Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago Food Mfrs. Pool Car Group

39 F. Supp. 283, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3192
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 10, 1941
DocketNo. 2132
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 39 F. Supp. 283 (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago Food Mfrs. Pool Car Group) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago Food Mfrs. Pool Car Group, 39 F. Supp. 283, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3192 (N.D. Ill. 1941).

Opinion

SULLIVAN, District Judge.

The question before me is whether, under the present facts, Baxter or any member of the Big Ten is a “broker” as that term is defined in 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (18) of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, dealing with motor transport, and which provides: “The term ‘broker’ means any person not included in the term ‘motor carrier’ and not a bona fide employee or agent of any such carrier, who or which, as principal or agent, sells or offers for sale any transportation subject to this part [chapter], or negotiates for, or holds himself or itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as one who sells, provides, furnishes, contracts, or arranges for such transportation.”, and therefore [289]*289obliged to secure a license under Sec. 311. Plaintiff contends that under this definition Baxter was a broker and further contends that Baxter’s acts may be imputed to the members of the Big Ten, thus constituting them brokers. That the operations of Baxter, the members of the Big Ten, and the non-members should be considered in their entirety, and such operations being unlawful, an injunction should issue against all persons contributing to the unlawful plan, even though certain of the acts of the various defendants would in themselves be lawful, except as they constituted a part of the unlawful plan.

Baxter was employed by the Big Ten on a full time salary of $150 per month and actual expenses, each of the ten members contributing an equal portion of such salary and expenses. On behalf of the members of the Big Ten he provided, procured, contracted for and arranged transportation by motor vehicle for their various food products. Plis duties included the consolidation of less-than-truckload shipments into truckload shipments for the purpose of obtaining the benefit of lower rates, which were in force and published according to the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It was customary for him to include in the shipments of the Big Ten the shipments also of the five-non-members at the rate of .03 to .10 per hundred weight, paid to him as compensation for his services in arranging such transportation. All of these shippers were manufacturers and sellers of food products. Individual bills of lading or delivery tickets for each shipment were furnished the motor carrier by each shipper. After the consolidation of a shipment was accomplished bills of lading covering the entire truckload were made out by the motor carrier, showing the Big Ten as consignor and consignee, and also showing the names of each individual shipper and each individual consignee or each less-than-truckload shipment. Such shipments were receipted for by such motor carrier on the individual bills of lading or delivery receipts. When Baxter arranged for the transportation of individual shipments of members of the Big Ten at truckload rates, he received no additional compensation other than the $150 salary per month.

The stipulation contains no reference to Baxter and the Big Ten holding themselves out to the public, by advertisement or otherwise, as “one who sells, provides, furnishes, contracts, or arranges for” motor transportation.

What Baxter did he did on behalf of his employers. He did not solicit transportation for or on behalf of any motor carrier. He was in fact the. traffic manager or agent for defendants, and under their directions he arranged for the transportation of their products. He also arranged for consolidation of their less-than-truckload shipments into truckload shipments, which any of the shippers themselves might have done on their own behalf in order to secure the benefits of a lower rate for transportation. I do not find anywhere in the Act any provisions which render such consolidations unlawful. If, as contended by plaintiff, there is a restriction against this practice, the law itself should contain the restriction, and this is a matter for the attention of the legislature, not for the. court.

Sec. 211(a) of the Act provides for the licensing of “motor transportation brokers” and I believe it contemplates the licensing and regulating of independent persons or corporations who engage in the business of selling transportation, and is not designed to include persons regularly employed, such as traffic managers or agents, shipping clerks, or other salaried officers of shippers, whose business it is to arrange for transportation on behalf of their employers, and whose activities may be regulated and controlled by the Interstate Commerce Commission by reason of its jurisdiction over the activities of the shippers themselves. Both sides agree that Baxter was an agent for The Big Ten. The complaint alleges, at Page 2 thereof, “that the Big Ten had in its employ defendant Dave Baxter at a salary of $150 per month and expenses, with full power and authority to carry out on behalf of itself and each of its members the operations hereinafter set forth.”

Defendants are not in the business of selling or providing transportation. They are admittedly all of them in the business of manufacturing and selling at wholesale non-competing items or classifications of food and food products, and that they utilize the services of motor carriers for the transportation of such food products and commodities to their various customers. Baxter, as agent and employee of the other defendants, does not “sell or offer for sale any transportation subject to this part.” On the contrary, on be[290]*290half of his employers he “buys” transportation for their use and benefit.

The case of Mesler Broker Application, decided November 16, 1939, and digested in- 1 Fed.Carrier Cases, 435 (par. 7415), illustrates that the Commission itself does not interpret the term “broker” as covering a salaried agent' such as Baxter. In that case the original report and order of the Examiner was adopted by fhe Commission, and is in part as follows:

“Applicant’s proprietor is a customhouse broker, licensed by the Federal government on February 3, 1930, for the port of New York. An office, but no warehouse, is maintained. No motor vehicles are owned or operated. The traffic, chiefly glass jars and incidental articles, originates at Muncie, Ind., and other points in Indiana and adjacent states, and is consolidated at Muncie and shipped by railroad to New York for local distribution, for transfer to piers for export, or for reshipment to New Jersey points. Practically all of the latter service is by motor carrier. This procedure results in carload rates on the numerous less-than-carload shipments thus consolidated for transportation from Muncie to New York City. Applicant has no corinection whatever with any motor carriers. Its compensation is derived wholly from the mid-western shippers, who ship carload quantities, with freight charges prepaid to it as local agent, and it then attends to the distribution of the individual less-than-carload shipments to retailers, wholesalers or exporters, as the case may be. The domestic shipment is done in applicant’s name, but that from the piers to foreign countries is done in the name of the mid-western shipper. Usually the expense of the local or nearby motor carriage is borne by the consignee; if by the shipper, then applicant pays it and bills the shipper therefor.

“ * * * The volume distributed by applicant ranges from 6 to 8 carloads per week.

“The facts of record fail to disclose any interest on applicant’s part in the method of distributing transportation from cars to New York to ultimate destination other than that of obtaining safe and expeditious service in behalf of the seller and the purchaser.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

National Bus Traffic Association v. United States
143 F. Supp. 689 (D. New Jersey, 1956)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
39 F. Supp. 283, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/interstate-commerce-commission-v-chicago-food-mfrs-pool-car-group-ilnd-1941.