Interior Lumber Co. v. Perkins

80 F. 528, 25 C.C.A. 613, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2225
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedMay 3, 1897
DocketNo. 118
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 80 F. 528 (Interior Lumber Co. v. Perkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Interior Lumber Co. v. Perkins, 80 F. 528, 25 C.C.A. 613, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2225 (7th Cir. 1897).

Opinion

WOODS, Circuit Judge,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

Following the testimony of the expert, Bates, the prior' art in dogging devices may be summarized as follows: The Freeman patent of 1858 has a rotating carriage, with a dog near the periphery, which is forced inward to hold the bolt, and an arm, pivoted to the dog and to the frame of the carriage, which serves to operate the dog. A cam acts upon the arm, and forces the dog inward, causing it to bite the bolt, and another cam, acting upon an extension of the arm, throws the arm and dog outward to release the bolt. The Freeman patent of 1859 has a rotary carriage, a dog near the periphery, an arm attached to the dog, and bearing a friction roller, and two cams, one of which acts upon the roller to move the dog outward and to release the bolt, and the other to produce the opposite effect. In the patent of Kinney and Parker there is a rotary carriage, a dog, a bent arm pivotally connected to the dog, and a cam acting on the arm to release the dog from the bolt, the dog being near the middle of the carriage, and the cam acting upon the outer end of the arm, instead of the reverse, as in the Perkins device; but, if transposed, as they might be without making any change in them, they could be described in the language of the Perkins claims. The Everts patent has a rotary carriage, movable dog, bent arm connected with the outer end of the dog, and acted upon at its inner end by a cam to cause it to release the dog from the bolt. The Clark patent has a rotary carriage, a dog near its periphery, a spring arm attached to the dog, a friction roller on the arm, and two cams acting upon the roller, one of which withdraws the dog, and the other causes it to bite. The Palmer patent contains almost the exact mechanism of Perkins’ fourth claim in its essential details, namely, a rotary carriage, with a dog near its periphery, a bent arm connected at its outer end to the dog, extending inward, with a cam or incline on the frame, which acts upon the inner end of the arm, and a spring connected to the projections or abutments on the arm and the carriage, the spring and the central cam both causing the dog to bite and hold the bolt, and a second cam near the periphery of the carriage, acting upon the arm, to withdraw the dog and release the bolt. This is the entire combination of the fourth claim except the anti-friction roll, but such rolls had theretofore been common in shingle machines and in other kinds of machines. The Clark patent has a rotary carriage with peripheral dog, a bent arm to actuate the dog, and a cam near the center of the machine to act upon the arm. The O’Connor patent has a rotary carriage with a dog near its periphery, and an arm or lever pivoted to the carriage, connected at one end to the dog, and carrying an anti-friction roll at the other end. There is a rod connected to the arm or [531]*531lever, and two abutments, one adjustable on tbe rod and tbe other fixed upon tbe carriage, and a spring, surrounding tbe rod between tbe abutments, serves to move tbe dog inward and cause it to bite tbe bolt. A cam on tbe frame, against wbicb tbe anti-friction roll bas a bearing when the carriage rotates, moves tbe dog outward to release tbe bolt. Tbe only changes from tbe device of O’Connor necessary to convert it into that of Perkins are suggested by tbe prior patents mentioned, and especially by tbe Palmer; that is, tbe substitution of a bent arm and a cam near tbe center of tbe machine for tbe pivoted straight arm or lever and'peripheral cam of the O’Connor design. Tbe O’Connor patent bas all tbe parts of tbe fifth and forty-fifth claims except that tbe portion of the arm wbicb extends inwardly is not quite long enough to reach past tbe stationary dog,—a circumstance wbicb does not affect its function, purpose, or operation, and therefore is not a material difference.

The foregoing propositions, and especially tbe conclusions supposed to result from them, are strenuously controverted by tbe opposing expert, Mr. Powers, who after pointing out particulars of difference between tbe devices of O’Connor and Perkins, says:

“I am aware that the witness Bates states that the missing elements not shown by the O’Connor patent may be found in some other patents in the record, but I do not understand that an anticipation can be created by taking up elements in different patents, and combining them for the occasion; but, on the other hand, in order to anticipate the claim of a patent, all of its elements, either identically or substantially, must be found in the same relation and combination with each other in some one patent or device.”

To tbe doctrine of selection be refused to subscribe, and for that reason failed to find tbe invention of Perkins in tbe patent of O’Con-nor. In matters of fact tbe entire testimony of tbe witnesses shows them to be in substantial accord. Their differences of opinion are explained by Mr. Powers’ mistaken understanding of tbe rule by which tbe patentability of combinations of old devices should be determined. That tbe mere bringing together, in a new combination, of old devices or elements, especially if they belong to tbe same art or to arts kindred to that to wbicb tbe combination belongs, does not constitute invention is well settled. “It is not enough that a thing shall be new, in tbe sense that in tbe shape or form in wbicb it is produced it shall not have been before known and that it shall be useful, but it must, under tbe constitution and tbe statute, amount to an invention or discovery.” Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U. S. 1, 11, 5 Sup. Ct. 1042; Hill v. Wooster, 132 U. S. 693, 10 Sup. Ct. 228; Burt v. Evory, 133 U. S. 349, 10 Sup. Ct. 394; Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310: Florsheim v. Schilling, 137 U. S. 64, 11 Sup. Ct. 20; Adams v. Stamping Co., 141 U. S. 539, 12 Sup. Ct. 66; Deere & Co. v. J. I. Case Plow Works, 9 U. S. App. 567, 6 C. C. A. 157, 56 Fed. 841. Tbe differences between tbe dogs described in the patent of Perkins and those of tbe earlier patents are differences of form and arrangement which produce nothing-new in function, result, or mode of operation. It is certainly not a matter of invention that a bent arm is operated by a centrally located cam instead of an outside ring, there being no essential difference in tbe result; or that one dog, rather than tbe other, is made [532]*532movable; or that an arm is not radial, extending centrally down in a machine to operate npon an interior cam; or that levers extend over and are actuated outside of instead of inside the periphery of the carriage; or that a spring is shown without means of adjustment for greater or less tension, such means being well known; or that a radial arm extends outward a considerable distance beyond the periphery of the carriage, and has its outer dog not pivoted to, but integral with it; or that a radial arm does not extend over and beyond the inner dog; or that a dog is adapted to be released beyond the periphery of the carriage instead of by an interior cam; or that a rectangular frame is employed instead of an arm; or that a cam instead of a spring is used to push a dog into place.

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Bluebook (online)
80 F. 528, 25 C.C.A. 613, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2225, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/interior-lumber-co-v-perkins-ca7-1897.