Interstate Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, E. Weaks McKinney Intervenor

265 F.2d 598, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 224, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4211
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMarch 19, 1959
Docket14391_1
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 265 F.2d 598 (Interstate Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, E. Weaks McKinney Intervenor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Interstate Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, E. Weaks McKinney Intervenor, 265 F.2d 598, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 224, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4211 (D.C. Cir. 1959).

Opinion

DANAHER, Circuit Judge.

Intervenor on April 20, 1954, applied for a construction permit for a new radio broadcast station on a frequency of 1560 kc. at Paducah, Kentucky. There was then on file an application of Tennessee Valley Broadcasting Company (herein, Tennessee) seeking to change the facilities of its station at Chattanooga to permit of its use of a frequency of 1560 kc. Tennessee later amended its application to specify a use of that frequency at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia. The Commission designated the applications of intervenor and Tennessee for comparative hearing in a consolidated proceeding, and appellant was named as a party therein, for it was the licensee of Station WQXR, already operating on 1560 kc. at New York City.

Five issues were specified in the hearing order. Issue 4 dealt with the comparative qualifications of intervenor and Tennessee, while issue 5 directed for determination “in the light of § 307(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, which, if either, of the subject proposals would provide the more fair, efficient and equitable distribution of radio service.” (Emphasis added.) Before hearing Tennessee sought and was granted a dismissal of its pending application. Intervenor requested the deletion of the comparative issues 4 and 5, and further sought either a modification or deletion of issue 3. The Commission amended its hearing order accordingly, specifying as issues:

1. To determine the areas and populations which may be expected to gain or lose primary service from the operation of the stations (sic) as proposed, and the availability of other primary service to such areas and populations.
2. To determine whether the subject proposed operations (sic) would involve objectionable interference with the existing or the authorized (File No. BP-4506) operation of Station WQXR, New York City, N. Y., or with any other existing standard broadcast station, and, if so, the nature and extent of such interference.
3. To determine whether the operation proposed by [Intervenor] E. Weaks McKinney-Smith would be in compliance with the provisions of Section 3.28(c) of the Commission’s Rules, and, if not, whether circumstances exist which, as determined by the Commission in the public interest, warrant a waiver of said rule.

*600 After formal hearing on the inter-venor’s application with full participation by the appellant as a party thereto, the Examiner released his Initial Decision. Both appellant and intervenor filed exceptions. After oral argument, the Commission on February 14, 1957, released its decision granting the intervenor’s application to operate a class II facility. Appellant petitioned for rehearing raising substantially the same points it urges here. On February 28, 1958, the Commission released its Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the appellant’s petitions for rehearing and for a stay.

Against the background thus generally stated, appellant urges here that the Commission erred: in deleting issue 5, supra, and thereafter basing its grant of intervenor’s application upon § 307 (b); with respect to issue 3, supra, in waiving Rule 3.28(c) 1 of its Rules and Regulations; and in its allegedly departing from the definition of “primary service” (as contained in the Commission’s Rules) as the Commission considered the availability of other primary services to intervenor’s proposed primary service area.

I

After the dismissal of Tennessee’s application, there was no longer need for a comparative hearing as to the respective qualifications of intervenor and Tennessee or for a determination as to which “if either” of the two applicants-might the better establish its right within the meaning of § 307(b). 2 In this latter particular it remained simply for the Commission to determine whether or not the public interest required the granting of intervenor’s application so-as to provide “a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service” among the several states and communities. That § 307(b) criterion persisted as a prerequisite to be met in any event, just as § 303(g) imposed upon the Commission the duty generally to “encourage the larger and more effective use of radio-in the public interest.” The “public interest” touchstone was that prescribed by Congress, a requirement always permeating the Commission’s administration of the Act whether there be one applicant or many for a particular facility. Upon the Commission devolved the burden not only of supervising radio traffic but of determining the composition of that traffic. “The facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them. Methods must be devised for choosing from among the many who apply. And since Congress itself could not do this, it committed the task to the Commission.” National Broadcasting Co. v. U. S., 1943, 319 U.S. 190, 216, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1009, 87 L.Ed. 1344.

Accordingly, the Commission concluded on the basis of the extensive record *601 here compiled, that a more equitable distribution of radio facilities would result, agreeably to the mandate of § 307(b). Obviously the Commission could have reached no such conclusion if the inter-venor had failed to establish that the ever-present requirements of § 307(b) had been met.

Appellant would have us say that when the Commission deleted issue 5, supra, appellant was thereby and thereafter deprived of due process insofar as the Commission nevertheless relied upon § 307(b) considerations in making the award. The immediate rejoinder is that § 307(b) was never out of the case. Appellant has failed to recognize the necessity for a determination as to whether or not one of two locations might the better serve if any new service were to be authorized. Thus location was an issue in the consolidated hearing. Surely, under § 307(b), various factors such as the problems posed by Cuban stations might have militated against an award to Tennessee for new construction at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia. Such an issue was a phase — an important phase — of the comparative hearing involving Tennessee and the intervenor, but it might have developed that neither of the “subject proposals” could be granted. It is in this context that issue 5 was first inserted, and so must its deletion be understood. Thereafter it was still essential for the intervenor to show and for the Commission to determine that the § 307(b) criteria could be and had been satisfied as to the Paducah site.

Thus when the hearing went forward solely on intervenor’s application, appellant was still a party, but at least comparative considerations were no longer at issue. Thereupon the intervenor not only had to prevail on all three specified remaining issues which clearly comprehended § 307(b) criteria, but it had to do so with specific reference to the authorized operations of Station WQXR and, for that matter, “with any other existing standard broadcast station.” (Emphasis added.)

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Bluebook (online)
265 F.2d 598, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 224, 1959 U.S. App. LEXIS 4211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/interstate-broadcasting-company-inc-v-federal-communications-commission-cadc-1959.