 21, after terminating his first attorney’s services,
Guaillas spoke with a member of Mendez’s staff and engaged Mendez to
handle his appeal. That same day, someone in Mendez’s office
researched Guaillas’s appeal.
Mendez failed to file the requisite notice of appeal by the October 8
deadline. Mendez testified he was unable to file the appeal because his
office could not get the proper documents from Guaillas’s previous
attorney. Mendez further testified he orally informed Guaillas of his
failure to file the notice of appeal and that this failure could constitute
grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel and support a basis to
reopen the matter. Nevertheless, Mendez could provide no
documentation substantiating this assertion.
On February 16, 2012, Guaillas retained the services of yet
another immigration attorney, James Benzoni. The same day, Benzoni
provided Mendez with a formal request to transfer Guaillas’s file. Mendez
testified that he immediately mailed the file, but has no documentation of
doing so. Benzoni did not receive the file. In late March, Benzoni again
contacted Mendez asking for Guaillas’s file. On April 24, Benzoni filed a
disciplinary complaint against Mendez. On June 14, Mendez provided
Benzoni with Guaillas’s immigration file.
Guaillas filed his own disciplinary complaint against Mendez. In
his response to this complaint, Mendez stated that he had met with
Guaillas on September 21, 2011, and that “[a]fter consultation,
Mr. Guaillas agreed to retain [him] as his attorney.” Mendez’s paralegal
also submitted a declaration stating Guaillas signed a retainer agreement 7
with Mendez on September 21. Mendez testified at the hearing before
the commission that he had met with Guaillas before November.
But, Mendez’s internal billing and time records contradict his
testimony. His records show the first time he personally met with
Guaillas was well after the October 8 appeal deadline. The September 21
notation in the file states that Guaillas “spoke with RF,” a staff member
in the office. The first file notation indicating Mendez met with Guaillas
is dated November 18, and Mendez’s invoice to Guaillas includes a
November 18 entry stating, “Attorney Richard Mendez met with
Mr. Guaillas.”
E. Miguel Angel Arechiga Cuellar Representation. On
August 30, 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement apprehended
Miguel Angel Arechiga Cuellar and detained him in the Polk County jail.
On September 1, Arechiga’s fiancée, Sandra Melendez, hired Mendez to
represent Arechiga in a bond reduction hearing. According to the terms
of the engagement agreement, Mendez charged a flat fee of $1500 for the
bond reduction hearing.
That day, Mendez paid the $1500 flat fee on Arechiga’s behalf.
Mendez did not deposit the advance payment into his client trust
account. In his written response to the Board’s request for his trust
account ledger for Arechiga and in his hearing testimony, Mendez
attempted to justify his failure to do so by explaining that he did not
think he needed to deposit the fee into his trust account “because part of
the services w[ere] performed before and on the next two days after [he]
was retained.” Mendez also failed to notify Arechiga for any withdrawal
of fees.
Arechiga was incarcerated at the time of Mendez’s retention and
wanted a bond reduction hearing as soon as possible so that he could be 8
released from custody. One of Mendez’s staff visited Arechiga at the Polk
County jail on September 1, and a paralegal and attorney followed up
with Arechiga to complete some paperwork. A paralegal twice contacted
the deportation office, apparently to no avail. Mendez’s billing records for
September 11 refer to a call regarding paperwork for Arechiga. But,
Mendez did not file any documents requesting the bond reduction
hearing. Mendez testified, “[I]f immigration doesn’t process the person,
then there’s nothing I can—I can do, it’s out of my control. I can only
respond once they are in the system.”
A month later, on September 30, Arechiga was released from
custody after posting the full amount of his original bail. On October 1,
Arechiga and Melendez went to Mendez seeking a refund. Not until
May 19, 2012—after Arechiga filed a disciplinary complaint—did Mendez
issue any refund. During the interim, Mendez did not retain the funds in
his client trust account. Mendez ultimately returned $1200 of the $1500
Melendez had paid.
F. Roberto Macedo-Davila Representation. In April of 2011,
Roberto Macedo-Davila engaged the services of ASESAL to represent him
in immigration matters. The contract provided that Macedo-Davila was
to pay a total of $4000, with $1000 paid in advance on April 21 and the
remaining money to be paid in increments of $150 monthly commencing
May 30. In July, Mendez “took over” ASESAL and incorporated it into his
own law firm. Macedo-Davila continued to make monthly cash payments
of $150 after this transition, and Mendez accepted these payments.
Mendez did not, however, deposit these payments into his client trust
account.
An itemization of services provided by Mendez to Macedo-Davila
indicates that, during the months of July through December, Mendez 9
“reviewed [the] case, updated files and made calls” for one and one-half
hours each month. Mendez charged $150 for each of these instances—
the exact amount paid by Macedo-Davila each month. Mendez admitted
that he did not know exactly what services had been provided for these
funds.
