INV Accelerator, LLC v. Vested Interest Co.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 24, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-02276
StatusUnknown

This text of INV Accelerator, LLC v. Vested Interest Co. (INV Accelerator, LLC v. Vested Interest Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
INV Accelerator, LLC v. Vested Interest Co., (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ! Be | □ SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK | |

INV Accelerator, LLC, be ~ a EB 24 Plaintiff, 19-CV-2276 (AJN) ~ OPINION MX Technologies, Inc., et al., AND ORDER Defendants.

ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge: Plaintiff INV Accelerator, LLC (“INV”), a startup accelerator, alleges that one of its alumni, Defendant Vested Interest Co. (doing business as “GoldBean”), breached a contract and implied covenant of good faith when it failed to compensate INV after an alleged transaction with Defendant MX Technologies (“MX”). It also alleges GoldBean, MX, and GoldBean founder, Defendant Jane Barratt, were unjustly enriched in the process and that MX and Barratt tortiously interfered with the contract at issue. Defendants GoldBean and Barratt, in return, bring a number of counterclaims against INV, including declaratory claims, tortious inference with contract, tortious interference with prospective business advantage, and unfair and deceptive business practices. Before the Court is Defendant MX’s motion to dismiss the claims against it and Plaintiff INV’s motion to dismiss the counterclaims. For the reasons articulated below, MX’s motion is granted, and INV’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. I. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the Complaint and Amended Counterclaims and assumed to be true for purposes of these motions to dismiss.

For six months starting in April 2016, GoldBean, a financial technology startup, was hosted by INV’s accelerator program. Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 15, | 6; Amended Counterclaims (“Amend. C.C.”), Dkt. No. 55, ff 23, 28. INV claims that its accelerator program helps startup businesses with the “objective of developing and enhancing their products and/or services.” Compl. § 2; Amend. C.C. 416. GoldBean and INV executed a “Participation Agreement” whereby GoldBean agreed to “[i]ssue a simple agreement for future equity (a ‘SAFE’)” in the aggregate amount of $500,000 to INV and agreed that this SAFE would “be on reasonable and customary terms and documentation provided by [INV].” Compl. 47; Amend. C.C Ff 24-25. At this point, the stories diverge. INV claims that both parties to the participation agreement understood that the ““reasonable and customary terms’ would be those set forth in the industry-standard model SAFE developed by Y Combinator,” a leading tech accelerator. Compl. { 8. It further alleges that on May 17, 2016, it delivered a draft SAFE with the following terms, “taken from the Model SAFE and supplemented by the Participation Agreement.” Jd. J 9. First, that “GoldBean will automatically issue to INV a certain number of equity securities upon any Equity Financing that occurs before the expiration or termination of the SAFE, with Equity Financing defined as ‘a bona fide transaction with the principal purpose of raising capital, pursuant to which [GoldBean] issues and sells Capital Stock at a fixed pre-money valuation with an aggregate sales price of not less than $20,000,000.” Jd. § 9(a). Second, that “[a]t any time before the expiration or termination of the SAFE, INV may convert all or a portion of the Principal Amount ($200,000) into equity securities at the Conversion Price (defined therein).” Jd. {9(b). Third, that “[u]pon notice of a Liquidity Event, INV may either (i) receive a cash payment equal to the Principal Amount ($200,000) or (it) receive a number of shares of GoldBean common stock equal to the

Principal Amount ($200,000) divided by the Liquidity Price (defined therein). A Liquidity Event is defined in the SAFE to mean an initial public offering or Change of Control, which includes by definition ‘any reorganization, merger or consolidation of [GoldBean]’ and ‘a sale, lease or other disposition of all or substantially all of the consolidated assets of [GoldBean].’” Id § 9(c). And fourth, that “[i]f there is a Dissolution Event before the expiration or termination of the SAFE, GoldBean will pay to INV the Principal Amount ($200,000) immediately prior to, or concurrent with, the consummation of the Dissolution Event. A Dissolution Event is defined in the SAFE to include (i) a voluntary termination of operations, (ii) a general assignment for the benefit of GoldBean’s creditors and (iii) any other liquidation, dissolution or winding up of GoldBean (excluding a Liquidity Event), whether voluntary or involuntary.” Jd. 9(d). INV claims that GoldBean never raised an objection and in fact assented to the terms of this SAFE. Id. § 10. The Complaint further alleges that on September 7, 2018, Barratt sent to INV a draft press release to be issued the next morning announcing that MX would acquire GoldBean and that Barratt would be joining MX’s executive team. Jd. 11. Two days later, INV alleges that it notified GoldBean of its election “to receive the greater in value of (A) a cash payment equal to $200,000, or (B) a number of shares of [GoldBean’s] common stock equal to $200,000 divided by the Liquidity Price (as defined in the SAFE).” Jd. § 12. INV allegedly sent a copy of this notice to MX. Jd. INV next alleges that GoldBean and MX “purported to ‘cancel’ the would-be acquisition.” Jd. 13. Instead, the Complaint states that MX publicly issued a press release announcing its hire of Barratt. The press release was allegedly “nearly identical” to the earlier draft, with references to “GoldBean” swapped out for “Jane [Barratt].” Id. 14, INV also alleges that Barratt transferred GoldBean’s assets to MX, and that GoldBean is now a “defunct

shell.” Id. | 13. The Complaint further claims that “[t]here was no business purpose for re- structuring the transaction this way,” and that “MX and Barratt acted solely to prevent Plaintiff from receiving the equity and/or cash payments it was entitled to under the Participation Agreement.” Id § 38. INV claims that it has not been paid what is owed to it under the SAFE. Id. 415. . GoldBean and Barratt tell a different story. While they agree that the Participation Agreement included the promise of a SAFE on reasonable and customary terms, GoldBean and Barratt claim that the Participation Agreement explicitly stated that INV would be entitled to an equity stake upon GoldBean’s first $20,000,000 equity raise. Amend. C.C {J 24-25. GoldBean and Barratt also allege that INV waited until late August of 2016 to proffer the SAFE at issue (which they refer to as the “Proffered Equity Agreement’), and that at the same time, INV proffered a second equity agreement that would grant INV’s partner, Fiserv, the same rights. Amend. C.C {J 29-30. GoldBean and Barratt dispute that the terms of the SAFE were reasonable and customary, and allege that they rejected and did not sign either agreement. Id. { 26-27, 31-32. They further allege that INV and its CEO, JJ Hornblass, were aware of the rejection. Id. 33. In May of 2018, GoldBean and Barratt allege that Barratt accepted an offer to join MX, and that GoldBean shut down in July 2018 because it was not a viable business. Id. [J 34-37. The Amended Counterclaims further state that “[i]n connection with its offer to hire Barratt, MX agreed to acquire the assets of GoldBean in exchange for the equivalent of rights to □ approximately $100,000 in MX stock, to be paid in the future, on specified conditions, to the investors in GoldBean” excluding Barratt and the other GoldBean founder. Jd. § 39. As part of the agreement between MX and GoldBean, Barratt would both assume $40,000 of corporate debt

personally guaranteed by her and write off several hundred thousand dollars in loans she had made to GoldBean. Jd. § 41. The Amended -Counterclaims also allege that “[s]eparately, MX and Barratt negotiated and signed an employment-at-will agreement (the ‘Barratt Employment Agreement’) under which Barratt would become an employee of MX” and her compensation would be calculated in a manner “entirely unrelated to GoldBean.” Jd. § 42.

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INV Accelerator, LLC v. Vested Interest Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/inv-accelerator-llc-v-vested-interest-co-nysd-2020.