Interstate Highway Construction, Inc. and Pacific Indemnity Company v. Lanco Turf & Seeding, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 17, 2006
Docket07-05-00200-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Interstate Highway Construction, Inc. and Pacific Indemnity Company v. Lanco Turf & Seeding, Inc. (Interstate Highway Construction, Inc. and Pacific Indemnity Company v. Lanco Turf & Seeding, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Interstate Highway Construction, Inc. and Pacific Indemnity Company v. Lanco Turf & Seeding, Inc., (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

NO. 07-05-0200-CV


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL B


APRIL 17, 2006

______________________________


INTERSTATE HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION, INC., AND
PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY, APPELLANTS


V.


LANCO TURF & SEEDING, INC., APPELLEE
_________________________________


FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;


NO. 90,213-A; HONORABLE HAL MINER, JUDGE
_______________________________


Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Interstate Highway Construction, Inc. (Interstate) and Pacific Indemnity Company (Pacific), appeal a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee, Lanco Turf & Seeding, Inc. (Lanco). We affirm.



Factual and Procedural Background

Interstate contracted with the City of Amarillo to upgrade a runway at the Amarillo International Airport. (1) Because portions of the work would be subcontracted, Interstate obtained a payment bond from Pacific to guarantee that subcontractors would be paid for the work they furnished.

Lanco entered into a subcontract with Interstate to seed, mulch, and water 80 acres at the airport. (2) The Contract provided specifications for this subcontract work, which were specifically incorporated into the Subcontract, requiring that a "good stand of grass of uniform color and density" be established on the 80 acres.

Lanco began performing the work required under the Subcontract in April of 2002. After Lanco had seeded the acreage, Amarillo received significant rains. Because of the rain, Interstate notified Lanco that the City was satisfied with the work and that watering would not be required. Lanco submitted an invoice to Interstate that included a charge of $110,400 for seeding, mulching, and watering the 80 acres, in accordance with the terms of the Subcontract. (3) Upon receipt of the invoice, Interstate requested credit from Lanco for the watering services that were not provided. Lanco refused to provide such credit. Interstate made a partial payment of $7,300, but did not pay the remaining balance of $116,900.

Lanco filed suit against Interstate and Pacific for breach of contract and quantum meruit. Interstate and Pacific filed answers in which they asserted the affirmative defense of unjust enrichment and counterclaimed for declaratory judgment, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract.

After discovery, Interstate and Pacific filed motions for partial summary judgment on their counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Lanco also filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted Lanco's motion, denied Interstate's and Pacific's motions, severed Lanco's claim for attorney's fees, and ordered that Lanco recover from Interstate and Pacific, jointly and severally, $116,900, plus 18 percent interest per annum from June 26, 2002 until paid. It is from the summary judgment in favor of Lanco that Interstate and Pacific now appeal.

By their sole issue, Interstate and Pacific contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Lanco. See Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970) (a general issue contending that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment allows argument as to all grounds upon which summary judgment should have been denied).

Standard of Review

A traditional summary judgment, such as the one granted to Lanco, is proper when the movant conclusively establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and, therefore, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). We review the granting of traditional summary judgment using the standards set out in Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985):

(1) The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.



(2) In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true.



(3) Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor.

When both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the appellate court reviews the summary judgment evidence of both parties, determines all questions presented, and renders the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. Bradley v. State ex rel. White, 990 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. 1999). If the trial court does not specify the basis on which it granted summary judgment, the judgment will be affirmed if any of the grounds in the motion are meritorious. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993).

Contract Ambiguity

The goal of a court in construing a contract is to determine and give effect to the objective intention of the parties as expressed in the contract. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. 2000). When a contract is worded such that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning, it is not ambiguous and will be enforced as written. See id. However, a contract is ambiguous if the terms of the contract are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Id. If a contract contains an ambiguity, the granting of a motion for summary judgment is improper because the proper construction of the contract presents a genuine issue of material fact. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1983).

The Subcontract defines the work to be performed by reference to the incorporated Schedule A, which provides that Lanco's "work" was to seed, mulch, and water the 80 acres.

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Related

Gulf Insurance Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc.
22 S.W.3d 417 (Texas Supreme Court, 2000)
Coker v. Coker
650 S.W.2d 391 (Texas Supreme Court, 1983)
Warrior Constructors, Inc. v. Small Business Investment Co. of Houston
536 S.W.2d 382 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1976)
Fortune Production Co. v. Conoco, Inc.
52 S.W.3d 671 (Texas Supreme Court, 2000)
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. S.S.
858 S.W.2d 374 (Texas Supreme Court, 1993)
Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napier
461 S.W.2d 119 (Texas Supreme Court, 1970)
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.
690 S.W.2d 546 (Texas Supreme Court, 1985)
Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Grant
73 S.W.3d 211 (Texas Supreme Court, 2002)
Bradley v. State Ex Rel. White
990 S.W.2d 245 (Texas Supreme Court, 1999)
Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp.
160 S.W.2d 509 (Texas Supreme Court, 1942)

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Interstate Highway Construction, Inc. and Pacific Indemnity Company v. Lanco Turf & Seeding, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/interstate-highway-construction-inc-and-pacific-in-texapp-2006.