IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1368 Filed October 2, 2024
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 1366, Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
CITY OF CEDAR FALLS, Respondent-Appellant,
and
IOWA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joseph Seidlin, Judge.
The City of Cedar Falls appeals the district court’s reversal of the Iowa
Public Employment Relations Board’s remedy order in a contested case.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
Andrew Tice of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
David Ricksecker (pro hac vice) and Matthew D. Purushotham (pro hac
vice) of McGillivary Steele Elkin LLP, Washington, DC, and Mark T. Hedberg of
Hedberg & Boulton, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Breanne A. Stoltze, Assistant Solicitor
General, for respondent Iowa Public Employment Relations Board.
Heard by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ. Langholz, J., takes
no part. 2
SANDY, JUDGE.
The International Association of Firefighters, Local 1366 (the Union) filed a
prohibited practice complaint against the City of Cedar Falls (the City) after its city
council passed a resolution to fully transition to a public safety officer (PSO)
program to provide traditional police officer and firefighter services. The passage
of the resolution led to eight traditional firefighters represented by the Union being
placed on administrative leave pending layoff.
An administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed decision finding the
City committed a prohibited practice in violation of Iowa Code section 20.10(2)(a),
(b), and (d) (2020) by placing the traditional firefighters on “administrative leave
pending layoff.” The ALJ’s proposed decision was appealed to the Iowa Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB adopted the ALJ’s decision and
expressly adopted her findings of fact and conclusions of law in full. Yet, in a
remedy order, PERB determined that damages resulting from the layoff were
inappropriate because the layoff was not a prohibited practice.
The Union petitioned for judicial review, asserting that PERB erred in its
remedy order by finding damages resulting from the layoff were inappropriate. The
district court agreed with the Union, finding PERB’s remedy order to be “clearly
erroneous, illogical, and irrational” for determining that the layoff was not a
prohibited practice. The district court remanded the matter to PERB to fashion an
appropriate remedy addressing the layoff.
The City appeals the district court ruling, arguing that the district court erred
by reversing PERB’s determination of remedial relief in a contested case. After
careful review of the record, we find PERB violated Iowa Code 3
section 17A.19(10)(i) (2023) by issuing such internally inconsistent rulings that
they are irreconcilable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling as modified
and remand the matter to the Iowa Employment Appeal Board to fashion an
appropriate remedy addressing the layoffs.
I. Factual Background
Since at least 1995, the City has experimented with alternative methods of
providing traditional police and firefighter services for its citizens. This
experimentation began with the creation of a police officer reserve program in
1995. A decade later the City took another step in the direction of providing
alternative police and firefighter services by starting the “Paid on Call” (POC)
program. The POC program permitted the City’s employees from other
departments to cross-train and apply for positions as firefighters or police officers.
According to the City, the POC program was a resounding success. The City
claims its citizens noticed “more police on patrol and significantly more firefighters
responding to a fire incident.” And the City believed the POC program presented
promising potential to deliver traditional police and firefighting services to its
citizens in a more cost-effective manner.
Spurred by the success of the POC program, the City began further
investigating other ways to provide traditional police and firefighter services to its
citizens. In a sign of things to come, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local
238—the union representing the City’s police officers—amended its bargaining
unit description to add the position of “police officer/firefighter” in 2009. And a year
later, the City began consulting other cities across the nation that utilized cross-
trained police officers and firefighters. The City believed that a PSO model— 4
exclusively utilizing cross-trained police officers and firefighters—would deliver its
citizens even more cost savings and operational efficiencies.1
Beginning in 2014, the City began a fundamental reorganization of its public
safety department. That year, the City officially launched the PSO program.
Around the same time, the City and the police union agreed on a public safety
officer job classification and included the position in the police union’s collective
bargaining agreement. In 2016, the City announced all new hires in the public
safety department were required to be cross-trained PSOs. The City also created
the public safety director position to oversee the public safety department. Jeff
Olson has served as the director of the public safety department since the
position’s inception.
The City has been open with its intentions of transitioning to a PSO model
to provide traditional police and firefighter services. Over the years, the city council
has published several memorandums identifying the City’s goals in transitioning to
a PSO model. In a memorandum for fiscal year 2016, the city council expressly
stated that it wanted to “[e]xpand the City’s Paid-on-Call (POC) program and other
cross-training programs such as a PSO program.” In a similar memorandum for
fiscal year 2018, the city council stated it wished to “[i]ncrease the number of
alternative staff in police and fire.” And in a memorandum for fiscal year 2019, the
city council stated its goal was to “[e]xpand the use of PSO’s and PCO’s to
adequately staff fire stations without adding full-time staff or overtime expenses.”