G. Orlando Ramirez Barragan Representation. In April 2011,
Orlando Ramirez Barragan retained ASESAL to represent him in
immigration matters. Barragan was to pay a total of $4000, with $1000
paid in advance on April 9 and the remaining money paid in monthly
increments of $200 commencing May 15. Barragan continued to make
monthly payments of $200 after July, when Mendez took over ASESAL.
Mendez failed to deposit these payments into his client trust account.
On August 31, Barragan was scheduled for a 9 a.m. immigration
hearing in Omaha, Nebraska. Mendez was in California that day.
Natalia Lazareva, an attorney in Mendez’s office, prepared for the hearing
and met Barragan in Omaha. Upon arriving at the location of the
hearing, Lazareva was informed that the scheduled judge was absent due
to illness and Barragan’s hearing was rescheduled to 1 p.m. that
afternoon. Lazareva informed Barragan of this change, and Barragan left
the building. Upon returning shortly before 1 p.m., Barragan discovered
that the hearing had not been rescheduled, but had been held that
morning without Barragan or Lazareva present, and the judge had
ordered Barragan removed in absentia. Barragan was in fact removed.
Mendez billed Barragan $625 for Lazareva’s legal services that day.
One remedy for an order of removal in absentia is the filing of a
motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Matter
of Lozada, 19 I.&N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988). One of the prerequisites
for obtaining relief on that basis is that the motion to reopen states 10
whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary
authorities with respect to an ethical or legal violation, and if not, why
not. Id. Mendez failed to advise Barragan to seek alternate counsel to
file such a disciplinary complaint.
Instead, Lazareva, with Mendez’s approval, continued to represent
Barragan and filed a motion to reopen. Mendez testified that filing a
complaint and pursuing relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel
was “just one of several options.” Lazareva’s motion to reopen asked for
relief because of “rescheduling confusion.” On October 27, the
immigration court denied Lazareva’s motion, finding “the respondent has
not advanced either credible or persuasive evidence to support his
assertion that his failure to appear at his removal hearing was due to
exceptional circumstances beyond his control.”
Without Barragan’s knowledge or consent, Mendez then hired a
California immigration attorney, Tina Malek, to prepare a second motion
to reopen. Malek did not file a complaint against Mendez before filing
this second motion to reopen. The court, in ruling on Malek’s motion,
noted that it was based upon the alleged ineffective assistance of former
counsel, 1 which requires:
(1) that the motion be supported by an affidavit of the allegedly aggrieved respondent setting forth in detail the agreement that was entered into with counsel with respect to the actions to be taken and what representations counsel did or did not make to the respondent in this regard, (2) that counsel whose integrity or competence is being impugned be informed of the allegations leveled against him and be given an opportunity to respond, and (3) that the motion reflect whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities with respect to any violation of counsel’s ethical or legal responsibilities, and if not, why not.
1A copy of Malek’s motion to reopen is not in the record. 11
Because Malek had not filed a complaint against Mendez, the
immigration court denied the second motion to reopen on January 9,
2012.
Mendez then had Malek file an appeal of the denial with the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA denied Barragan’s appeal on
September 19, again due to lack of a disciplinary complaint and other
necessary evidence. Mendez paid Malek $910 from Barragan’s funds for
filing the second motion to reopen and appealing the denial of that
motion. Mendez billed Barragan an additional $700 for services relating
to the motions to reopen.
On September 23, 2013, the Board filed a six-count complaint
against Mendez, alleging violations of our disciplinary rules in the
foregoing matters. A five-member division of the commission conducted
a two-day evidentiary hearing on January 6–7, 2014. Mendez testified,
and documentary evidence was submitted by the Board. Posthearing
briefs were then submitted. On March 14, the commission filed its
“Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Sanction Recommendation.”
The commission, by a four-to-zero vote, found multiple violations by
Mendez and recommended that he be barred from practicing law in Iowa
for sixty days. A footnote stated, “One panel member was unable to
participate in the deliberations concerning the recommendation in this
matter.” No further information is provided to explain why one panelist
did not participate in the recommendation.
II. Scope of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. See Iowa Ct.
R. 35.12(4). “We give deference to the commission’s credibility findings
because the commission hears live testimony and observes the demeanor
of witnesses.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ouderkirk, 845 12
N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 2014). The Board has the burden to prove attorney
misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 844 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Iowa
2014). “This standard is more demanding than proof by preponderance
of the evidence, but less demanding than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d at 33.
