International Association of Heat & Frost Insulators & Allied Workers, Local #135 v. The Local 135 Joint Apprenticeship & Training Committee, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01626
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF Case No.2:25-CV-1626 JCM (NJK) HEAT & FROST INSULATORS & ALLIED 8 WORKERS, LOCAL #135, ORDER 9 Plaintiff(s),

10 v.

11 THE LOCAL 135 JOINT APPRENTICESHIP & TRAINING COMMITTEE, et al., 12 Defendant(s). 13

14 Presently before the court is plaintiff International Association of Heat & Frost Insulators 15 & Allied Workers, Local 135’s (“Local 135” or “the union”) motions for a temporary restraining 16 17 order and preliminary injunction. (ECF Nos. 28, 29). Defendants Shane Striley, Jeremy Azevedo, 18 Christopher Hooks, Thomas Brackett, and George Tuiaana filed a response (ECF No. 31), to which 19 Local 135 replied (ECF No. 32). 20 I. Background 21 On August 29, 2025, Local 135 filed the instant action for declaratory judgment and breach 22 23 of fiduciary & statutory duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). 24 Local 135 is a labor union within the meaning of “labor organization” under the Labor- 25 Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). (ECF No. 29 at 4). The union 26 sponsors The Local 135 Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee (“JATC”). (Id.). 27

28 1 The JATC is governed by a trust agreement and the union’s bylaws. (Id.; Exs. 5, 6). The 2 JATC trust agreement provides that a “Union Trustee may be removed from office at any time and 3 for any reason by an instrument in writing signed by the appropriate executive of the Union,” and 4 that “the party who designated such Trustee shall promptly designate a successor Trustee.” (ECF 5 6 No. 1, Ex. 5 §§ 5, 6). 7 Under the trust agreement, the JATC is governed by six trustees: three labor trustees are 8 appointed by the union, and three management trustees are appointed by the Southern Nevada 9 chapter of the Western Insulation Contractor’s Association. (ECF No. 29 at 4). 10 In November 2024, the JATC adopted its own set of bylaws (“JATC bylaws”), allegedly 11 12 to “harmonize” the trust agreement, union bylaws, and the JATC’s history of “conduct and 13 practices.” (ECF No. 31 ¶ 8). These bylaws stated that “Local trustees will be ranked in 14 quorum/voting in the ranking of local body received votes.” [sic] (ECF No. 1, Ex. 3 at Art. VII § 15 5). It also contained the statement that “Three local trustees and one alternative will be elected to 16 sit on the JATC Board every 3 years.” [sic] (Id. at § 3). 17 18 In May 2025, Gerald Bragg, the president of Local 135, wrote and delivered a letter 19 purporting to remove three union trustees—Larry Valoaga, Shane Striley, and Andres 20 Altimirano—and alternate trustee George Tuiaana, from the JATC. (ECF No. 29, Ex. 3). Bragg 21 simultaneously appointed their successors, Daniel Haguewood, Larry Valoaga (reappointed), and 22 himself. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 35). 23 24 Striley filed internal union charges against Bragg, alleging he violated his duties to the 25 union by removing him. (ECF No. 29 at 6). The charges went to the international union president 26 for determination as to whether they would go to trial. (Id. at 6–7). The president dismissed the 27 charges by letter on September 2, 2025. (Id. at 7; Ex. 7 at 1–2). 28 1 Plaintiff Local has filed for a TRO and a preliminary injunction based on the trustees’ 2 refusal to accept their removal, in advance of the union’s upcoming December 9, 2025, board 3 meeting. (ECF No. 29 at 5–9). The court ordered expedited briefing from the parties, (ECF No. 4 30), and now executes the following decision. 5 6 II. Legal Standard 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs temporary restraining orders (“TRO”) and 8 preliminary injunctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). TROs and preliminary injunctions are 9 extraordinary remedies meant to “preserve the status quo” and “prevent irreparable loss of rights 10 prior to judgment.” Estes v. Gaston, No. 2:12-cv-1853-JCM-VCF, 2012 WL 5839490, at *2 (D. 11 12 Nev. Nov. 16, 2012); see also Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 13 (9th Cir. 1984). The standard for granting a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard for 14 granting a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 15 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 The court considers the following elements in determining whether to grant preliminary 17 18 injunctive relief: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable injury if 19 preliminary relief is not granted; (3) balance of hardships; and (4) advancement of the public 20 interest. Winter v. N.R.D.C., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Stanley v. Univ. of S. California, 13 F.3d 1313, 21 1319 (9th Cir. 1994). The party seeking injunctive relief must satisfy each element. 