International Union, United Mine Workers v. District 50, United Mine Workers

298 F. Supp. 1262, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2289, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9329
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMay 19, 1969
DocketCiv. Nos. 748-68, 1238-68
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 298 F. Supp. 1262 (International Union, United Mine Workers v. District 50, United Mine Workers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
International Union, United Mine Workers v. District 50, United Mine Workers, 298 F. Supp. 1262, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2289, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9329 (D.D.C. 1969).

Opinion

OPINION

HOLTZOFF, District Judge.

This is a joint trial of two actions that were consolidated for that purpose. In each action the plaintiff is International Union, United Mine Workers of America. It is a nationwide labor organization of coal miners, subdivided into numerous local unions, organized along geographical lines in regions in which coal mining is carried on. The defendant in each action is District 50, an organization of persons employed in gas, coke and chemical industries, which for many years was allied with the plaintiff, and which is likewise subdivided into local units.

The first action is a simple suit on a promissory note, which originally was made for $8,440,000 in round figures. The balance claimed to be due on that note is $8,000,664.27. The second action is brought to enjoin the defendant from using the words “United Mine Workers of America” as part of its title, in view of the fact that the plaintiff has terminated the affiliation agreement between the two organizations. The affiliation agreement contained a provision giving either party the privilege of terminating it on 30 days’ notice, which undeniably the plaintiff has given. Although on their face the two actions seem to be entirely separate and distinct, actually some of the issues in the two actions are intertwined and much of the evidence is applicable to both. Hence, it seemed in the interest of efficiency and of preventing a good deal of duplication that the two actions be consolidated for trial.

We shall take up first the action on the promissory note given by the defendant to the plaintiff on February 26, 1962, on which some payments have been made, leaving the balance due as has just been stated. Execution of the note and failure to pay the balance due are not denied. The defenses interposed are fraud, duress, lack of consideration and an understanding that the note was a paper transaction and that it was not intended that the note should be actually enforced and paid. The first three of these defenses completely collapsed at the trial. Not an iota or scintilla of evidence was introduced even remotely tending to show any fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, or any physical, moral or business duress or pressure.

What capped the climax as to these defenses was the testimony given on cross-examination by Angelo Cefalo, the Vice President of District 50, the defendant in these actions. He was one of the three executive officers who signed [1264]*1264the note on its behalf. He gave the following answers on cross-examination (page 423 of the transcript):

Q. At the time you executed the Articles of Affiliation, the financial agreement and the promissory note on February 26, 1962, did you do this voluntarily or were you coerced into affixing your signature?
A. I did it voluntarily.
Q. Were you fraudulently persuaded to sign any of these three agreements on that specific date?
A. No, sir.
Q. Were you subjected to duress, coercion or restraint at the time you affixed your signature on these three documents ?
A. No, sir.
Q. At the time you signed the documents on February 26, you had occasion to read or have these documents read to you, is that correct?
A. I so testified.

As to the claim of lack of consideration, the evidence showed that the note was executed as the result of a compromise and settlement of a long standing obligation or indebtedness, that was reached as a result of negotiations. In order to understand the last contention, namely, that it was not intended that there was a real indebtedness between the parties or that the note was to be actually paid, it is necessary to review some of the antecedent events that led to its execution.

United Mine Workers, the plaintiff in these two actions, was created in 1890 and eventually became the dominant labor organization in the coal mining in-' dustry. In 1936 a large unorganized amorphous group of gas, coke and chemical workers desired to create a union and to become allied with the United Mine Workers. Their leaders informally approached the United Mine Workers and were welcomed. John L. Lewis, who was then the President of the United Mine Workers, apparently felt that it would strengthen the position of his organization in the labor world to have as an ally a group of workers in occupations that were on the fringe of the coal mining industry. He annexed the group to his cohorts. It was organized and chartered under the arbitrary name of “District 50, United Mine Workers of America.” It had no experienced personnel at the beginning, it had but few facilities, and it possessed very little money. John L. Lewis appointed the officials of the new organization, lent personnel to it to conduct its operations and to expand its activities and caused the United Mine Workers to advance funds to it from time to time.

The sums advanced were very small at the beginning but increased in size as time went on, until on occasion they amounted to several hundred thousand dollars or more at a time. Each request for an advance was personally passed upon by John L. Lewis. These advances made it possible for the new organization to exist, to operate and to grow. The advances, however, were not intended as gifts but were deemed to be loans. In each instance Mr. Lewis in approving an advance expressly designated it as a loan and the defendant likewise denominated every advance as a loan. These advances were carried on the books of both organizations as loans and later were listed in the defendant’s reports as loans when it filed official reports with the Department of Labor under recent amendments to the Labor Management Act. The plaintiff union imposed an obligation on the defendant to pay 50 cents per month per member as the price of the alliance and the privilege of using the plaintiff’s name. The defendant’s financial resources were insufficient to keep up these payments and to meet operating expenses as well. On many occasions the defendant borrowed funds from the plaintiff not only for operating expenses, but also for the purpose of paying the assessment it owed to the plaintiff. Thus we see an astounding and fantastic method of financing by [1265]*1265which the debtor borrowed money from his creditor in order to pay his debt to the creditor.

The plaintiff was very careful not to make the defendant an integral part of its organization. Thus, District 50 had no vote in the United Mine Workers and sent no delegates to its conventions. It was a vassal rather than a member of the plaintiff and was governed by the plaintiff in an autocratic method. It had no elections of its own and its members had no participation in its government and affairs. This situation continued from 1936 to 1961.

By 1961 the aggregate amount of advances from the United Mine Workers to District 50 reached the vast sum of about $23,000,000. On the other hand, the assessments paid by the defendant to the plaintiff totaled about $14,000,000. It will be remembered as heretofore stated that in large part these assessments were paid by the defendant to the plaintiff out of money that the defendant had borrowed from the plaintiff. Over the years the vassal had grown in membership, strength and prestige and possibly had become somewhat restive under the domination of the United Mine Workers.

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298 F. Supp. 1262, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2289, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9329, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/international-union-united-mine-workers-v-district-50-united-mine-dcd-1969.