#30810-r-PJD 2025 S.D. 38
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA IN THE INTEREST OF J.W., child, and concerning A.B., Respondent.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
THE HONORABLE STACY L. WICKRE Judge
OLE J. OLESEN of Pennington County Public Defender’s Office Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for appellant J.W.
MARTY J. JACKLEY Attorney General
ANGELA R. SHUTE Assistant Attorney General Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for appellee State of South Dakota.
ARGUED APRIL 30, 2025 OPINION FILED 07/16/25 #30810
DEVANEY, Justice
[¶1.] J.W. and two other juvenile boys were involved in an incident in which
one of the other boys exploded a large firework inside a vacant trailer home in their
neighborhood, resulting in significant fire and smoke damage to the trailer. When
questioned by police, J.W. initially lied about who caused the fire in order to protect
the other juveniles involved. J.W. admitted to a juvenile delinquency petition
alleging accessory to a crime. One of the juveniles paid a portion of the restitution
for the damage to the trailer, and the circuit court ordered J.W. and the third
juvenile to pay the balance of the restitution amounting to approximately $15,000.
On appeal, J.W. challenges the restitution order. We reverse.
Factual and Procedural Background
[¶2.] On July 5, 2023, law enforcement and firefighters responded to a
structural fire at a residential trailer park off Sturgis Road near Black Hawk, South
Dakota. Upon their arrival, they saw a vacant trailer home with black smoke
billowing out the windows and door. Law enforcement officers spoke to a woman
standing outside with juvenile boys. She said she was the one who called 911 after
the boys knocked on her door and reported the fire. Two of the boys, 14-year-old
J.W. and 15-year-old S.E., were interviewed by law enforcement on the scene; a
third boy, 14-year-old D.B., had left when his father picked him up soon after the
deputies arrived.
[¶3.] J.W. told the officer that he saw two kids running away from the
trailer and up the hill. He described one as about ten years old and wearing cargo
shorts, and described the other as a tall kid wearing a white hoody.
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[¶4.] While on the scene, law enforcement interviewed another woman who
lived in the trailer park. She had witnessed three juvenile boys go into the trailer
and then she heard an explosion. She also saw the boys run away and attempt to
hide, then return to the trailer. When they opened the door, black smoke came out.
She watched the boys throw something into a trash can, then saw them approach
the trailer where the 911 caller lived. This witness showed law enforcement a video
she had recorded on her cellphone, as well as a video captured on her home security
camera, that showed J.W., S.E., and D.B. engaging in these events.
[¶5.] The next day, law enforcement separately interviewed the three boys
about the fire, as documented by law enforcement reports in the record. During his
interview, J.W. stated that he was with S.E. and D.B. and they had fireworks.
According to J.W., at some point S.E. said he had an idea. S.E. took a mortar
firework, walked over to the trailer which he knew to be vacant, and kicked in the
front door. J.W. claimed that he and D.B. were telling S.E. not to do it. All three
boys entered the trailer. J.W. said that S.E. lit the mortar and threw it toward the
refrigerator in the kitchen, after which the boys ran out of the trailer and continued
running. They returned and saw the trailer was on fire. At that point, S.E. told
them to throw the fireworks in the trash can and not say anything, and he devised a
plan for them to say that two unknown boys were responsible for the fire. The boys
then knocked on the neighbor’s door and asked her to call 911. J.W. stated that
when he talked to law enforcement on the scene the day before, he lied because he
was afraid S.E. would beat him up.
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[¶6.] During their interviews, D.B. and S.E. each provided a version of the
events consistent with what J.W. explained, although D.B. and S.E. both tried to
minimize some of their own involvement. S.E. admitted that he was the one who lit
the firework inside the trailer.