22 There are two kinds of injunctions: mandatory and prohibitive. Mandatory injunctions go 23 24 beyond maintaining the status quo and are disfavored by the courts. Stanley v. Univ. of S. 25 California, 13 F.3d, 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994). When the movant seeks a mandatory injunction, 26 it must make a heightened showing of the Winter factors. See Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals 27 Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993). Relief should be denied unless the facts and law clearly 28 1 favor the moving party. Id. Mandatory injunctions “are not granted unless extreme or very serious 2 damage will result and are not issued in doubtful cases.” Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 3 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 1979). 4 III. Discussion 5 6 As a threshold matter, the court finds it appropriate to decide this motion without having 7 held an evidentiary hearing or heard oral argument. In the Ninth Circuit, whether to hold an 8 evidentiary hearing or hear oral argument on a preliminary injunction is a matter of the district 9 court’s discretion. See, e.g., Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1326 (citations omitted) (refusal to hold 10 a preliminary injunction hearing “is not an abuse of discretion if the parties have a full opportunity 11 12 to submit written testimony and to argue the matter.”). 13 Here, the parties have not requested oral argument or an evidentiary hearing as to the 14 request for preliminary injunction. See id. (noting the failure to request an evidentiary hearing 15 16 may constitute waiver). Additionally, the grounds for granting or denying a TRO are substantively 17 the same as for a preliminary injunction. After reviewing briefings from the parties, the court finds 18 there are no disputes of fact material to the request for preliminary relief that would necessitate an 19 evidentiary hearing. For those reasons, the court finds ruling on both the TRO and preliminary 20 injunction is appropriate in this case. 21 22 Local 135 seeks a mandatory injunction. At its heart, the requested injunctive relief would 23 require Striley and Tuianna to vacate the JATC trustee positions. This is an affirmative act, 24 requiring a higher standard of scrutiny in the court’s Winter analysis. See Dahl, 7 F.3d at 1403. 25 The court finds that, based on the facts alleged in the amended complaint and the 26 27 applications for TRO and preliminary injunction, Local 135 fails to demonstrate any of the Winter 28 factors. 1 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 2 The court first considers the parties’ arguments regarding the governing documents. Then, 3 it considers whether Local 135 is likely to succeed on the merits of its breach of fiduciary duty 4 claim at trial. The court finds that the documents are ambiguous, which weighs against granting a 5 6 TRO or preliminary injunction. See Winter v. N.R.D.C., 555 U.S. at 20. 7 1. Governing documents 8 Local 135 and JATC are governed by the trust agreement and union bylaws. (ECF No. 29, 9 Ex. 2, ECF No. 29 at 4). 10 The trust agreement is the controlling document for the operation of the trust. See NLRB 11 12 v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 331–34 (1981); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 13 U.S. 211, 223 (1986) (looking first to the express terms of the trust agreement and the plan); see 14 also Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 641–42 (1993) 15 (same). Courts look to the plain language of the trust agreement. E.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit 16 Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 (1986). They do not “artificially create ambiguity where none 17 18 exists.” Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Allstate Ins. 19 Co. v. Ellison, 757 F.2d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 1985)). 20 Likewise, a labor union’s bylaws govern the “rights, powers, obligations and duties of the 21 Brotherhood, the local unions, and the members.” Carpenters & Joiners v. Moore, 206 Va. 6,8 22 (S. Ct. Va. 1965); see also Coronado Coal Co. v. UMWA, 268 U.S. 295, 304 (1925). 