International Equipment Trading Ltd. v. Illumina, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedNovember 20, 2019
Docket1:17-cv-05010
StatusUnknown

This text of International Equipment Trading Ltd. v. Illumina, Inc. (International Equipment Trading Ltd. v. Illumina, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
International Equipment Trading Ltd. v. Illumina, Inc., (N.D. Ill. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

INTERNATIONAL EQUIPMENT ) TRADING, LTD., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 17 C 5010 v. ) Hon. Marvin E. Aspen ) ILLUMINA, INC., ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge: Plaintiff International Equipment Trading (“IET”) and Defendant Illumina, Inc. (“Illumina”) filed a joint request for a confidentiality order. (Dkt. No. 92.) Although titled “Joint Order,” the parties dispute several facets of the structure of the order. (Joint Mem. of Law in Support of Joint Mot. (“Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 93) at 1.) The Joint Memo contains the arguments from each side presented as if they were filing briefs on a contested question. (Id.) We therefore refer to Plaintiff’s section of the Joint Memorandum as “Pl. Mem.” and Defendant’s section as “Def. Mem.” for clarity. For the forgoing reasons, we will enter the below order, primarily in line with Defendant’s proposed order. The parties agree we should issue a protective order but disagree as to the content of that order. (Mem. at 1.) There are three main areas of dispute: (1) whether “Highly Confidential” material may be disclosed to a receiving party’s employees or officers if they are (or may be) used as experts or consultants by the receiving party; (2) whether a receiving party must identify its experts or consultants to the producing party and provide an opportunity for the producing party to object prior to disclosing “Highly Confidential” material to said experts or consultants; (3) which party must first file a motion in the event of a dispute as to designations of material as “Highly Confidential.” (Id.) ANALYSIS

I. Limiting Disclosure to a Party’s Employees or Officers May be Necessary

The parties dispute whether limiting disclosure of information to the parties’ employees or officers will ultimately prove necessary. The Plaintiff contends disclosure would allow IET to participate in prosecuting its own case. If counsel cannot share certain information with their clients, Plaintiffs worry their counsel will face difficulty in understanding the nature of the disclosed materials. Defendant argues disclosure may be necessary, but instead of allowing any information to be disclosed to any employee who may consult or serve as an expert, we should adopt safeguards. Defendant believes the party receiving discovery of “Highly Confidential” information should be allowed to object to disclosure of information to particular individuals designated as experts or consultants before any information is disclosed. Defendant’s approach resolves two issues simultaneously because it allows disclosure to employees who will actually serve as consultants or experts, while still guarding against unnecessary disclosure to all employees of the party receiving discovery. Discovery of confidential business information, trade secrets, or technical specifications deserves care, particularly where the parties operate as competitors. See Saso Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., No. 8 C 1110, 2009 WL 3242112, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2009); Amsted Industries, Inc. v. Nat’l Castings, Inc., No. 88 C 924, 1988 WL 90022, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 1988) (Rovner, J.); Davis v. Gen. Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 420, 422 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (Bauer, J.). There is no privilege

against discovery of trade secret information. Davis, 64 F.R.D. at 422. Nevertheless, “[c]onfidentiality orders routinely are entered in cases like this to protect sensitive an confidential material.” In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Lit., 2019-1 Trade Cases P 80,773, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (slip op.). Designation of material as “attorneys’ eyes only” is permissible, but such a designation should “only be used on a relatively small and select number of documents where a

genuine threat of competitive or other injury dictates such extreme measures.” Team Play, Inc. v. Boyer, No. 03 C 7240, 2005 WL 256476, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2005.)1 One common solution is to restrict disclosure of “Highly Confidential” information to “witnesses, outside counsel, outside expert witnesses, outside consultants, and their respective staffs.” See id.; Davis, 64 F.R.D. at 422. Given the difficulty of “practically polic[ing] a protective order” and the fact that “[if an] expert is called upon two years after this litigation to assist a potential competitor . . . will he really be able to compartmentalize all he or she has learned and not use any of the information . . . ” courts have been willing to prophylactically police protective orders. Saso, 2009 WL 3242112, at * 3 (citation omitted). Team Play was a decision on release of sales documents to a party for his use in determining whether to settle, in part because he was not a direct competitor of the producing

party. 2005 WL 256476, at *1–2. This is an example of such ex ante policing resulting in timely release of the requested discovery. Id. Defendant’s approach properly balances the interests between potential competitive harm and the Plaintiff’s interest in keeping litigation costs manageable. Illumina suggests a similar scheme of designation to Judge Bauer’s design in Davis and Judge Rovner’s scheme in Team Play. (Def. Mem. at 10–11.) As in those cases, Illumina does not object to use of party experts; instead, they only want to preserve the opportunity to object to disclosure of information to potential experts who are IET’s own principals before that information is released. (Def. Mem. at

1 The structure of the agreement is not characterized as an extreme measure, only the finding that disclosure of the information to the receiving counsel’s client would result in harm to competition. (Contra Pl. Mem. at 4.) 12.) Given that information, once known, is difficult to forget, Illumina’s prophylactic notice requirement is well-designed to protect its interests, while still allowing IET to use its principals as experts. See Saso, 2009 WL 3242112, at * 3; Team Play, 2005 WL 256476, at *1–2. Plaintiff is concerned that Defendants’ policy requires disclosure of all experts or

consultants to whom they may show “Highly Confidential” information. (Pl. Mem. at 7.) Plaintiff’s concern about the situation where “a potential expert does not agree with a party’s counsel’s theory of the case” is unwarranted in this context. (Id.) The party’s counsel is an agent of the potential expert at issue in this discussion, since the potential expert is a principal of IET itself. Thus, IET essentially ports a concern about outside expert disclosure into the context of a party expert without explaining the applicability of their argument. That is reasonable, because their argument does not apply. Plaintiff is also worried pre-clearance of experts may unnecessarily drive up litigation costs. (Id. (citing Saso, 2009 WL 3242112, at *2).) Plaintiff has answered their own contention within their memo. As “IET is a small company with under 10 employees, and it realistically will

designate one representative – its founder and President – as an expert witness” there is little cause for concern about protracted or duplicative litigation over disclosure of “Highly Confidential” material. (Pl. Mem. at 6.) Indeed, IET’s characterization appears to limit the universe of likely potential experts who might need access to specific documents to one person. (Id.) Plaintiff would therefore need only present a single motion to this court to resolve all disclosure issues related to their single potential representative expert witness. See Saso, 2009 WL 3242112, at *2–4 (addressing disclosure of multiple categories of information to a single expert through a single motion). Thus, Plaintiff’s concerns do not comport with their own account of reality. Accordingly, we should decline to endorse their view. Finally, there is some dispute whether the parties are competitors or not.

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Related

Davis v. General Motors Corp.
64 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Illinois, 1974)

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International Equipment Trading Ltd. v. Illumina, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/international-equipment-trading-ltd-v-illumina-inc-ilnd-2019.