At the same time, in several city council meetings in the fall of 2019, Director Olson
1 The record discloses the City believes the full implementation of the PSO model
would save the City nearly $2 million per year. 5
made it clear the City had no intention of laying off traditional firefighters. Director
Olson even said that there “will always be” full-time firefighters.
To carry out the transition to a PSO model, the City relied on a system of
attrition. As traditional police officers and firefighters either resigned or retired,
they would be replaced by cross-trained PSOs. But this gradual transition to the
PSO model was not without its challenges. The traditional firefighters remaining
in the City’s public safety department often voiced safety concerns they had with
the implementation of the PSO program. Some of the traditional firefighters took
to social media to express their safety concerns with the PSO program. The record
discloses that the traditional firefighters and PSOs in the fire division seldom got
along. Director Olson received many complaints from PSOs in the fire division
concerning harassment and the creation of a hostile work environment by
traditional firefighters. As one city council member put it, the traditional firefighters
and PSOs “are like oil and water.”
The year 2020 marked a turning point for the transition to the PSO program.
On February 17, the city council conducted a work session, at which Director Olson
made a presentation on the current state of the City’s PSO program. During his
presentation, Director Olson advised the city council it had three options with the
PSO program. According to Director Olson, the city council could move forward
with a full implementation of the PSO model, modify the current PSO model, or
return to separate police and fire departments. At this time, there were only eight 6
traditional firefighters—excluding management—left in the public safety
department. All eight were represented by the Union.2
After Director Olson concluded his presentation, the city council discussed
the PSO program. One city council member asked Director Olson if the reason
the traditional firefighters and the Union were against the program was because
the firefighters did not want to be subjected to higher standards of testing, such as
a polygraph test. Another City Council member expressed frustration with the
Union’s “absolute unwillingness” to work with the City on the PSO program. And
one city council member stated, in an apparent reference to the traditional
firefighters and the Union, “we know why this doesn’t work.” Several city council
members also expressed frustration with the fact the Union had filed at least
twenty-five grievances against the City over the past few years. At the end of this
work session, Councilman Mark Miller called for a special meeting to be held on
February 20.
At the special meeting, the city council exclusively discussed the
implementation of the PSO program. Director Olson again presented several
options to the city council for implementing the PSO program. One of the options
Director Olson discussed was the immediate implementation of the PSO program.
This option required eliminating all employees in the traditional firefighter position.
After extensive public comments, Councilman Miller asked Director Olson whether
the City had adequate staffing to transition fully to the PSO model. Director Olson
2 The record discloses fire division management was not a part of the Union’s
bargaining unit. 7
responded that the City had adequate staffing to move forward with a complete
transition to the PSO model.
The city council then voted to adopt resolution 21,893—authorizing the
immediate implementation of the PSO program. After resolution 21,893 was
passed, the city council held a brief discussion. During this discussion Councilman
Miller stated, “[w]e don’t have the option of speaking about union issues, so I’ve
essentially been biting my tongue for a long while.” Councilman Miller added that
he understood the “optics of what this looks like,” but he claimed the city council
was not engaging in “union busting” by passing the resolution. Councilman Miller
also expressed frustration that the City was not getting cooperation from the Union
in implementing the PSO program.
The next day, Cedar Falls Mayor Rob Green vetoed resolution 21,893. In
his veto memorandum, Mayor Green expressed his concerns with the city council’s
process in adopting the resolution. Mayor Green asserted the city council failed to
“follow basic principles of good governance” in passing the resolution at the special
meeting. Mayor Green noted the special meeting “allowed staff less than two
working days to prepare presentation, engage stakeholders, and obtain critical
feedback on a plan [that] called for departmental reorganization and expected staff
layoffs.”
But on March 2, at a regularly scheduled meeting, the city council voted to
override Mayor Green’s veto of resolution 21,893. After the vote, Councilman Nick
Taiber stated the City had difficulty garnering support for the PSO program
because the Union’s leaders would not give their support. Councilman Taiber
believed the Union’s resistance to the PSO program “can’t be overstated.” 8
Following the city council’s vote to override his veto, Mayor Green issued a
memorandum to announce the creation of a transition task force. The task force
was instructed to provide recommendations for equitable outcomes for the “former
firefighters displaced as a result” of resolution 21,893. It was then that the eight
traditional firefighters—all of whom were members of the Union—were placed on
administrative leave with pay.
