International Paper Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services

621 A.2d 330, 42 Conn. Super. Ct. 356, 42 Conn. Supp. 356, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3705
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedOctober 15, 1992
DocketFile 312263S
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 621 A.2d 330 (International Paper Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
International Paper Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 621 A.2d 330, 42 Conn. Super. Ct. 356, 42 Conn. Supp. 356, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3705 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

Hon. Robert Satter,

State Trial Referee. In this appeal, brought pursuant to General Statutes § 12-237, the plaintiff, International Paper Company (International) contests an assessment levied against it by the defendant commissioner of revenue services (commissioner) in the amount of $355,297, 1 plus interest, for unpaid corporation business taxes for 1981 and 1982.

The basis of the assessment is International’s failure to include as taxable income for the two years the capital gains and interest realized from sales of the stock of a wholly owned subsidiary, Canadian International Paper (Canadian), and of the stock of a company in which it held a 14.4 percent interest, called C. R. Bard, Inc. (Bard).

As a New York corporation doing business in Connecticut, International is required to apportion its net income to determine the amount subject to the Connecticut corporation business tax in accordance with the formula in General Statutes § 12-218. International *358 contends that apportionment of the income derived from the sales of the aforementioned stocks violates the due process and commerce clauses of the constitution of the United States.

When contesting the commissioner’s assessment, International asserted these constitutional claims. In denying the claims, the deputy commissioner said: “The challenge raised by you as to the constitutionality of this particular section of the General Statutes [§ 12-218] is not a question of fact to be heard by the Department of Revenue Services. The Department of Revenue Services is not the proper forum to determine the constitutionality of the General Statutes of the State of Connecticut.”

The parties have agreed to a lengthy stipulation of facts. Extensive exhibits have been appended. The court did not hear any evidence at the hearing on this appeal.

While states have broad powers to tax, those powers are limited, at least as to multistate corporations, by the due process and commerce clauses of the constitution of the United States. The underlying reason for the commerce clause limitation is that to subject such corporations to unrestrained multiple state taxation would have drastic consequences for the national economy. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 777-78,112 S. Ct. 2251,119 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1992). The underlying reason for the due process clause limitation is that fairness dictates that there be “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45, 74 S. Ct. 535, 98 L. Ed. 744 (1954). The basic principle that emerges is that the state’s power to tax is justified by the “protection, opportunities and benefits” the state confers on the taxpayer’s *359 activities within the state. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, supra, 778; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444, 61 S. Ct. 246, 85 L. Ed. 267 (1940).

The due process clause imposes two requirements on the state’s right to tax income generated in interstate commerce: “ '[A] minimal connection’ between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise.” Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37,100 S. Ct. 1223, 63 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1980). The requisite connection or nexus is supplied by the corporation availing itself of the substantial privilege of doing business within the state, or maintaining an office there. Id., 437; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., supra. The rational relationship between income attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the enterprise is achieved by a formula that apportions a corporation’s total income on the basis of its property, payroll and sales receipts within a state to its total of those factors everywhere. The constitutionality of this method of apportionment has long been upheld. Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 165,103 S. Ct. 2933, 77 L. Ed. 2d 545, reh. denied, 464 U.S. 909, 104 S. Ct. 265, 78 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1983); Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879 (1931); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 283, 65 L. Ed. 165 (1920). That method of apportionment is also embodied in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, adopted by the great majority of states.

The “linchpin” for including the dividends or capital gains realized from the sale of the stock of a subsidiary corporation in the apportionable income of the parent is the unitary business principle. “So long as *360 dividends from subsidiaries and affiliates reflect profits derived from a functionally integrated enterprise, those dividends are income to the parent earned in a unitary business.” Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, 440. To establish that the dividends or capital gains are not subject to the apportioned tax, the taxpayer must show the subsidiary was engaged in a “discrete business.” Exxon Corporation v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 224, 100 S. Ct. 2109, 65 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1980).

Among the criteria of a unitary business enterprise are functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale. Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, supra, 179; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Department, 458 U.S. 354, 371, 102 S. Ct. 3128, 73 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1981); Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, 438. The application of the unitary business principle to a particular case is “fact sensitive”; Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, supra, 785; and regard is paid to the “underlying economic realities.” Exxon Corporation v.

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621 A.2d 330, 42 Conn. Super. Ct. 356, 42 Conn. Supp. 356, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3705, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/international-paper-co-v-commissioner-of-revenue-services-connsuperct-1992.