If we conclude there has been a rule violation,
our determination of the appropriate sanction “is guided by the nature of the alleged violations, the need for deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and [the attorney’s] fitness to continue in the practice of law.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Laing, 832 N.W.2d 366, 367–68
(Iowa 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Comm. on Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Kaufman, 515 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa 1994)). “We respectfully
consider the commission’s findings of fact and recommended sanction,
but we are not bound by them.” Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d at 33.
III. Ethical Violations. The commission found the Board proved over sixty violations, but
did not meet its burden to prove five other alleged violations. In his challenge to the commission’s recommendation, Mendez makes three
general arguments: (1) “there has been no legal criteria advanced to
define who or what constitutes an Iowa client when there is obvious
cross jurisdictional practice going on with Nebraska”; (2) “Nebraska holds
a different position than Iowa on how flat fees for Nebraska immigration
clients should be handled and it is permissible to deposit them into the
attorney’s general account upon receipt”; and (3) he has “been deprived
of a properly constituted panel wherein the original 5 selected to consider
all evidence and testimony, was without warning or consultation, 13
diminished to 4 in deliberations depriving [him] of yet another voice in
final deliberations.”
None of these arguments excuses Mendez’s violations of our state’s
disciplinary rules. We will address each argument in turn. First, the
clients at issue were living in Iowa and retained Mendez through his
Des Moines office. A commissioner stated at the hearing:
I think we have the right to assume, not seeing any notations to the contrary in your itemizations of services, that the work that you performed for the various named clients did occur here in Iowa. I don’t see why somebody who is domiciled in Des Moines would hire someone that would require them to travel to Nebraska to get an answer on a particular legal question.
Mendez agreed with this statement. We find that Mendez has provided
legal services in Iowa on the matters at issue. We hold that jurisdiction
therefore exists pursuant to Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.5(a).
That rule states:
Disciplinary Authority. . . . A lawyer not admitted in Iowa is . . . subject to the disciplinary authority of Iowa if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in Iowa. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both Iowa and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.
Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.5(a) (emphasis added). “Our jurisdiction to
discipline attorneys practicing in Iowa under rule 32:5.5(d)(2) rests on
our responsibility to protect the citizens of our state from unethical
conduct of attorneys who provide services in Iowa.” Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Iowa 2010)
(emphasis added); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Olson, 807 N.W.2d 268, 270, 276 n.7 (Iowa 2011) (finding jurisdiction
over Minnesota counsel based on the conduct of communicating with an
Iowa resident located in Iowa). 14
Second, the fact that Nebraska’s ethical rules differ from Iowa’s
does not excuse a violation of Iowa’s ethical rules for legal services
provided in Iowa. Mendez operated an office in Iowa, and it was
incumbent on him to learn and follow Iowa’s rules when assisting clients
here.
Mendez’s third argument about the loss of a panel member also
lacks merit. The Iowa Court Rules generally require the grievance
commission panel to consist of at least five members. See Iowa Ct. R.
35.1(1) (“The grievance commission shall also consist of no fewer than 5
nor more than 35 laypersons appointed by the court.”); id. r. 36.2 (“The
commissioners may act as a body or in such divisions as the chair may
direct. Each division shall consist of five members.”). Iowa Court Rule
36.17, however, states that “[a]n omission, irregularity, or other defect in
procedure shall not render void or ineffective any act of the commission
or a division or any member thereof unless substantial prejudice is
shown to have resulted.”
We find Mendez was not prejudiced by the fact one panel member
did not deliberate. Rule 35.10 provides that “[a]ny determination or
report of the commission need only be concurred in by a majority of the
commissioners sitting.” Id. r. 35.10; see also In re Paulson, 216 P.3d
859, 876 (Or. 2009) (noting a third disciplinary panel member’s failure to
sign a disciplinary opinion did not prejudice attorney because the
decision only required two concurring members), opinion adhered to as
modified on reconsideration, 225 P.3d 41, 42 (Or. 2010). Even if the fifth
panel member had participated in deliberations and dissented, the
commission’s four other voting members constituted the requisite
majority. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.10 (noting also that “[a]ny commissioner
has the right to file with the supreme court a dissent from the majority 15
determination or report”); cf. Paulson, 216 P.3d at 876 (concluding
missing panel member was “effectively . . . in the position of an
abstaining panel member” that “did not join in the opinion and . . . did
[not] dissent”).
Mendez’s argument that he was “depriv[ed] of yet another voice in
final deliberations” does not require a new hearing. See Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics & Conduct v. Michelson, 345 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Iowa 1984) (“He
was afforded a full-blown hearing and there is no indication that the
outcome of the hearing was affected.”); Paulson, 216 P.3d at 876 (“We
might reach a different conclusion if the irregularity were shown to have
prejudiced the accused. But here, there is no prejudice.”). Mendez has
not shown participation of the fifth panelist likely would have changed
the recommendation. In any event, our court has examined the record
de novo and we are not bound by the commission’s recommendations.
Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d at 33. Accordingly, Mendez is not entitled to
relief on this ground.
A. Trust Account Violations Involving Forty-Three Clients.
The Board charged Mendez with violating Iowa Court Rule 45.7(4) with
regard to forty-three clients. Rule 45.7(4) provides:
A lawyer accepting advance fee or expense payments must notify the client in writing of the time, amount, and purpose of any withdrawal of the fee or expense, together with a complete accounting. The attorney must transmit such notice no later than the date of the withdrawal.
Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(4). Mendez admitted he did not comply with rule
45.7(4), and the commission found he violated that rule as to those forty-
three clients. We agree with the commission and find Mendez violated
rule 45.7(4) with regard to those forty-three clients. 16
The Board also charged Mendez with several trust-account-related
violations involving the clients specifically discussed above. Iowa Rule of
Professional Conduct 32:1.15(c) provides: “A lawyer shall deposit into a
client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in
advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or
expenses incurred.” Iowa Court Rule 45.10(2) provides: “If the client
makes an advance payment of a flat fee prior to performance of the
services, the lawyer must deposit the fee into the trust account.” Those
allegations are summarized as follows:
(1) Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.10(2) by failing to deposit Flores’s $1000 payment into his trust account and rule 45.7(4) by failing to provide the requisite notices to Flores when he withdrew fees; (2) Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.10(2) by failing to deposit Arechiga’s $1500 payment into his trust account and rule 45.7(4) by failing to provide the requisite notices to Arechiga when he withdrew fees; (3) Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.10(2) by failing to deposit Macedo-Davila’s monthly payments into his trust account; (4) Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.10(2) by failing to deposit Barragan’s monthly payments into his trust account.
The commission found Mendez committed each of these rule violations.
On our de novo review, we agree that Mendez violated each of these rules
as charged by the Board.
B. Nonrefundable Fees in Flores and Arechiga
Representations. The Board alleged, and the commission found,
Mendez violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(c) and Iowa
Court Rule 45.7(5) by representing in his fee agreement with Flores and
Arechiga that he was entitled to a nonrefundable fee of $300 for “opening
the file,” even if he did not provide any legal services. Rule 45.7(5) states,
“Notwithstanding any contrary agreement between the lawyer and client, 17
advance fee and expense payments are refundable to the client if the fee
is not earned or the expense is not incurred.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(5).
Mendez admitted that his contracts with Flores and Arechiga contained
impermissible, nonrefundable fees.
We find Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.7(5). See Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d 470,
475 (Iowa 2003) (“[C]ontracts providing for nonrefundable special
retainers and nonrefundable ‘flat’ fees are void as well as unethical.”). As
we have long recognized, nonrefundable fees undermine the client’s right
to discharge an attorney. Id. at 476. “[C]lients would be reluctant to
exercise the right if an advance fee was nonrefundable” and
nonrefundable fees “also undermine the fiduciary nature of an attorney–
client relationship.” Id.
C. Rigoberto Flores Representation.
1. Unauthorized practice of law. While Mendez is allowed to
practice immigration law in Iowa, he is not authorized to defend criminal
charges in our state courts. The Board alleged that Mendez engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law by representing Flores in his state
criminal case. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:5.5(a) states, “A
lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction . . . .” The
commission highlighted that “the amount of fees in question is
de minimus” and concluded that, “given the way the criminal case played
out,” the Board did not meet its burden to prove Mendez violated rule
32:5.5(a).
Mendez contends his representation of Flores was proper because
he only “facilitated” an Iowa-licensed attorney’s representation and
because the fees he charged were for “administrative support.” The 18
record reflects that Mendez provided translation services for Flores on at
least one occasion, and Mendez is authorized to advise clients as to the
immigration consequences of criminal proceedings. We agree with the
commission that the Board failed to prove by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence that Mendez violated rule 32:5.5(a)
through his involvement with the Flores case.
2. Unreasonable fee. The Board next asserts Mendez collected an
unreasonable fee in violation of rule 32:1.5. Iowa Rule of Professional
Conduct 32:1.5(a) prohibits a lawyer from “mak[ing] an agreement for,
charg[ing], or collect[ing] an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable
amount for expenses.” The Board presents two rationales for finding
Mendez violated this rule. First, based on its belief that Mendez’s
representation of Flores was outside the scope of his permissible
practice, the Board charged Mendez with collecting an unreasonable fee.
Because we find the Board failed to prove Mendez engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, we find his fee was not unreasonable on
this basis.
However, we agree with the Board’s second argument. The Board
asserts that Mendez collected an unreasonable fee by paying Hedgecoth
$808 from Flores for his services while Hedgecoth’s billing records show
that he provided Flores with only $558 of legal services. The commission
found Mendez violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a) and
(e) by using Flores’s money to pay Hedgecoth more than was earned.