The transition task force provided three recommendations for the eight
traditional firefighters impacted by the full implementation of the PSO model. The
traditional firefighters could apply to become a cross-trained PSO, apply for
another position within the City, or accept a severance package.3 If the traditional
firefighters elected not to take any of these three options, they would be laid off
effective June 22, 2020. On March 16, the city council passed resolution 21,918,
which adopted the recommendations for the traditional firefighters provided by the
transition task force. Of the eight traditional firefighters, five opted to accept the
severance package the City offered, one opted to transition to a PSO position, one
was promoted to fire captain, and one was laid off.
II. Procedural Background
On April 2, 2020, the Union filed a prohibited practice complaint against the
City with PERB. Among other things, the Union asserted the City committed a
prohibited practice in violation of several paragraphs of Iowa Code
section 20.10(2) by placing the traditional firefighters on administrative leave
pending the elimination of the firefighter position. See Iowa Code § 20.10(2)
3 The severance agreement offered by the City included a provision in which the
traditional firefighters would waive all potential claims against the City. 9
(2020) (defining actions by public employers that constitute a prohibited practice).4
PERB assigned an ALJ to preside over the matter, and an evidentiary hearing was
held on February 24, 2021.
In her written proposed decision, the ALJ determined the City committed a
prohibited practice by placing the traditional firefighters on “administrative leave
pending layoff” in violation of Iowa Code section 20.10(2)(a), (c), and (d). As the
ALJ reiterated several times in her proposed decision, “[t]he issue is whether the
City had a legitimate motive to place the bargaining unit employees on
administrative leave pending layoff as a result of its implementation of the PSO
program.” Utilizing the dual-motive test formulated in National Labor Relations
Board v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 901–02 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
989 (1982), the ALJ reasoned the City’s actions were motivated by union animus
based on the comments of city council members, the disparate treatment of
traditional firefighters, and the abrupt departure from past practice regarding the
implementation of the PSO program. See Cerro Gordo Cnty. v. Pub. Emp. Rels.
Bd., 395 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (finding a county committed a
prohibited practice in violation of Iowa Code section 20.10(2) because the county’s
decision to discharge an employee was motivated by union animus).
The City then appealed the ALJ’s proposed decision to PERB. PERB
expressly adopted the ALJ’s factual findings and conclusions of law. PERB also
4 In its prohibited practice claim, the Union also asserted the City committed violations of Iowa Code section 20.9(1) by implementing unilateral changes to “in- service training,” “job classifications,” and “procedures for staff reduction.” As such claims are not the subject of the instant appeal, we do not address them in this opinion. 10
added some additional commentary concerning the ALJ’s legal conclusions, but
such commentary did not otherwise alter the ALJ’s legal conclusions. PERB then
ordered the City and the Union to meet to come to terms on an appropriate remedy.
But after the City and the Union could not come to terms on an appropriate remedy,
PERB then issued a remedy order.5 In its remedy order, PERB found that
damages resulting from the layoff would be inappropriate “[b]ecause the final layoff
on June 22, 2020, was not determined to be a prohibited practice.” PERB
determined the appropriate remedy was a cease-and-desist order.
Believing that the agency incorrectly denied its requests for remedies
stemming from the layoff of the traditional firefighters, the Union petitioned for
judicial review. The Union contended the agency erred in fashioning a remedy
because it incorrectly determined the layoff was not found to be a prohibited
practice. The district court agreed, finding the agency’s decision that the layoffs
were not found to be a prohibited practice was “clearly erroneous, illogical, and
irrational.” Therefore, the district court remanded the matter back to the agency to
fashion an appropriate remedy addressing both the placement of the firefighters
on administrative leave and the layoff.
The City now appeals the district court’s ruling, contending the district court
erred in reversing the agency’s determination of remedial relief.
III. Standard of Review
Judicial review of agency action is controlled by Iowa Code chapter 17A
(2023), applying the standards found in Iowa Code section 17A.19(10). Pohl v.
5 In briefing to PERB on the issue of an appropriate remedy, the Union argued
reinstatement, back pay, and the restoration of benefits were appropriate here. 11
Univ. of N. Iowa, No. 23–0426, 2024 WL 960918, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6,
2024). The applicable standard of review differs depending on the nature of the
error alleged by a party. Env’t L. & Pol’y Ctr. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 989 N.W.2d 775,
781 (Iowa 2023). A party’s challenge to an agency’s factual findings or sufficiency
of the evidence is subject to substantial evidence review. Burton v. Hilltop Care
Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa 2012). A party’s challenge to an agency’s
application of law to fact is subject to a deferential standard of review, and we are
to reverse only if the agency’s action is irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.