[¶7.] The State filed juvenile delinquency petitions against all three
juveniles. In J.W.’s case, the petition alleged second degree burglary as well as
aiding and abetting reckless burning or exploding. Thereafter, an amended petition
was filed alleging that J.W. had committed one count of accessory to a crime under
SDCL 22-3-5(4).1 Upon J.W.’s admission to the amended petition, the court
adjudicated him to be a delinquent child. On March 28, 2024, the circuit court
entered a dispositional order placing J.W. on four months of probation and imposing
other conditions. The court set an evidentiary hearing to address restitution.
[¶8.] Only J.W. and S.E. participated in the joint restitution hearing held on
June 4, 2024, as D.B.’s case was dismissed pursuant to an agreement he reached
with the State wherein he agreed to pay $9,086.75 in restitution. At the hearing,
the State presented evidence that, as a result of the fire and smoke, the trailer
1. SDCL 22-3-5(4) provides:
A person is an accessory to a crime, if, with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a felony, that person renders assistance to the other person. . . .
The term, render assistance, means to: ... (4) Obstruct anyone by force, intimidation, or deception in the performance of any act which might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of the other person[.] -3- #30810
sustained significant damage and was uninhabitable until repairs could be
completed. It was not insured. The trailer owner, as well as his contractor who was
still doing the repairs, testified regarding the damage and the cost of repairs. The
owner also claimed an amount for lost rental income, as he had purchased the
trailer to be used as rental property and had been unable to do so while repairs
were being made. J.W. did not testify, but his mother testified about their living
situation and her income, debts, and household expenses, as well as J.W.’s job
prospects in the area.
[¶9.] Following the hearing, both parties submitted briefs to the court. J.W.
first argued that he should not be required to pay any restitution because there was
no causal connection between the damages suffered by the trailer owner and the
conduct for which J.W. was adjudicated—i.e., his lying to police about seeing two
other kids run away from the trailer, in his effort to protect S.E. and D.B. He
acknowledged older cases from this Court that held such a causal connection need
not be shown in juvenile delinquency cases. See People ex rel. K.K., 2010 S.D. 98,
¶ 12, 793 N.W.2d 24, 28; see generally In re M.D.D., 2009 S.D. 94, ¶ 5, 774 N.W.2d
793, 795 (holding that adult restitution statutes are inapplicable to juvenile
proceedings). But he claimed those cases were no longer valid in light of subsequent
legislative amendments made in 2016 to the juvenile statutes regarding restitution.
He pointed to the amendment’s cross-reference to the criminal restitution statute
applicable to cases involving adults and argued that case law interpreting that
statute requires a causal connection to be shown before restitution may be ordered.
J.W. further argued that, if restitution were imposed, the court should limit the
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amount ordered to avoid creating serious hardship or injustice to J.W. and his
mother, who he claimed would realistically be the likely source for the payments.2
J.W. also challenged some of the amounts claimed as damages.
[¶10.] In its brief, the State requested a restitution award of $30,013.25,
imposed jointly and severally upon J.W. and S.E. This included the victim’s request
for lost rental income but excluded the amount already paid as restitution by D.B.
Although the State likewise noted the legislative amendments to the juvenile
statutes regarding restitution, it disagreed with J.W.’s interpretation of the
amendments. It argued that the prior cases remained good law and, accordingly,
under those cases no causal connection need be shown. In the alternative, the State
argued a causal connection existed under the facts of the case. The State further
contended that J.W. failed to show how he would incur serious hardship or injustice
by an order of restitution.
[¶11.] The circuit court entered a written restitution order in a memorandum
that detailed its findings and analysis of the statutes and case law governing
juvenile restitution. The court analyzed the legislative changes to the statutes
governing dispositions in juvenile delinquency cases (SDCL 26-8C-7) and in cases
involving children in need of supervision (CHINS) (SDCL 26-8B-6). In the court’s
view, K.K.’s holding that no causal connection need be shown in juvenile
2. J.W. argued that any restitution award should not exceed $2,500, citing SDCL 25-5-15. That statute addresses parental liability for damage caused by willful acts of a minor child and caps the amount recoverable in a civil suit against the parents at $2,500. The circuit court ruled that this statute did not apply to the question of restitution in a delinquency proceeding against a juvenile. J.W. does not challenge the court’s ruling on appeal. -5- #30810
delinquency cases was still valid, even after the legislative amendments. Thus, the
court applied the broad principles governing juvenile proceedings announced in K.K.
that related to the “guidance, control, or rehabilitation” of delinquent children, and
concluded that it was in J.W.’s “best interest” to require him to pay restitution. The
court made this ruling after noting that S.E. admitted to second degree burglary
and J.W. admitted to being an accessory to a crime, finding that both juveniles “had
‘some involvement in the crime’ that caused near total destruction of the trailer
home[.]”
