International Seaway Trading Corp. v. United States

69 Cust. Ct. 144, 1972 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2485
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in International Seaway Trading Corp. v. United States. Read the opinion of the Court — 69 Cust. Ct. 58
United States Customs Court·Decided October 5, 1972·No. C.D. 4385·Published

Opinion

EichaRdsoN, Judge:

This case involves the construction of certain exclusionary language appearing in the first inferior heading under the third superior heading of Schedule 7, Part 1, Subpart A, TSUS, covering rubber and plastics protective footwear, which reads:

Hunting boots, galoshes, rainwear, and other footwear designed to be worn over, or in lieu of, other footwear as a protection against water, oil, grease, or chemicals or cold or inclement weather, all the foregoing having soles and uppers of which over 90 percent of the exterior surface area is rubber or plastics (except footwear with uppers of nowmolded construction formed by sewing the parts thereof together and having exposed on the outer surface a substantial portion of functional stitching').... [Emphasis added.]

The merchandise at bar consists of insulated rubber woodmen’s boots which were exported from South Korea between May and August of 1968, and classified in liquidation under TSUS item 700.53 as “Other” at 37.5 percent ad valorem. And it is alleged in the complaint at bar that the boots should be classified at 11 percent ad valorem under TSUS item 700.55 which reads as follows:

Other footwear (except footwear having uppers of which over 50 percent of the exterior surface area is leather) :
Having uppers of which over 90 percent of the exterior surface area is rubber or plastics (except footwear having foxing or a foxing-like band applied or molded at the sole and overlapping the upper) . . . .
[Emphasis added.]

The imported boots, composed of rubber, are formed by placing a number of differently shaped pieces of rubber material upon a textile boa (lining) which has been stretched tight upon a metal last. While most of the rubber pieces adhere to the boa either by means of a self-adhering quality (tackiness) or by means of an adhesive applied to them before being mounted on the last, some of the pieces comprising the upper portion of the boot are stitched together before [146]*146placement upon the boa. [It is this phase of the process, namely, the stitching an the upper that remains visible in the finished boot, which centers the present controversy.] When all of the pieces of rubber are fully assembled on the last the last is inserted into an autoclave where the boot is vulcanized. And after vulcanization, the boot is trimmed, inspected, and packed for shipment.

Irwin I. Berman, plaintiff’s vice-president in charge of foreign operations who has spent some time in Korea observing the production of the imported boots, was called as a witnes on plaintiff’s behalf. Mr. Berman testified, among other things, that he has done some experimenting with the boot himself, and has found that the stitching serves the function of preventing the back stay from being pulled away from the boot under pressure, as when the upper is turned down. But William Gottlieb, vice-president in charge of manufacturing of The Servus Rubber Company, called as a witness on defendant’s behalf, testified on the basis of his experience with the domestic manufacture of an insulated rubber boot said to be comparable to the imported boot that “vulcanization holds the upper together”, that stitching did not add strength to the imported boot, and that this boot was formed by vulcanization. To the same effect was the testimony of Frederick R. Funk, vice-president and treasurer of La Crosse Rubber Mills Company, a domestic manufacturer of rubber, canvas, and plastic footwear, who was also called as a witness on behalf of the defendant.

Among the exhibits put in evidence is a sample of a woman’s black vinyl boot, identified as defendant’s exhibit A, which, according to the marking on the sole, was made in Japan. At the instance of the defendant leave was given by the court at the trial for the introduction of such evidence into the record as an aid to the court in determining the type of footwear that the exclusionary language in question was intended to cover (R. 51-55). And in this connection the witness Ber-man, called as a witness on defendant’s behalf, testified that plaintiff imported a boot similar to exhibit A, and that he knew how such a boot as exhibit A was made — stating that “the vinyl is cut, parts are sewn together, and the sewn parts are then pulled over a last. The insole is laid on the last prior to the parts being pulled over the last, and a molded outsole is then adhered to it.” Mr. Berman said that he did not know whether the boot was put into an autoclave.

Plaintiff argues that the imported boots come within the exclusionary clause because they have uppers of nonmolded construction formed by sewing the parts thereof together, and have exposed on the outer surface a substantial portion of functional stitching. Defendant and amicus curiae argue to the contrary, contending that plaintiff’s proofs do not satisfy the requirements of the exclusionary language.

[147]*147An exception clause in a statute must be strictly construed in accordance with, tlie legislative purpose underlying the statute. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 73 F. 2d 831, 834 (C.C.A. 9, 1934). The exclusionary clause in issue here was not part oí the predecessor item 700.50 when it was first proposed by the Tariff Commission whose report also recommended that all item 700.50 merchandise be subject to the American selling price basis of valuation (see Tariff Classification Study, Schedule 7, pages 2 and 3). The proposed item 700.50 classification threatened to embrace certain types of plastic footwear, among others, within a provision designed to be “protective” to the domestic rubber footwear industry in line with Presidential Proclamation No. 2026, dated February 1, 1933 [47 Stat. 2552], which increased the duties on imported rubber-soled and rubber footwear pursuant to section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Consequently, this state of affairs evoked protests from Canadian and Japanese plastic (vinyl) protective footwear manufacturing interests who felt that their products were being improperly threatened by the proposed item 700.50 classification. The Canadian product was described as seamless, and “molded in one seamless ply, or one seamless outer ply and a lining ply”, and the Japanese product was described as a cold weather boot composed of rubber sole with vinyl upper, and said to be more like leather than rubber. Both of these foreign interests sought to have their respective vinyl protective footwear products excluded from the potential application of item 700.50 classification, contending that these products posed no threat to domestic rubber footwear because they were not competitive with domestic rubber footwear. (Tariff Classification Study, First Supplemental Report, pages 265-272.)

At the hearings conducted by the Tariff Commission on the First Supplemental Report to the Tariff Classification Study it was pointed out to the Commission that the vinyl footwear products are “sewn, cemented and stitched, or molded, but are not vulcanized.” Also, at the hearings the Commission extended an invitation to the representative of the Japanese interests to suggest to the Commission language which would insure the exclusion of the footwear represented by samples placed before the Commission from the American selling price method of valuation upon their importation into the United States, to which invitation the representative replied in his supplemental brief (Tariff Classification Study, First Supplemental Report, pages 270, 397) :

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International Seaway Trading Corp. v. United States, 69 Cust. Ct. 144, 1972 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2485 (cusc 1972).

69 Cust. Ct. 144 (International Seaway Trading Corp. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States
73 F.2d 831 (Ninth Circuit, 1934)