Env’t L. & Pol’y Ctr., 989 N.W.2d at 781; see also Iowa Code § 17.19(10)(i), (m).
In reviewing a district court’s decision on a petition for judicial review
invoking the standards set forth in section 17A.19(10), we examine whether we
would reach the same conclusion as the district court. Eyecare v. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 770 N.W.2d 832, 835 (Iowa 2009). “The petitioner challenging agency
action has the burden of demonstrating the prejudice and invalidity of the
challenged agency action.” Colwell v. Iowa Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 923 N.W.2d 225,
231 (Iowa 2019) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a)).
IV. Analysis
A. Challenges Based on Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(l)
We read the City’s briefing to assert three related arguments that the district
court applied the wrong standard of review in its decision. Thus, we believe this a
logical point to begin our analysis.
The City asserts the district court incorrectly applied Iowa Code
section 17A.19(10)(l) in its decision reversing PERB’s remedy order.
Section 17A.19(10)(l) provides that an agency decision may be reversed if it is 12
“[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable interpretation of a
provision of law whose interpretation has clearly been vested by a provision of law
in the discretion of the agency.”
In its first argument for why section 17A.19(10)(l) should not have been
applied by the district court in its analysis, the City notes that the Iowa
Administrative Procedure Act contains a strict pleading standard to preserve
issues for review in agency action cases. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(4) (listing the
requirements a petition for judicial review of agency action must meet). Our
supreme court has stated the pleading requirements of section 17A.19(4) are met
when each alleged error is separately and distinctly stated so that the other party
is sufficiently notified of the alleged error. See Off. of Consumer Advoc. v. Iowa
State Com. Comm’n, 419 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Iowa 1988). Additionally, our supreme
court has emphasized that the party opposing a petition for judicial review of an
agency action “is entitled to know the exact nature of the claimed errors, and each
error must be separately and distinctly stated so an opponent can adequately
prepare and respond to the issues being reviewed.” Kohurst v. Iowa State Com.
Comm’n, 348 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Iowa 1984). From these principles, the City
argues that judicial review of agency actions must be limited to the “exact nature
of the claimed errors” by the petitioning party.
Building off this reasoning, the City argues the district court exceeded the
permissible scope of its limited review by analyzing the Union’s claims under
section 17A.19(10)(l). As the City points out to us, the Union neither pleaded nor
asserted a claim under section 17A.19(10)(l) in the district court. The City further
notes the Union only pleaded and asserted claims under section 17A.19(10)(f), (h), 13
(i), and (n).6 Thus, the City claims the district court erred in analyzing the Union’s
claim under section 17A.19(10)(l) because it was not one of the errors pleaded by
the Union.
The City also argues section 17A.19(10)(l) is inapplicable in this case
because this case does not involve “interpretation of a provision of law.” We
concede what precise paragraph of section 17A.19(10) the district court based its
decision on is unclear. We agree with the City that if the district court made its
ruling under paragraph (l) error occurred because no “interpretation of a provision
of law” is at issue. However—without deciding whether the district court incorrectly
applied section 17A.19(10)(l)—we may affirm the district court on an alternative
ground that is supported by the record and urged by the prevailing party. See
Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 609
(Iowa 2012).
Thus, the relevant question is, did the agency violate a paragraph of
section 17A.19(10) that was pleaded by the Union? As we explain below, it did.
B. Does section 17A.19(10)(i) provide an adequate alternative
ground?7
The agency found “overwhelming” evidence of union animus by the City that
led to its decision to “place the firefighters on administrative leave pending layoff”
6 As the City points out, the Union originally pleaded claims for relief under section 17A.19(10)(c) and (e) but later withdrew these claims. 7 The Union also asserts we can affirm the district court’s decision under
section 17A.19(10)(f) and (h). Section 17A.19(10)(f) provides that courts may reverse an agency action that is “not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Section 17A.19(10)(h) provides a court may reverse an agency action that is “inconsistent with the agency’s prior practice or precedents.” Even so, we believe section 17A.19(10)(i) is more on point because we read the Union’s 14
rendering it a prohibited practice. Yet the agency determined the City’s decision
to lay off the firefighters was not a prohibited practice. Implicit in the City’s
argument and the district court ruling is that both assume the agency ignored its
own internally inconsistent decision in an irreconcilable manner. But the City
argues the agency knows best the determination it made when rendering its
ruling.8 On the unique facts of this case, we find the Union’s argument more
persuasive.
