International Coal Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad

63 A. 880, 214 Pa. 469, 1906 Pa. LEXIS 682
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania·Decided March 19, 1906·No. No. 1; Appeal, No. 286·Published·Cited by 22 cases

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Brown,

As between the plaintiff and the defendant below, the order appealed from may be regarded as interlocutory, but as to this appellant it is certainly final. It was made upon a matter entirely distinct from the general subject of the litigation. As the appellant is not a party to the suit, he could not be heard on appeal from a final judgment in it. This distinction seems to be overlooked by counsel for the appellee. If the appellant had not appealed from the order directing him to answer, the penalty for disobedience of it immediately confronted him. Though not interested in the result of the suit between the plaintiff and defendant, he is very much interested in the order of the court, which is final as to him, and he, therefore, has a right to be heard on the question of the authority of the court to make it, without waiting to be attached for refusing to obey it.

At common law a commission could not issue to take the testimony of witnesses de bene esse in any case: 3 Bl. Com. 383; Story’s Eq. Jur., sec. 1514. The practice of taking testimony out of court comes to us from the chancery courts, where, in administering justice, the rules of the common law were found to be deficient. In the equity courts bills are entertained to perpetuate testimony, but only where the matter as to which the witnesses are to be examined cannot be made [471] the subject of immediate judicial investigation. The right to file such a bill exists whenever one is threatened with future disturbance of present possession or enjoyment of property or rights, and no suit at law can be instituted for their protection and preservation at the time the bill is filed. In addition to a bill to perpetuate testimony to be used in a suit not brought, but which may be instituted in the future, the testimony of witnesses to be used in a pending proceeding may be taken, in view of their special conditions or circumstances, or it will be lost to the party whose rights in the pending suit are dependent upon it. Such witnesses are the aged, infirm or those about to depart from the country, and if there be but a single witness as to the matter upon which he is to be examined, his testimony may be taken out of court. The extent of this jurisdiction of equity to perpetuate and preserve testimony is thus stated in Angell v. Angell, 1 Sim. & Stu. 83: “If it be possible that the matter in question can, by the party who files the bill, be made the subject of immediate judicial investigation, no such suit [to perpetuate testimony], is entertained.. But if the party who files the bill can, by no means, bring the matter in question .into present judicial investigation (which may happen, when his title is in remainder, or when he is himself in possession), there courts of equity will entertain such a suit; for, otherwise, the only testimony which could support the plaintiff’s title, might be lost by the death of his witnesses. Where he himself is in possession, the adverse party might purposely delay his claim with a view to that event. It is, therefore, ground of demurrer to a bill to perpetuate testimony generally, that it is not alleged by the plaintiff that the matter in question cannot be made the subject of present judicial investigation. But, courts of equity do not merely entertain jurisdiction to. take or preserve testimony, generally, to be used on -a future occasion, where no present action can be brought, but also to take and preserve, .testimony in special cases in aid of a trial at law, where the subject admits of present investigation. At law, no commissions to examine witnesses.who .are abroad, for the purpose of being used at the trial, can go without the consent of the adverse party. Courts of equity will, upon a bill filed, grant such a commission without the consent of the adverse..party.. So [472] courts of equity will entertain a bill to preserve the testimony of aged and infirm, witnesses to be used at the trial at law, if they are likely to die before the time of trial can arrive ; and will even entertain such a bill to preserve the testimony of.a witness who is 'neither aged or infirm, if he happen to be the single witness to support the. case.”

For cause existing, courts of equity permit testimony to be taken for its perpetuation and allow witnesses to be examined outside of the court where an action may be pending in which their testimony is material' and importantand unless testimony can be so perpetuated and taken, in advance of a trial,' justice would often miscarry. But courts of equity have gone ho further in the departure from the rule of the common law than to allow testimony to be perpetuated and taken where cause exists-for perpetuating and taking it. When, in view .of the condition; circumstances or conduct of a witness, his testimony may be lost to the party needing it, if not taken in advance of the trial, it ought to be so taken, but as courts of equity have not gone beyond this, it is the limit for courts of law.

By the rule in the court below, under which, the appellee insists that it has a right to -examine the appellant outside of court and in advance of the trial, either party to a pending action may át any time, as a matter of course, .with no cause existing for doifigso, proceed to. examine any witness in advance of the trial, though he be neither aged,: infirm nor' going, and there be no reason , for supposing that, he’will not appear in court when subpoenaed to do so. The rule is : “A rule may in like manner be entered by. either party to take the depositions of witnesses without regard to the circumstances of their being aged, infirm or going', witnesses, stipulating, however, eight days’ notice to the adverse party; subject,’ nevertheless, in all other respects to the existing rules and regulations.”

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International Coal Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 63 A. 880, 214 Pa. 469, 1906 Pa. LEXIS 682 (Pa. 1906).

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