Rule 32:1.5(e)(3) provides “[a] division of a fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if . . . the total fee is reasonable.”
Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(e)(3). Because Mendez collected from
Flores and paid Hedgecoth more than he had earned, we agree Mendez
violated rule 32:1.5(a) and (e)(3). 19
3. Improper division of fees. The Board charged Mendez with the
improper division of fees based on his arrangement with Hedgecoth.
Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(e)(2) states that a lawyer may
divide fees with a lawyer in a different firm only upon receiving the
client’s written agreement to the fee division. Mendez did not receive
written approval from Flores for the fee-splitting agreement. The
commission found Mendez violated this rule, and we agree.
4. Failure to communicate. Finally, the Board alleged Mendez
violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.4 by failing to properly
advise Flores of the immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea.
Rule 32:1.4 requires a lawyer to “explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(b). The
commission found the Board failed to prove this allegation by a
convincing preponderance of the evidence. We agree with the
commission. We are not persuaded on this record that Mendez failed to
discuss with Flores the immigration consequences of his pleas. The
postconviction court ruling that granted Flores relief from his guilty plea
only mentioned Mendez in passing. The ruling focused on the guilty plea
proceedings handled by Hedgecoth and the fact that the plea colloquy
was not translated into Spanish to ensure Flores understood the
consequences. Mendez testified that he did indeed discuss the
immigration consequences with Flores, and the Board has failed to rebut
Mendez’s testimony on that point.
D. Sergio Guaillas Representation.
1. False statement of material fact. The Board charged Mendez
with making a false statement of material fact in connection with a
disciplinary matter, in violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 20
32:8.1(a). Rule 32:8.1 provides, “[A] lawyer . . . [,] in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly make a false statement of
material fact[.]” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.1(a). Mendez asserts that he
met with Guaillas on September 21, but the Board contends this is
untrue and Mendez did not meet with Guaillas until November 18. The
commission found a violation of this rule. As the commission
summarized,
Mendez’s written and oral recollections are the only evidence presented in support of his position on this point. His time and billing records tell a different story. In fact, Mendez’s own billing records show that Mendez did not meet with [Guaillas] until November 18, 2011 . . . .
The commission found Mendez’s version of events not credible. “We give
deference to the commission’s credibility determination because the
commission heard [Mendez]’s live testimony and observed his demeanor.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 659
(Iowa 2013). Nevertheless, we give less weight to the documentary
evidence in this context. Mendez had a high volume immigration
practice. It is not uncommon for attorneys to meet a new client in
person and hand him off to a paralegal to conduct the initial interview,
with the attorney not billing for an attorney–client conference on the day
of the client’s initial office visit. We find the Board failed to prove by a
convincing preponderance of the evidence that Mendez violated rule
32:8.1(a) by misrepresenting the date that he first met with Guaillas.
2. Neglect. The Board charged Mendez with a violation of Iowa
Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 for failing to file Guaillas’s notice of
appeal by the deadline, and the commission found Mendez violated that
rule. Rule 32:1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence 21
and promptness in representing a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3.
A comment to rule 32:1.3 emphasizes the importance of diligence:
Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client’s interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client’s legal position may be destroyed.
Id. r. 32:1.3 cmt. 3. The commission did not credit Mendez’s excuse that
he was unable to file the appeal because he could not get some necessary
documents from Guaillas’s former counsel. Giving deference to the
commission’s credibility determination, we likewise find his excuse
unconvincing. We find Mendez violated rule 32:1.3 by neglecting
Guaillas’s appeal.
3. Failure to communicate. The Board alleged that Mendez
neglected to tell Guaillas that he had failed to file the notice of appeal
and that this failure could serve as grounds for ineffective assistance of
counsel and support a basis to reopen the matter. The Board charged
Mendez with violating Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.4, which
requires attorneys to “keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter” and to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.” Id. r. 32:1.4(a)(3), (b). The commission found Mendez
violated rule 32:1.4. Again, giving deference to the commission’s
determination, we agree Mendez violated this rule.
4. Failure to turn over file. The Board charged Mendez with
violating Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(d) and 32:1.16(d)
for failing to promptly turn over Guaillas’s file to Benzoni, and the
commission found a violation of these rules. Rule 32:1.15(d) states “a
lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or 22
other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive.” Id. r.
32:1.15(d). Rule 32:1.16(d) states that, “[u]pon termination of
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably
practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as . . . surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled.” Id. r. 32:1.16(d).
Benzoni received Guaillas’s file only after he filed a disciplinary complaint
against Mendez—four months after the initial request. Mendez testified
that he immediately sent the file but could provide no documentation
supporting his testimony. The commission found Mendez’s testimony
not credible on this point. So do we. We find Mendez violated rules
32:1.15(d) and 32:1.16(d) by failing to promptly deliver Guaillas’s file.