No prior Iowa case law exists further defining “reasoning that is so illogical
as to render it wholly irrational.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(i). Based on the facts
before us, that task is now ours.
When a statute or rule is plain and its meaning is clear, the rules of statutory
construction do not permit courts to search for meaning beyond its express terms.
State v. Snyder, 634 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 2001). We generally presume words
contained in a statute are used in their ordinary and usual sense with the meaning
commonly attributed to them. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax
Rev., 302 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Iowa 1981). When not defined in a statute, we
construe a term according to its accepted usage.
Here, “reasoning that is so illogical as to render it wholly irrational” would be
reasoning that is so internally inconsistent so as to make it irreconcilable. While
our judicial power does not confer authority to substitute our judgement for that of
argument to essentially claim the agency erred in determining that damages resulting from the layoffs were inappropriate based on flawed reasoning that the layoffs were never found to be a prohibited practice. Thus, we decline to address the Union’s arguments invoking section 17A.19(10)(f) and (h). 8 The City also claims the district court should not have resorted to canons of
statutory interpretation to substitute its judgment for the agency. 15
the agency, it is the agency that disagrees with itself. Cf. Christensen v. Snap-On
Tools Corp., No. 01-1734, 2003 WL 1024942, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2003).9
The agency adopted the ALJ’s findings in full to include “administrative leave
pending layoff” as a prohibited practice. The agency also determined that a layoff
is not a prohibited practice.10 Such conclusions are so internally inconsistent as to
make them irreconcilable, and we are unable to find any explanation (logical or
otherwise) within this record explaining the inconsistency. In this way the agency’s
findings were “[t]he product of reasoning that is so illogical as to render it wholly
irrational.” See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(i).
Moreover, if placing the traditional firefighters on administrative leave was
a prohibited practice, we fail to see how the later layoffs were not also a prohibited
practice. And the City offers no cogent explanation otherwise. Certainly, a layoff
is more serious than leave. The evidentiary record and resulting analysis by the
9 Christensen stated,
A rational person certainly could, on this record, find Christensen sustained a disability greater than ten percent. However, after a careful review of the record, we cannot say the agency’s decision is so illogical or irrational as to permit the court on judicial review to dictate a different outcome. The legislature’s grant of judicial power to reverse an agency decision that is the “product of reasoning . . . so illogical as to render it wholly irrational,” Iowa Code section 17A.19, did not confer upon courts wholesale authority to substitute their judgment for that of agencies whenever courts might favor a different outcome in a contested case. After a careful review of the record, we are unable to conclude that the agency’s decision is so wholly irrational as to mandate reversal in this case. Accordingly, we affirm. 2003 WL 1024942, at *3 (alteration in original). 10 The “pending layoff” language used by the agency makes sense when it
considered that, at the time of the filing of the Union complaint, the firefighters were placed on administrative leave pending layoff. From their complaint, it was clear the firefighters were complaining about the City’s decision to not only place them on administrative leave, but to place them on administrative leave pending layoff. 16
agency apply with indistinguishable equal force to both leave and layoff. The City’s
obfuscation of such in its attempts to categorize different outcomes—severance
agreements versus termination—is a distinction without a meaningful analytical
difference.
We recognize that agencies enjoy deference in their decisions. See
Bridgestone/Firestone v. Accordino, 561 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1997) (noting
appellate courts are “obliged to broadly and liberally construe an agency’s factual
findings so as to uphold, rather than defeat, the agency’s decision”). But we have
previously overturned final agency actions that are so internally inconsistent that
they are irreconcilable with other agency orders in the same case. See Babka v.
Iowa Dep’t of Inspection & Appeals, 967 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021)
(reversing a final agency action that was internally inconsistent to the point it was
irreconcilable).
Therefore, the agency’s conclusions are so internally inconsistent they are
irreconcilable and thus “[t]he product of reasoning that is so illogical as to render it
wholly irrational” in violation of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(i).
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we hold the agency’s decision in its remedy
order to deny the Union firefighters’ request for damages resulting from the layoff
violated Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(i). Accordingly, we believe the district court
correctly reversed the agency’s decision in its remedy order. 17
We thus affirm the judgment of the district court as modified and remand to
the district court with instructions to remand to the Iowa Employment Appeal
Board11 for purposes of fashioning a remedy consistent with this opinion.
11 See 2024 Iowa Acts ch. 1170, § 513.4(f).