[¶12.] Additionally, the court determined it was “reasonably satisfied” that
the purposes of affording “guidance, control, or rehabilitation” were served by using
the cost of repair of the trailer home as the appropriate measure of damages, which
it found to be $24,700 based on the evidence. The court declined to include
restitution for the claimed lost rental income after determining it was “unclear what
damages [the victim] suffered for lost rents.” Subtracting approximately $9,000
that D.B. had already paid in restitution, the court found J.W. and S.E. jointly and
severally liable for $15,613.25 in unrecovered damages. In this regard, the court
found that “the delinquent act in this case was quite serious, . . . the destruction
caused by the actions of [J.W.] and the other minor children was significant[,]” and
that “the actions of [J.W.] and the other minor children were extremely reckless and
dangerous.” The court found that requiring restitution in the amount imposed
would “serve a rehabilitative purpose and help the children understand the gravity
of the harm they caused and the danger of such reckless conduct.”
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[¶13.] The court also found there was “no credible evidence” that the
restitution order would cause J.W. serious hardship. Noting his mother’s testimony
about her financial situation, the court found the testimony was offered in relation
to J.W.’s assumption that his mother would ultimately be financially responsible for
the restitution. But, the court explained, the juvenile restitution statute speaks in
terms of the child paying restitution, not the parent. Based on the limited
testimony from J.W.’s mother, the court found that J.W. was capable of earning
income to apply toward restitution without impacting the family’s ability to afford
its household and living necessities.
[¶14.] J.W. appeals the circuit court’s restitution order, asserting the
following restated issues:
1. Whether the circuit court erred in ordering restitution without finding a causal connection between the victim’s damages and J.W.’s criminal act.
2. Whether the circuit court clearly erred in finding that J.W. would not suffer serious hardship from the order of restitution.
Analysis and Decision
[¶15.] As to the first issue, J.W. claims there is no causal connection between
the offense for which he was adjudicated—accessory to a crime stemming from his
act of lying to the police—and the victim’s damages as a result of the trailer fire.
On appeal, the State does not argue that a causal connection factually exists in this
case. Rather, the State argues, as the circuit court ruled below, that the causal
connection requirement does not apply to restitution awarded in juvenile
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delinquency adjudications. J.W. contends the circuit court erred in its ruling, and
he seeks reversal of the court’s restitution order.
[¶16.] Both sides point to a legislative amendment to the juvenile
delinquency statute regarding restitution, SDCL 26-8C-7(1), and take opposite
positions regarding the meaning of that amendment and whether it effectively
abrogates certain prior cases from this Court involving juvenile restitution. This is,
therefore, a matter of “statutory interpretation and application, which we review de
novo.” State v. Dutton, 2023 S.D. 29, ¶ 17, 993 N.W.2d 136, 141 (citing State v.
Goulding, 2011 S.D. 25, ¶ 5, 799 N.W.2d 412, 414). But first it is necessary to
discuss relevant case law and its connection to the statutes at issue.