E. Miguel Angel Arechiga Cuellar Representation.
1. Neglect. The Board alleges, and the commission found, Mendez
violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 by failing to file any
documents requesting a bond reduction hearing for Arechiga. As
discussed above, rule 32:1.3 requires reasonable diligence and
promptness. See id. r. 32:1.3.
A member of Mendez’s staff visited Arechiga at the jail on the day
the firm was retained, an attorney and paralegal followed up with
Arechiga to complete paperwork, a paralegal twice contacted “the
Deportation Office,” and someone in the firm took a call regarding
Arechiga’s paperwork. Mendez testified he could not request a bond
reduction hearing because Arechiga had not been processed by the
immigration court. The Board did not present any expert testimony or
other evidence to rebut Mendez’s assertion. We conclude the Board has
failed to prove by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that
Mendez’s representation of Arechiga violated rule 32:1.3. 23
2. Failure to refund fees and retain disputed fees in trust. The
Board charged Mendez with a violation of rule 32:1.15(d) for failing to
promptly return Arechiga’s funds along with an accounting of services
rendered and with a violation of rule 32:1.15(e) for failing to retain
disputed funds in trust. The commission found Mendez violated both of
these rules. We agree. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(d)
requires an attorney to
promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
Rule 32:1.15(e) states:
When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in dispute.
Id. r. 32:1.15(e). Mendez did not refund Arechiga’s payment until seven
months after Arechiga first requested the refund. During this time,
Mendez did not retain Arechiga’s payment in his client trust account.
F. Roberto Macedo-Davila Representation. The Board alleges Mendez violated rules 45.7 and 45.10(3) by taking an unearned fee from
Macedo-Davila. Rule 45.10(3) states, “In no event may the lawyer
withdraw unearned fees.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.10(3). The commission
concluded “[w]hile certain inferences adverse to Mendez could be drawn
from the evidence presented, the preponderance standard does not
permit such an inquiry.” Accordingly, the commission found the Board
did not prove Mendez violated rules 45.7 and 45.10(3). We agree. The
Board did not present any evidence to rebut Mendez’s billing records, 24
which indicate someone in Mendez’s office “reviewed [Macedo-Davila’s]
case, updated files and made calls” each month.
G. Orlando Ramirez Barragan Representation.
1. Unreasonable fee. The Board charged Mendez with collecting
an unreasonable fee from Barragan, in violation of Iowa Rule of
Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a). The Board takes issue with the fact that
Mendez billed Barragan $625 for the Omaha hearing, despite the fact
that Lazareva missed the hearing. The commission found the Board did
not carry its burden to prove Mendez violated rule 32:1.5(a). The
commission stated:
While it is true that Ms. [Lazareva] missed the hearing, she prepared for it and traveled to and from Omaha to attend it. We think Mendez’s firm is reasonably entitled to compensation for her efforts even though she missed the hearing.
The Board did not assert that Lazareva or Mendez was to blame for
missing the hearing. On this record, we agree with the commission and
find the Board failed to prove by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence that Mendez violated rule 32:1.5(a) by charging Barragan for the
time Lazareva spent in Omaha.
2. Failure to communicate and conflict of interest. The Board
alleges Mendez violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.4(b) and
32:1.7(a)(2) by failing to inform Barragan that he should retain alternate
counsel and file a disciplinary complaint against Mendez’s firm in order
to reopen his immigration matter. Again, rule 32:1.4 governs
communication and requires an attorney to “explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(b).
Rule 32:1.7(a)(2) instructs a lawyer to withdraw from representation if 25
“there is a significant risk that the representation of [the client] will be
materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer.” Id.
r. 32:1.7(a)(2). The commission found Mendez violated both of these
rules.
We too find Mendez violated rules 32:1.4(b) and 32:1.7(a)(2) by
failing to withdraw from representation and inform Barragan that he
should file a disciplinary complaint. When faced with nearly identical
facts in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Yang, we
found a violation of rule 32:1.4(b) because “Yang owed his client an
explanation of the alternative course of action because it was reasonably
necessary to permit [the client] to make an informed decision on the
matter.” 821 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Iowa 2012). We also found the failure to
withdraw under these circumstances violates rule 32:1.7(a)(2) because,
“[i]n continuing the representation . . . without disclosure of the apparent
conflict of interest, Yang ignored a significant risk that the representation
would be materially limited by Yang’s personal interest in avoiding a
potential ethical complaint.” Id.