23 24 The plain language of the trust agreement provides for removal of a union trustee “by an 25 instrument in writing signed by the appropriate executive of the Union.” (ECF No. 1, Ex. 5 § 5). 26 This clause is ambiguous: it could be read as the appropriate executive signing off on removal that 27 the union body has approved, or as the delivering of the letter serving as the removal itself. 28 1 Local 135’s bylaws do not provide clarity on this issue. Article IV, Section 1 states that 2 the President “Chairs Union Meetings and appoints committees.” (ECF No. 29, Ex. 6 at Art. IV, 3 § 1). Yet, within the same Article, the bylaws state that committee members are “Appointed by 4 the Chair,” without explanation as to whether this would be the President, in his position as Chair 5 6 of union meetings, the Vice President, in his position as Chair of E-Board Meetings, or the Chair 7 of the JATC. (Id. at §§ 1, 2, 11). 8 Further ambiguity as to whether JATC officers are appointed or elected arises from the title 9 of Article IV and the preceding chapter. Article IV governs “officers,” under which the JATC 10 committee is listed, and Article V governs the election of officers. (Id. at Arts. IV, V). The parties 11 12 agree that elections have occurred, though their exact function is debated. Defendant trustees 13 argue that JATC members have been elected by a secret ballot of the union membership since the 14 formation of the JATC, while Local 135 claims that such election merely informs the president’s 15 choice. (ECF No. 32 at 10; ECF No. 31 at Ex. 1 ¶ 6). 16 2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim 17 18 Under the heightened standard of scrutiny for a mandatory injunction, the court finds that 19 Local 135 is not likely to succeed on the merits of its breach of fiduciary duty claim. See 29 U.S.C. 20 §§ 409, 502(a)(3), 1104(a)(1)(A) and (D). To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duties under 21 ERISA, Local 135 must establish that (1) the defendants were plan fiduciaries, (2) defendants 22 breached their fiduciary duties, and (3) the breach caused harm to Local 135. Friend v. Sanwa 23 24 Bank Cal., 35 F.3d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1994); Trs. Of the Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & 25 Welfare Trust v. Vasqeuz, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112041, at *12 (D. Nev. Sept. 29, 2011). 26 Considering the ambiguous nature of the governing documents, Local 135 cannot establish 27 that defendants breached their fiduciary duties. 28 1 Even if the governing documents were clear, Local 135 also fails to establish the harm 2 element of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Local 135 pleads that the defendant trustees’ breach 3 of their fiduciary duties has caused Local 135 harm to the trust by way of an inability to conduct 4 meetings with the “proper” trustees or interview and select a new class of apprentices. (ECF No. 5 6 29 at 18). Defendant notes that there is not an immediate plan or need to select a new class of 7 apprentices; the process usually begins in the spring. (ECF No. 31 at 7). 8 It is foreseeable that the need for a new class will arise before trial, which has not yet been 9 scheduled. (See ECF No. 25). However, defendants proffer a solution, under which Striley, 10 Valoaga, Bragg, and Haguewood would all be required to unanimously vote on recommended 11 12 apprenticeship candidates, pending the outcome of the case. (ECF No. 31, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 39, 40). The 13 court need not intervene in such a case. Therefore, Local 135 fails to demonstrate the third element 14 of breach of fiduciary duty. 15 The court finds, based on the pleadings and evidence presented, that Local 135 is not likely 16 to succeed on the merits at trial as to its claim of breach of fiduciary duty. 17 18 B. Irreparable Harm 19 Local 135 must demonstrate that the harm alleged is imminent and irreparable to merit 20 granting a TRO or preliminary injunction at this time. It does not. 21 Local 135 argues that the Union will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue 22 due to defendants Striley and Tuiaana refusing to accept their removal from the JATC. As a result 23 24 of their refusal, Local 135 claims that the JATC cannot turn over debated items on its agenda and 25 is hindered from interviewing a new class of apprentices. (ECF No. 32 at 13). 