Prior restitution decisions
[¶17.] In support of his causal connection argument, J.W. cites State v. Joyce,
a restitution case involving an adult driver of a vehicle who accidently rear-ended
another vehicle and then fled the scene. 2004 S.D. 73, 681 N.W.2d 468. He pled
guilty to a charge of leaving the scene of an accident (hit and run), and the court
ordered that he pay restitution for the other motorist’s medical expenses and
vehicle damages. Joyce appealed, claiming “he should not have been ordered to pay
restitution” because the motorist’s “damages were not caused by his leaving the
scene of the accident, but rather by the accident itself.” Id. ¶ 10, 681 N.W.2d at
469−70. This Court cited various provisions of SDCL chapter 23A-28, the chapter
governing restitution to victims of crimes, after first recognizing that “[i]t is the
policy of this state that restitution shall be made by each violator of the criminal
laws to the victims of the violator’s criminal activities to the extent that the violator
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is reasonably able to do so.” Id. ¶ 12, 681 N.W.2d at 470 (quoting SDCL 23A-28-1).
The Court noted, in particular, the definitions found in SDCL 23A-28-2:
“Restitution” is defined as “full or partial payment of pecuniary damages to a victim.” SDCL 23A-28-2. “Victim” is defined, in part, as “any person, as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(31), who has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal activities[.]” SDCL 23A-28-2(5). “Criminal activities” include “any crime for which there is a plea of guilty or a verdict of guilty upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered and any other crime committed after June 30, 1979, which is admitted by the defendant, whether or not prosecuted.” SDCL 23A-28-2(2). “Pecuniary damages” include “all damages which a victim could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event, except punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium.” SDCL 23A-28-2(3).
Id. (emphasis added). The Court held that “South Dakota’s restitution statutes
require a causal connection between a defendant’s crime and a victim’s damages.”
Id. ¶ 16, 681 N.W.2d at 471; see also State v. Hofer, 2008 S.D. 109, ¶ 28, 757 N.W.2d
790, 798 (noting that the causal connection requirement arises from the “as a result
of” language in SDCL 23A-28-2(5)). Therefore, the Court reversed the restitution
order after concluding that “Joyce’s act of leaving the scene did not cause [the
motorist’s] injuries and resulting damages.” Joyce, 2004 S.D. 73, ¶ 16, 681 N.W.2d
at 471.
[¶18.] Here, J.W. argues that, like in Joyce, his after-the-fact act of lying to
the police, which formed the basis for his admission to the amended petition, was
not causally connected to the victim’s damages that were a result of the entry into
the trailer and S.E.’s lighting of the firework. The State, citing this Court’s rulings
in M.D.D. and K.K., contends the circuit court correctly determined that the “causal
connection” requirement has no application in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
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[¶19.] In K.K., the Court addressed this very issue. 2010 S.D. 98, 793 N.W.2d
24. In that case, several teenagers broke into a bar during the night, stole items,
and caused significant damage to the building. K.K. was one of the juveniles
involved, although she did not participate in the actual burglary. She was,
however, involved in the planning of the break-in and told the others they should
get a brick to break into the bar. Afterward, she either helped them load the stolen
goods into the car or watched them being loaded. After K.K. later admitted to a
juvenile delinquency petition alleging misprision of a felony, the court ordered her
to pay restitution jointly and severally with the other juveniles. She appealed,
alleging there was no causal connection between her misprision of a felony offense
and the losses sustained by the bar owner as a result of the burglary. Id. ¶ 8, 793
N.W.2d at 27.
[¶20.] When considering the causation issue raised by K.K., we acknowledged
Joyce’s holding regarding the causal connection requirement in adult restitution
cases, which we noted is derived from SDCL 23A-28-1 and the “as a result of”
language in SDCL 23A-28-2(5). Id. ¶¶ 9−10 (citing Joyce, 2004 S.D. 73, ¶ 16, 681
N.W.2d at 471). However, we explained that “the terms of SDCL [chapter] 23A-28
do not ‘have application in juvenile proceedings.’” Id. ¶ 11 (quoting M.D.D., 2009
S.D. 94, ¶ 4, 774 N.W.2d at 794). In M.D.D., this Court noted that the language
used in the criminal restitution statutes contained terms applicable only to criminal
cases involving adults, and not juvenile proceedings. 2009 S.D. 94, ¶ 4, 774 N.W.2d
at 794. We further noted in M.D.D. that “the different language used in the
criminal restitution statutes does not reflect legislative intent that the criminal
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statutes (SDCL [chapter] 23A-28) apply to restitution in juvenile proceedings[.]” Id.