Lazareva did not file a disciplinary complaint against herself or
arrange for anyone else to file such a complaint against her on
Barragan’s behalf before she filed the first motion to reopen Barragan’s
case. Accordingly, the court denied Lazareva’s motion to reopen. The
outside counsel retained by Mendez similarly failed to file a disciplinary
complaint, as made clear in the rulings denying both the second motion
to reopen and the appeal of that motion. Had Mendez informed Barragan
of the need to retain independent counsel, rather than pursuing these
ineffective appeals, Barragan may have successfully reopened his case
and avoided removal. “Although this may be speculative, the fact
remains that [the attorney’s conflict of interest] denied [the client] the 26
opportunity to make an informed choice.” See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Wagner, 599 N.W.2d 721, 730 (Iowa 1999).
3. Improper referral, improper division of fees, and unreasonable
fee. Also in connection with the futile motions to reopen, the Board
charged Mendez with (1) billing an unreasonable fee, in violation of rule
32:1.5(a); (2) improperly dividing fees with outside counsel, in violation of
rule 32:1.5(e); and (3) improperly referring Barragan to outside counsel,
in violation of rule 32:1.6. The commission found Mendez violated each
of these rules. Mendez did not receive Barragan’s written agreement to
the fee division between Mendez and outside counsel. See id. r.
32:1.5(e)(2). Nor did he not obtain Barragan’s consent to retain outside
counsel to pursue Barragan’s motion to reopen. See Iowa R. Prof’l
Conduct 32:1.6(a) (setting forth general rule that a lawyer “shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent”). Mendez conceded as much, testifying, “I
guess I was in such a rush to try to get this reopened, I may have cut
some corners there. . . . I should have had that all in writing.” In total,
Mendez billed Barragan $1610 for unproductive attempts to reopen his
case. We find Mendez violated rules 32:1.5(a), 32:1.5(e)(2), and 32:1.6(a).
IV. Sanction.
Although we consider prior cases when imposing a sanction,
“[t]here is no standard sanction for particular types of misconduct.”
Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 660. We consider the unique circumstances of
each case, weighing several factors, such as
“the nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue in the practice of law, the protection of society from those unfit to practice law, the need to uphold public confidence in the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” 27
Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827
N.W.2d 169, 182 (Iowa 2013)).
The commission recommended we order Mendez to cease and
desist from the practice of law in Iowa for a period no shorter than sixty
days. 2 We give respectful consideration to this recommendation. See
Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d at 33. The Board urged the same sixty-day
sanction in its posthearing brief. Mendez argues a public reprimand is
an appropriate sanction. He argues, “I have spent my entire career
serving the disenfranchised seeking asylum and immigration status in
this country and it is my desire to continue to follow this path.”
We conclude the numerous violations committed by Mendez
require more than a public reprimand. His violations span a wide variety
of rules. He disregarded our trust account rules, impermissibly
contracted for nonrefundable fees, charged an unreasonable fee,
improperly divided fees, neglected a client’s appeal, failed to promptly
turn over a client’s file, failed to return funds promptly, failed to keep
disputed funds in trust, failed to communicate with a client, and failed to
disclose a conflict of interest.
The commission accurately recited the mitigating circumstances in
this case: “Cooperating with the Board is generally considered a
mitigating factor, and Mendez did. Mendez also serves a vulnerable
2[W]hen a non-Iowa licensed attorney commits misconduct that typically warrants a sanction directly affecting licensure, such as suspension or revocation, such sanctions are not feasible because there is no Iowa law license to suspend or revoke. Nevertheless, like our sister courts, we conclude our authority to discipline non-Iowa licensed attorneys includes the ability to fashion practice limitations through our injunctive and equitable powers that are equivalent to license suspension, disbarment, or other sanctions related to an attorney’s license. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d at 269–70. 28
population, many of whom do not speak English and are unfamiliar with
the American legal system.” We agree these are mitigating factors here.
See Yang, 821 N.W.2d at 431 (noting as mitigating factors the attorney’s
“substantial service to the immigrant community and his complete
cooperation with the Board’s investigation”).
Several aggravating factors are also present. First, several officials
from the Office of Professional Regulation met with Mendez when he was
new to Iowa to explain our trust account requirements to him.
Nevertheless, he proceeded to flout those requirements. The commission
appropriately faulted Mendez for his “total lack of appreciation for the
Iowa trust account rules and how they apply to his practice.” Indeed,
when asked at the end of the hearing if he had read the Iowa Rules of
Professional Conduct, Mendez responded:
I haven’t actually sat down and read them. I’ve consulted with counsel. . . . It’s no excuse, but perhaps sometimes, you know, you get bogged down in day-to-day serv[ing] your clients, your cases, personal life, you know those things. So I haven’t sat down and really opened it up and read the different sections.
We find it remarkable that even by the late date of his disciplinary
hearing, Mendez still had not yet read the Iowa rules he was charged
with violating.
