International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co.
Opinion
This appeal was taken by the defendant below from a permanent injunction entered by the Circuit Court of Dade County.1 The appellant is a labor organization composed of persons who perform the labor of loading and unloading ships in Miami, Florida; the appellees are both engaged in the business of owning and operating cruise ships which transport persons from Port Everglades and Miami to various points of interest in the Carribean and West Indies area. The ships are of foreign registry, owned by Liberian and Panamanian corporations. It must also be noted that none of the members in the appellant labor union are employed to perform any work in connection with the operation of the cruise ships involved herein; moreover, the union itself does not represent any of the employees who work on the ships.
In May of 1966, the appellant established a picket line on the public docks of Miami, adjacent to the berths where the ships operated by the appellees were being loaded and unloaded. Some of the appellant’s members carried picket signs and placards; others distributed handbills to passengers [53]*53who were embarking or disembarking from the ships.2
Thereafter, appellees instigated this action to enjoin the labor union from picketing and distributing the handbills in question. At the trial court hearing, testimony was taken which tended to show the following: (1) that the union was concerned with safety conditions aboard the two foreign vessels; and (2) that the union was attempting to inform the public that the American residents who were working on the cruise ships were being paid substandard wages. The trial court first determined that it had jurisdiction in the matter, and further, that such jurisdiction was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Board since no labor dispute existed. The court next decreed its order which temporarily restrained the appellants from their activities, setting forth the court’s findings and the provisions of the injunction, supra, note 1. An interlocutory appeal was taken by the appellants which tested the question of whether or not the circuit court did, in fact, have jurisdiction over the dispute. We answered, in International Longshoremen’s Association, Local 1416, AFL-CIO v. Ariadne Shipping Company, Ltd., Fla.App.1967, 195 So.2d 238, that it did have [54]*54jurisdiction and could properly entertain the action. Thereafter, based on our affirmation of the jurisdictional issue, the circuit court changed the nature of its order to that of a permanent injunction.
The permanent injunction was specifically designed to counter the harmful effects of the appellant’s false accusations regarding the unsafeness of the ships. Furthermore, the injunction also embodied the court’s finding that no real dispute over wages really existed, and therefore, publicizing accusations as to that grievance was also forbidden. Thus, wé affirm the order’s first three provisions.
However, in framing a proper remedy for these actions, the trial court caused one section of the order to b.e too broad, i. e., Provision Four. We therefore find merit in appellant’s contention that the precise wording of this particular provision does in fact put the union in jeopardy as to its rights and obligations for any future activity. A succinct statement which summarizes the Florida holding in cases of injunctions which are too broad appears in Florida Peach Orchards, Inc. v. State, Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 796:
“An injunctive order, should never be broader than is necessary to secure to the injured party, without injustice to the adversary, relief warranted by the circumstances of the particular case. Moore v. City Dry Cleaners and Laundry, Fla. 1949,41 So.2d 865; and Seaboard Rendering Co. v. Conlon, 1942, 152 Fla. 723, 12 So.2d 882. An injunctive order should be adequately particularized, especially where some activities may be permissible and proper. Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laundry, supra. Such an order should be confined within reasonable limitations and phrased in such language that it can with definiteness be complied with, and one against whom the order is directed should not be left in doubt as to what he is required to do. Pizio v. Babcock, Fla.1954, 76 So.2d 654.” Id. at 798.
A final point raised by the appellant questions the correctness of the court’s order which granted appellee’s motion to dissolve the surety bond and discharge the surety for the injunction order. We dealt more fully with that question in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1416, AFL-CIO v. Eastern Steamship Lines, Inc., Fla.App.1968, 206 So.2d 473, but reiterate here that such order was in error since it purported to preempt all of the appellant’s rights against the surety bond before an ultimate determination of the injunction’s correctness had been made.
As to the rest of the permanent restraining order, we find no error. Therefore, the order appealed from is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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215 So. 2d 51 (International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.