¶ 5, 774 N.W.2d at 795.
[¶21.] Relying on M.D.D., the Court determined in K.K. that the juvenile
restitution statute then in effect “broadly authorized courts to order restitution in
juvenile cases for ‘any damage done to property.’ There [was] no limiting or
restricting language akin to the ‘as a result of’ language found in the adult
restitution statutes.”3 K.K., 2010 S.D. 98, ¶ 12, 793 N.W.2d at 28. See M.D.D., 2009
S.D. 94, ¶ 6, 774 N.W.2d at 795 (noting that, unlike adult restitution statutes, the
juvenile restitution statute contained “broad, unqualified language”). We explained
that the different language used in the adult restitution statutes and the juvenile
restitution statute indicated that “the Legislature intended a different analysis in
juvenile cases.” K.K., 2010 S.D. 98, ¶ 11, 793 N.W.2d at 27−28. We noted that “the
juvenile statutes do not require that restitution be strictly associated with the crime
for which the juvenile has been adjudicated.” Id. ¶ 12, 793 N.W.2d at 28. Thus, we
held that in juvenile proceedings, no causal connection was required between the
victim’s damages and the juvenile’s criminal activities. Id. After concluding that
the best interests of a child could include imposing restitution “that is not strictly
3. When M.D.D. and K.K. were decided, the juvenile delinquency disposition statute (SDCL 26-8C-7) authorized a court to impose the dispositions allowed in SDCL 26-8B-6, the statute governing adjudications of CHINS, which at the time provided in subsection (4): “The court may require the child to pay for any damage done to property or for medical expenses under conditions set by the court if payment can be enforced without serious hardship or injustice to the child[.]” See 2008 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 139, §§ 1−2; see also In re M.D.D., 2009 S.D. 94, ¶ 6 n.3, 774 N.W.2d 793, 795 n.3. -11- #30810
causally related[,]” we held that, because K.K. had “some involvement” in the crime,
it was appropriate for her to make restitution.4 Id. ¶ 13, 793 N.W.2d at 29.
[¶22.] Against this backdrop, the present case requires the Court to assess
whether the holdings in M.D.D. and K.K. remain viable considering the
Legislature’s subsequent amendments to the juvenile restitution statute.
Legislative changes to juvenile statutes
[¶23.] In 2015, the Legislature made significant changes to the juvenile
justice statutes as part of a comprehensive reform act. See 2015 S.D. Sess. Laws ch.
152. While the act included a number of changes, of relevance to the issue here was
the amendment of SDCL 26-8C-7, which provides disposition alternatives to a court
in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The act struck the provision in SDCL 26-8C-7
that referred to SDCL 26-8B-6—the statute providing available disposition
alternatives including juvenile restitution. 2015 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 152, § 20.
That change appears to be inadvertent, as the Legislature enacted emergency
legislation in 2016 to again amend SDCL 26-8C-7. See 2016 S.D. Sess. Laws ch.
146.
[¶24.] Of particular note, the 2016 legislation amended subsection (1) of the
juvenile delinquency disposition statute, SDCL 26-8C-7, to add the following
alternative available to the court: “The court may require the child to pay
4. Alternatively, the Court determined that, factually, there was a sufficient casual connection in the case. Id. ¶¶ 14−17, 793 N.W.2d at 29−30. We rejected K.K.’s reliance on Joyce, noting that Joyce was distinguishable because, in that case, the defendant’s crime of leaving the scene of an accident “was committed after the infliction of injuries” and therefore “[t]he damage was already done.” Id. ¶ 15, 793 N.W.2d at 29. -12- #30810
restitution, as defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4) and under conditions set by the
court, if payment can be enforced without serious hardship or injustice to the
child[.]” 2016 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 146, § 1. The 2016 legislation also amended
SDCL 26-8B-6(4) in the CHINS chapter, eliminating the broad language referred to
in M.D.D. and K.K. that allowed a court to require a child to pay “for any damage
done to property or for medical expenses” and changing this statutory provision to
read: “The court may require the child to pay restitution, as defined in subdivision
23A-28-2(4) and under conditions set by the court[,] if payment can be enforced
without serious hardship or injustice to the child[.]” 2016 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 146,
§ 7. Additionally, the 2016 legislation added a specific reference to restitution, “as
defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4)[,]” in two other juvenile statutes. 2016 S.D. Sess.
