Iowa Department of Revenue v. Setra Antonio Deshunt Sumerall

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: August 20, 2025
• Docket: 24-0403
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0403 Filed August 20, 2025

IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

SETRA ANTONIO DESHUNT SUMERALL, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Paul D. Miller,

Judge.

The defendant appeals the denial of his motion to quash garnishment after

he failed to pay his drug-tax assessment. AFFIRMED.

Setra Antonio Deshunt Sumerall, West Branch, self-represented appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Patrick C. Valencia, Deputy Solicitor

General, and William C. Admussen (until withdrawal), Assistant Solicitor General,

and John T.M. Whiteman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Badding, P.J., Sandy, J., and

Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

In May 2022, the Iowa Department of Revenue (the department) imposed

a drug-tax assessment of $18,668.16 against Setra Sumerall. Sumerall had sixty

days to file a protest in writing. It is possible that counsel for Sumerall mailed a

letter to the department within the window of time. But there is no evidence the

department received the letter or that any appeal was initiated. And Sumerall later

entered into a payment agreement with the department, where he agreed to pay

$500 per month toward the assessment. After he failed to make a payment, the

department sent Sumerall a notice of intent to levy on February 27, 2023, in which

the department notified him that he had “broken [his] agreement to pay on the

amount due” and that he needed to pay the full balance due or enter into another

payment agreement. In July, Sumerall entered into a second agreement to pay

the tax assessment. Between September and January 2024, the department sent

Sumerall four notices of intent to levy; Sumerall did not respond or make the

agreed-upon payments.

The department initiated this garnishment action in January 2024. It sought

to garnish funds seized from Sumerall in a criminal investigation, which were being

held by the Iowa City Police Department. Sumerall responded by filing a motion

to quash; he maintained he was not liable for any drug-tax assessment because

the associated criminal drug charges were dismissed by the State. The district

court filed an order noting that taxpayers who seek to challenge the validity of a

tax assessment must exhaust certain administrative remedies. See Iowa Dep’t of

Revenue v. Yuska, No. 11-0291, 2012 WL 3590455, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 22,

2012). Because it was not clear that Sumerall had taken the necessary 3

administrative steps, the district court would not take any further action on

Sumerall’s motion to quash.

A few weeks later, the department asked the court to condemn the funds.

Sumerall responded with another motion to quash and a motion to dismiss. He

asserted that he received a ruling in his favor in another district court case—a

return-of-seized-property action (SPCR140543)—which established that the drug-

tax assessment of $18,668.16 was unlawful. In that case, the district court ruled

that because the Iowa Supreme Court had denied Sumerall’s appeal in the

associated criminal case, the county attorney’s office no longer had any grounds

to hold the money as evidence. See Iowa Code § 809.5 (2024) (requiring property

to be returned to the owner when it is no longer required as evidence, among other

requirements). The district court recognized that the department “did not have a

position on the issue of the initial seizure”; the department “indicated that it had

filed a claim under chapter 453 and asks that any orders entered on this case be

subject to the [d]epartment’s garnishment.” The court did “not reach any

conclusions” regarding whether the department’s claim was “superior or inferior”

to Sumerall’s because the claim was “filed as a separate action and therefore was

not properly litigated in this action.” In other words, the SPCR140543 court

adjudicated the competing rights of Sumerall and the county attorney’s office—it

did not decide the department’s rights to the seized funds.

Back in the garnishment action, the department responded with affidavits

and business records, showing that it did not receive any communication from

Sumerall that he wanted to appeal the initial drug-tax assessment. The 4

department’s filings also showed that Sumerall later entered into two payment

agreements with the department regarding the $18,668.16 drug-tax assessment.

Without a hearing, the district court denied Sumerall’s motions to quash and

dismiss and granted the department’s motion to condemn the funds. The court

concluded, “There is no convincing proof on file that [Sumerall] filed a formal

protest or any type of appeal with [the department]. Rather, [Sumerall] entered

into a payment agreement . . . . The Court is not persuaded that [Sumerall] has

exhausted the administrative remedies available to him.” The court also concluded

that the ruling in SPCR140543, which decided Sumerall had the right to the seized

monies over the county attorney’s office, did not foreclose the department from

taking possession of the funds.

Sumerall appeals. As we understand it, his argument is two-fold. First, he

maintains the court’s ruling in the return-of-seized-property action was that the

drug-tax assessment does not apply to him and is unlawful. But Sumerall

misunderstands that ruling, which did not consider the drug-tax assessment at all.

Rather, the court ruled that the county attorney and police department no longer

had a reason to hold onto the seized property—Sumerall’s monies—because

Sumerall’s appeal of his guilty plea had been finally rejected by the supreme court,

meaning there was no need to hold on to the case evidence. The SPCR140543

court did not consider the validity of the drug-tax assessment or the department’s

right to the monies. Second, Sumerall contends that either the department

received the June 15, 2022 letter that gave notice to the department of his “formal

protest”—an attempt to initiate an administrative challenge—and failed to take

appropriate action or his attorney failed to ensure the letter was received, which 5

constitutes malpractice. Either way, he argues he should not be prevented from

challenging the validity of the tax assessment now. Sumerall’s decision to twice

enter payment agreements on the $18,668.16 drug-tax assessment undercuts his

argument that he attempted to pursue an administrative remedy but was

thwarted—it seems that Sumerall took responsibility for the debt. And, as we have

held before, “in order to challenge the assessment, [Sumerall] was required to

exhaust his administrative remedies.” Yuska, 2012 WL 3590455, at *2. “We do

not consider issues raised on appeal where adequate administrative remedies

have not been exhausted.” Id. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.