Second, the harm Mendez caused several clients is an aggravating
factor. See Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 660 (finding it significant an attorney’s
actions caused harm to clients, both in terms of cost and delay). The
commission correctly discounted Mendez’s argument that no clients were
harmed by his conduct:
First, [Guaillas] was harmed in some aspects because he was denied the opportunity for relief by Mendez’s failure to file his appeal. Second, Barragan suffered serious harm as a result of a member of Mendez’s firm missing his immigration 29 hearing. Finally, we are also mindful that while Mendez’s other clients may not be aware that they were harmed by his billing tactics, this does not mean that they received all of the services he billed them for.
We also note that Barragan suffered harm due to Mendez’s failure to
inform him that he needed to file a complaint against the firm in order to
proceed with his motion to reopen.
Finally, at the hearing, Mendez blamed other attorneys for the
client complaints against him. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics
& Conduct v. Herrera, 560 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Iowa 1997) (“[W]e have a
strong negative reaction to a lawyer’s attempt to blame professional
shortcomings on [another].”); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Postma,
430 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Iowa 1988) (noting that blaming others for failings
is a “timeworn excuse” that is viewed with “unbounded skepticism, and
never with admiration”). Mendez portrays himself as the victim of a
confusing set of ethical rules imposed as a result of his voluntary
purchase of a federal immigration practice located in Iowa and his
service to clients residing in Iowa. We are unimpressed by his failure to
take responsibility for his ethical breaches. As the commission
accurately observed, “Mendez does not fully appreciate the seriousness of
his transgressions or his obligations to follow the Iowa Rules of
Professional Conduct when representing Iowa residents in any legal
matter.”
We also find Mendez’s violation of our conflict-of-interest rules in
the Barragan matter significant in light of his other violations. In Yang,
we merely imposed a public reprimand as recommended by the
commission for the same conduct—failing to advise the client of the
option to retain new counsel to file a complaint alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel as a ground to reopen the immigration hearing. 30
821 N.W.2d at 430–31. But, Yang involved an isolated violation, not the
array of violations committed by Mendez involving numerous clients. See
id. at 429. Suspensions in other cases for conflict-of-interest violations
in combination with other ethical breaches typically fall in the two-to-
four-month range. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Qualley, 828 N.W.2d 282, 293–94 (Iowa 2013) (sixty-day suspension for
attorney who, among other things, violated conflict of interest rules);
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Zenor, 707 N.W.2d 176, 182,
187 (Iowa 2005) (imposing a four-month suspension when attorney
represented opposing entities, among other violations); Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 378, 382 (Iowa 2005)
(same); Wagner, 599 N.W.2d at 723–24 (imposing a three-month
suspension when attorney failed to inform the client of the attorney’s
financial interest in a transaction); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics
& Conduct v. Sikma, 533 N.W.2d 532, 537–38 (Iowa 1995) (imposing a
three-month suspension on attorney who engaged in undisclosed
business transactions with a client). But see Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 600–02, 607 (Iowa 2011)
(imposing a two-year suspension when attorney engaged in a conflict of
interest with his client, among other violations).
Mendez has also flouted our trust account rules, which in
combination with his other ethical breaches warrants a suspension. See
Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Kennedy, 684 N.W.2d
256, 261 (Iowa 2004) (sixty-day suspension for neglect, trust account
and accounting violations, and failure to cooperate, in light of mitigating
factors); Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d at 477–78 (four-month suspension for
neglect, an illegal fee accompanied by a trust account violation, failure to
provide an accounting, and failure to cooperate); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of 31
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Kallsen, 670 N.W.2d 161, 166–68 (Iowa 2003)
(three-month suspension for neglect, failure to make accounting, and
failure to cooperate); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Adams, 623 N.W.2d 815, 818–19 (Iowa 2001) (three-month suspension
for neglect, failure to deposit a fee into a trust account, failure to account
for client property, and misrepresentation to the client in an effort to
cover up the neglect).
Considering all these factors, and giving weight to the
commission’s recommendation, we determine that a sixty-day
suspension is appropriate.
V. Disposition.
We order Mendez to cease and desist from all legal practice in Iowa
indefinitely with no possibility that the order will be lifted for a period of
sixty days. Mendez shall provide all notifications specified in Iowa Court
Rule 35.23. In addition, costs are taxed to Mendez pursuant to Iowa
Court Rule 35.27(1).
For purposes of having the cease-and-desist order lifted, as well as
for all other purposes, Mendez shall be treated as though he has been
suspended. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.13. This sanction shall be conveyed to
the California state disciplinary authority, the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, and other disciplinary authorities as appropriate for
their consideration.
ATTORNEY ORDERED TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW IN IOWA FOR SIXTY DAYS.