Interstate Commerce Commission v. United Van Lines
This text of 110 F. Supp. 273 (Interstate Commerce Commission v. United Van Lines) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
v.
UNITED VAN LINES, Inc., et al.
United States District Court E. D. Missouri, E. D.
*274 George L. Robertson, U. S. Atty., and Herbert H. Freer, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo.; and Leo H. Pou, Atty. Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D. C., and D. R. Partney and H. J. Simmons, Attorneys, Interstate Commerce Commission, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
B. W. LaTourette and Gregory M. Rebman, St. Louis, Mo., for defendant, and for intervenor.
MOORE, Chief Judge.
This cause having come on for trial before the Court, upon the pleadings of the plaintiff and the defendant, upon a stipulation entered into by the parties, and upon the depositions of certain witnesses and the testimony of other witnesses before the Court, and the parties thereafter having submitted briefs, the Court, upon consideration of the said pleadings, evidence, and briefs, now makes and enters the following:
Findings of Fact
I
The defendant, United Van Lines, Inc., is a corporation having its office and principal place of business at St. Louis, Missouri, and is a common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in the transportation of property by motor vehicle in interstate commerce, for compensation. The defendant is the holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued to it by the Interstate Commerce Commission and dated July 16, 1945, whereby the defendant was and is authorized to engage in the transportation of
"Household goods, as defined in Practices of Motor Common Carriers of Household Goods, 17 M.C.C. 467, over irregular routes, between points and places in the United States".
II
The definition of "household goods" referred to in the defendant's said certificate embraces three classes or types of property, as follows:
(1) Personal effects and property used or to be used in a dwelling when a part of the equipment or supply of such dwelling;
(2) Furniture, fixtures, equipment and the property of stores, offices, museums, institutions, hospitals, or other establishments when a part of the stock, equipment, or supply of such stores, offices, museums, institutions, hospitals, or other establishments;
(3) Articles, including objects of art, displays, and exhibits, which because of their unusual nature or value require specialized handling and equipment usually employed in moving household goods.
III
Purporting and claiming to operate under and by virtue of the said certificate, the defendant has for several years been engaged in certain transportation and operations which the plaintiff contends are not within the scope of the operating authority granted by the said certificate. The following described shipments, which the defendant admits it transported, are the instances of which the plaintiff has complained and describe the transportation and operations complained of, as well as the circumstances under which said transportation and operations occurred insofar as said circumstances were developed by the evidence of record in the instant case:
Shipment No. 1: New furniture, transported from Penn Furniture Company, Altoona, Pennsylvania, to Mengel Company, Louisville, Kentucky. The transportation was not incidental to a change of location of either company. The consignor was a distributor of new furniture and the consignee was a manufacturer of furniture and other wood products.
Shipment No. 2: Shuffleboards, transported from Jemwood Shuffleboard Co., Los Angeles, California, to Patton Music Company, Las Vegas, Nevada, to which the articles had been sold. The transportation was not connected with or incidental to a change in location of the consignor's place of business, but was incidental to an ordinary transaction between a buyer and a seller.
Shipment No. 3: Used coin-operated roll-down machines (commonly called "pin-ball machines"), transported from Frontier Novelty Company, Niagara Falls, New *275 York to Cleveland Coin Machine Exchange, Cleveland, Ohio, incidental to a sale of the property by the consignor to the consignee.
Shipment No. 4: Cafeteria and kitchen equipment, transported from Monarch Store Fixture Co., Cleveland, Ohio to Mojud Hosiery Co., Long Island, New York, incidental to a sale of the equipment by the consignor to the consignee.
Shipments Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8: Microfilming equipment previously sold or leased by Eastman Kodak Company to its subsidiary, Recordak Corporation, and, on the occasions in question, transported by the defendant from an office of Recordak in another state to the Eastman factory at Rochester, New York, for reconditioning. The transportation was of part of the stock of the consignor in each instance, but had no connection with a movement of its place of business from one location to another. The equipment was fragile and of a delicate nature, and ranged in value from $600 to $4,000 per unit.
Shipment No. 9: Television recording cameras, monitors, audio equipment, and other equipment, transported from Columbia Broadcasting Company, New York City, to the same company at Los Angeles, California, for its use at one of its stations. The equipment was of a fragile and delicate nature and was valued at $120,000.
Shipment No. 10: Calculating machines and parts, transported from International Business Machines Corporation, Chicago, Illinois, to Lehigh Warehouse & Transport Co., Elizabeth, New Jersey, incidental to a sale of the articles by the consignor to the consignee.
Shipment No. 11: Shuffleboards, transported for the same consignor and under the same conditions and circumstances as shipment No. 2.
Shipment No. 12: New furniture, transported from Tropical Sun Company, Pasadena, California, to Myrick's Furniture Company, Orlando, Florida, to which it had been shipped on consignment and as "display merchandise". The transportation was not connected with or incidental to a change in the location of the place of business of the consignor.
Shipment No. 13: Cash registers, transported from Fort Pitt Typewriter Co., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to G. Sampedro, Miami, Florida, incidental to a sale of the registers by the consignor to the consignee.
Shipments Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20: Office equipment, including tabulating machines, tabulators, punchers, sorters, and wiring units, transported from offices of Remington Rand, Inc., to other offices of the same company, not in connection with a removal of its place of business or any portion thereof from one location to another, but incidental to a sale or lease of the equipment. The shipper employed a household goods carrier to perform the service because by doing so the machines could move uncrated and be transported directly from the point of origin to the places desired, and because they contained intricate and delicate wiring and were of high value (one shipment having a value of $49,600).
Shipment No. 21: Office furniture, including cabinets, desks and chairs, from Linde Air Ceramics Plant, Tonawanda, New York, to United States Atomic Energy Commission, St. Louis, Missouri. The transportation was incidental to a movement of an office of the Atomic Energy Commission from one location to another. After the trial the plaintiff conceded that the evidence was insufficient to show a violation by the defendant with respect to this shipment.
Shipment No. 22:
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110 F. Supp. 273, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/interstate-commerce-commission-v-united-van-lines-moed-1953.