Laws ch. 146, §§ 5−6 (amending SDCL 26-7A-129 and SDCL 26-7A-11,
respectively).
Application of current juvenile restitution statutes
[¶25.] In the present case, both parties and the circuit court agreed that, in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding, SDCL 26-8C-7(1) allows a court to order
restitution, as defined in SDCL 23A-28-2(4) as “full or partial payment of pecuniary
damages to a victim[.]” The circuit court determined, however, that in its view, the
Legislature’s specific reference to subsection (4), but not to any other subsection,
demonstrated an intention to “necessarily exclude” all other subsections in that
chapter, including the definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5). The circuit court
found it significant that the current juvenile restitution statute in the CHINS
chapter, SDCL 26-8B-6, refers to “restitution, as defined in § 23A-28-2,” which the
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court construed as the Legislature’s intent to adopt this statute in its entirety.5
(Emphasis added.) In the court’s view, the Legislature’s failure to do the same with
regard to SDCL 26-8C-7 reflected an intent to not adopt the entirety of the adult
restitution statutes for juvenile delinquency proceedings. Thus, because the court
believed that the other definitions in SDCL 23A-28-2 did not apply to juvenile
delinquency proceedings, it determined that K.K.’s holding remained valid. In other
words, the court held that no “causal connection” need be shown, as restitution was
not limited to damages occurring only “as a result of” or “strictly associated with”
the crime for which the juvenile was adjudicated. See K.K., 2010 S.D. 98, ¶ 12, 793
N.W.2d at 28.
[¶26.] On appeal, the State adopts a similar position as the circuit court and
argues the Legislature intended to maintain a distinction between adult restitution
and juvenile restitution, as reflected in M.D.D. and K.K. On the other hand, J.W.
argues that the juvenile restitution statutes are clear, certain, and unambiguous,
and the amendments evince the Legislature’s intention to treat juvenile restitution
the same way as adult restitution, thus abrogating this Court’s contrary holdings in
M.D.D. and K.K.
[¶27.] Despite the path that may have led to this point, a resolution of this
issue is rather straightforward. The starting point, of course, is “an analysis of the
statute’s text.” In re Implicated Individual, 2021 S.D. 61, ¶ 16, 966 N.W.2d 578,
5. In 2021, the Legislature amended SDCL 26-8B-6(4) to strike the reference to “subdivision 23A-28-2(4)” and replaced it with “§ 23A-28-2”. This occurred when the Legislature made other changes to the CHINS statutes unrelated to the issue of restitution. See 2021 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 120. -14- #30810
583. We adhere to the rule that “the language expressed in the statute is the
paramount consideration.” Puffy’s, LLC v. Dep’t of Health, 2025 S.D. 10, ¶ 38, 18
N.W.3d 134, 145. “When the language in a statute is clear, certain, and
unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and this Court’s only function is
to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.” Implicated Individual,
2021 S.D. 61, ¶ 16, 966 N.W.2d at 583.
[¶28.] The language of SDCL 26-8C-7(1) now provides: “The court may
require the child to pay restitution, as defined in subdivision 23A-28-2(4) and under
conditions set by the court, if payment can be enforced without serious hardship or
injustice to the child[.]” Thus, in unambiguous terms, restitution in juvenile
delinquency proceedings is defined as “full or partial payment of pecuniary damages
to a victim[.]” SDCL 23A-28-2(4). But to understand the full import of that statute,
the terms “pecuniary damages” and “victim” must also be given meaning. Rather
than applying the rest of the definitions in SDCL 23A-28-2 when addressing the
question of whether causation must be shown, the circuit court relied instead on the
broader principles announced in M.D.D. and K.K., which interpreted the juvenile
statutes as they existed prior to the amendments. There are two problems with
that approach.