26 Local 135 further claims that the apprentice program is the “chief function of the trust,” 27 and a continued stalemate on this front will result in harm in the form of reputational damage, an 28 1 inability to select a new class of apprentices, and the loss of market share by union and signatory 2 contractors that rely on the program for skilled contractors. (ECF No. 29 at 20). 3 The court is not persuaded that the harm alleged by Local 135 rises to the heightened level 4 required to permit a mandatory TRO or preliminary injunction. Local 135 alleges that it is 5 6 hindered from interviewing a new class of apprentices, but defendants declare that there is no 7 present or expected need for another class of apprentices. (ECF No. 31 at 7). Indeed, the JATC 8 just sat a new class in August, and defendants explain that sitting another class at the December 9, 9 2025, meeting would only increase the number of out-of-work apprentices and potentially harm 10 overall morale of the apprentice workforce. (Id.; Ex. 1 ¶ 38). 11 12 Local 135’s argument as to market share fails. There is no need for a new class of 13 apprentices at this time. 14 There is no clear evidence that the trustees are prevented from conducting business or that 15 they lack oversight. Defendants attest that new business items have been discussed and debated 16 during the pendency of this litigation. (ECF No. 31 at 22). The parties also appear to disagree 17 18 whether Haguewood and Bragg have attended any meetings since the purported removal. (Id., Ex. 19 1 ¶ 28; ECF No. 32 at 13). Indeed, the minutes from May 6, 2025, clearly state that they were in 20 attendance and participated in the meeting. (ECF No. 31, Ex. 2). 21 Moreover, Local 135 fails to provide clear evidence of reputational harm. Local 135 22 attempts to argue, with citation to a series of cases from the Southern District of New York, that 23 24 there is irreparable injury in the form of reputational damage merely because defendants Striley 25 and Tuianna continue to hold themselves out as trustees. See, e.g., Partenza v. Brown, 14 F. Supp. 26 2d 493, 498–499 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding continuing oneself out as trustee despite removal 27 “arguably damages the reputation and image of the Joint Council, the Executive Board, and the 28 1 individual plaintiffs.”). The court does not find this bare-bones assumption of harm persuasive, 2 particularly considering the heightened pleading standard applicable here. 3 4 Notably, Local 135 is contributing to the potential confusion it protests. Its website 5 continues to display Striley and Tuiaana as trustee and alternate trustee (without reference to Bragg 6 and Haguewood as trustees). (ECF No. 31, Ex. 4). If Local 135 is concerned about public 7 confusion and reputational harm, it could remove Striley and Tuiaana from the website. 8 This factor weighs against granting a TRO or preliminary injunction. 9 10 C. Balance of Hardships 11 Irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits have not been shown. 12 Accordingly, the balance of hardships weighs against granting a TRO or preliminary injunction at 13 this time. 14 D. Public Interest 15 16 Local 135 argues that there is a strong public interest in the continued operation of ERISA- 17 governed entities. (ECF No. 29 at 22). Congress enacted ERISA to ensure uniform and reliable 18 plan governance under federal law. Local 135 claims that without a temporary restraining order, 19 Local 135 would not be able to operate because it would not have a quorum and would not be able 20 to elect and train a new class of apprentices, which is one of its primary functions. (Id.). This 21 22 contention assumes that Local 135’s “success on the merits” argument is tenable. It is not. This 23 factor weighs against issuing a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. 24 Accordingly, Local 135’s motion does not satisfy the requirements of a TRO or preliminary 25 injunction. 26 . . . 27 28 1 IV. Conclusion 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff Local 135’s motion for a 4 temporary restraining order (ECF No. 29) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 5 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Local 135’s motion for a preliminary injunction 7 (ECF No. 28) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED without prejudice. 8 DATED December 8, 2025. 9

10 _________________________________________ 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28