International Adjusters, Inc. v. Korean Wonis-Son

682 F. Supp. 383, 1989 A.M.C. 1284, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2403, 1988 WL 27020
District Court, N.D. Illinois·Decided March 21, 1988·No. 87 C 352·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORAN, District Judge.

Defendants were hired to transport 40 cartons of variable resistors and 11 other cases and cartons, all placed in one large sealed container, from Yokohama, Japan, to Chicago, Illinois. Although the bill of lading indicates that the cartons and cases were sealed in the large container when received by the carrier, it is not clear from the facts which party provided the container. The complaint alleges that the value of the damaged resistors was $25,000, although no agreed valuation of the goods was stated on the bill of lading. Defendants move for partial summary judgment claiming that plaintiffs damages are limited to $500 pursuant to the terms of the bill of lading and the limitation of damages provided in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (“COGSA” or “the Act”), 46 U.S.C. 1304(5).

DISCUSSION

Section 1304(5) of COGSA limits to $500 the liability that carriers may incur for loss or damage to each package they transport, unless the shipper declares the precise value of the package on the bill of lading. 1

This section of the Act, and its application, have been a source of confusion for the courts since its enactment in 1936. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has construed the definition of the term “package” in light of recent advances in shipping technology. Thus, we turn to the decisions of the other courts of appeals, and the history of the Act, for assistance in interpreting COGSA and applying it here.

There are two policies behind § 1304(5). The first of these was explained in General Motors Corporation v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 451 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.1971). General Motors involved a shipper who sought to recover $60,000 from a carrier for damage to an electric generator when the generator was dropped into the sea while being unloaded from the carrier’s vessel. The court in that case held that the guiding policy of the Act was “to limit liability of common carriers for damage to cargo where the value of the cargo is not known to the carrier.” Id. at 26. Using this rationale, the court concluded that the generator was a “package” for purposes of the Act and plaintiff’s damages were limited to $500.

The second policy behind § 1304(5) was described by the court in Leather’s Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d *385 Cir.1971), where a shipper sought to recover $155,192 for the loss of 99 bales of leather that had been placed in a large container similar in size to the one at issue here. The court permitted the plaintiff to recover $500 per bale, concluding that

we cannot escape the belief that the purpose of § 4(5) of COGSA [46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) ] was to set a reasonable figure below which the carrier should not be permitted to limit his liability and that “package” is thus more sensibly related to the unit in which the shipper packed the goods and described them than to a large metal object, functionally a part of the ship, in which the carrier caused them to be “contained.”

Id. at 815.

Defendants contend that it was the intent of Congress to protect the shipping industry from hidden liability. While this position is not without merit, it appears that in enacting the legislation Congress intended to address both the concerns of the shipping industry and the concerns of shippers. At the core of this problem is the fact that COGSA was enacted in 1936. As the court stated in Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831, 88 S.Ct. 97, 19 L.Ed.2d 89 (1967), “[f]ew, if any, in 1936 could have foreseen the change in the optimum size of shipping units that has arisen as the result of technology advances in the transportation industry.”

Defendants urge the court to follow the COGSA policy as described in General Motors, and hold that the large container in which plaintiffs cartons and cases were placed is one “package” for purposes of § 1304(5). 2 Defendants claim that on the bill of lading plaintiff designated the container a “package.” The bill of lading, however, is ambiguous and does not settle the issue of whether the one container or the numerous cartons are properly considered “packages.” Under “TOTAL NO. OF Packages” the entry is “ONE (1) CONTAINER ONLY.” Under “NO. OF COUNT OR PEGS. OTHER” the entry is “1 CONTAINER,” “DESCRIPTION OF PACKAGES (9 CASES & 42 CARTONS).” By listing the cases and cartons plaintiff informed defendants that the shipment involved two levels of packaging and did not contractually agree that one of these levels would control the shipment.

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International Adjusters, Inc. v. Korean Wonis-Son, 682 F. Supp. 383, 1989 A.M.C. 1284, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2403, 1988 WL 27020 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

682 F. Supp. 383 (International Adjusters, Inc. v. Korean Wonis-Son) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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