Investors Insurance of America v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Investors Insurance of America v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance

232 A.D.2d 285, 648 N.Y.S.2d 913, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10538

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 24, 1996

StatusPublished

This text of 232 A.D.2d 285 (Investors Insurance of America v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Investors Insurance of America v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance, 232 A.D.2d 285, 648 N.Y.S.2d 913, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10538 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

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Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lorraine Miller, J.), entered on or about February 6, 1996, which granted third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The first three causes of action of the third-party complaint, sounding in professional malpractice, breach of contract and [286]*286negligence, are barred by the applicable Statutes of Limitations (see, CPLR 213, 214). Indeed, the limitations period began to run in February 1986, when third-party defendant allegedly failed to notify defendant and third-party plaintiff that a claim had been filed against the insured. The third-party action was commenced more than eight years later. There is no basis for third-party plaintiff’s present contention that the first three causes of action are essentially claims sounding in contribution.

As to the fourth cause of action of the third-party complaint seeking indemnification, the third-party plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an independent right of recovery for third-party defendant’s breach of a duty, based upon either contract or implied obligation, owed to plaintiff or itself. Accordingly, the fourth cause of action fails to state a cognizable claim (see, Kemron Envtl. Servs. v Environmental Compliance, 184 AD2d 755). Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Rubin, Ross and Williams, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lorraine Miller, J.), entered on or about February 6, 1996, which granted third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The first three causes of action of the third-party complaint, sounding in professional malpractice, breach of contract and [286]*286negligence, are barred by the applicable Statutes of Limitations (see, CPLR 213, 214). Indeed, the limitations period began to run in February 1986, when third-party defendant allegedly failed to notify defendant and third-party plaintiff that a claim had been filed against the insured. The third-party action was commenced more than eight years later. There is no basis for third-party plaintiff’s present contention that the first three causes of action are essentially claims sounding in contribution.

As to the fourth cause of action of the third-party complaint seeking indemnification, the third-party plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an independent right of recovery for third-party defendant’s breach of a duty, based upon either contract or implied obligation, owed to plaintiff or itself. Accordingly, the fourth cause of action fails to state a cognizable claim (see, Kemron Envtl. Servs. v Environmental Compliance, 184 AD2d 755). Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Rubin, Ross and Williams, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

232 A.D.2d 285, 648 N.Y.S.2d 913, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/investors-insurance-of-america-v-mount-vernon-fire-insurance-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

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