[¶29.] First, the circuit court’s approach leaves an unnecessary void in the
understanding of how to apply the definition of restitution. Indeed, a court cannot
address restitution without knowing who it applies to and what type of damages are
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implicated. The State points to definitions of “victim” in other parts of the code.6
Ironically, the circuit court did just the opposite when assessing the measure of
damages to be imposed as restitution in this case. Instead of looking elsewhere, the
court applied the definition of “pecuniary damages” found in SDCL 23A-28-2(3)
when determining the amount of restitution, and rightly so.7 Yet, the court refused
to apply the definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5) when considering whether a
causal connection with the delinquent act for which J.W. was adjudicated must be
established.
[¶30.] When a court applies the definition of “restitution” in SDCL 23A-28-
2(4), its consideration of the other definitions found within SDCL 23A-28-2 is not
6. The State cites SDCL 26-7A-36.1, which allows a victim of delinquent acts to attend juvenile hearings and which refers to two definitions of a “victim” found in statutes that apply in adult criminal proceedings. See SDCL 23A- 28C-4 (defining a victim as “any person being the direct subject of an alleged act that would constitute . . . a violation of chapter 22-22”); SDCL 22-1-2(53) (defining a victim as “any natural person against whom the defendant in a criminal prosecution has committed or attempted to commit a crime”). The State notes in its brief that these definitions do not contain “the ‘as a result of’ language from SDCL 23A-28-2(5) that provides the causal connection requirement in adult restitution cases.” It is not clear how this is helpful to the State’s position, because the language in these definitions similarly contemplates a causal link with a defendant’s criminal activities.
7. Notably, the definition of “pecuniary damages” in SDCL 23A-28-2(3), which the circuit court applied when determining the measure of damages, refers to those a victim could recover in a civil action against a defendant. Such recovery hinges on successfully proving the damages were caused by a defendant’s acts or omissions. And in addition to citing SDCL 23A-28-2(3), the circuit court also noted the language of S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29(14) (Marsy’s Law), which provides victims the “right to full and timely restitution in every case and from each offender for all losses suffered by the victim as a result of the criminal conduct and as provided by law for all losses suffered as a result of delinquent conduct[.]” (Emphasis added.) Such language mirrors the definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5) as one “who has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal activities[.]” -16- #30810
only logical but required. The definitions are prefaced with the introductory clause
of SDCL 23A-28-2, which states: “Terms used by this chapter mean: . . . .” Thus, a
court should follow the clear and unambiguous language of the statute and not look
elsewhere for the meaning of the words. See State v. Turner, 2025 S.D. 13, ¶ 47, 18
N.W.3d 673, 689 (concluding that because the meaning of phrases in a statute is
provided in the definitions statute, “there is no need to engage in statutory
construction”); see also N. Border Pipeline Co. v. S.D. Dep’t of Rev., 2015 S.D. 69,
¶ 13 n.9, 868 N.W.2d 580, 584 n.9 (“[I]n declaring the meaning of a statute, a court
is not free to disregard legislative definitions of words.”). The circuit court therefore
erred in not applying the definition of victim provided in SDCL 23A-28-2(5).
[¶31.] The second problem with the circuit court’s approach is its reliance on
K.K. for the principle that no causal connection is required for juvenile restitution.
This Court’s rationale in both K.K. and M.D.D. was dependent on an interpretation
that the Legislature intended to treat juvenile restitution differently from adult
restitution, and that “the terms of [chapter] 23A-28 do not ‘have application in
juvenile proceedings.’” K.K., 2010 S.D. 98, ¶ 11, 793 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting M.D.D.,
2009 S.D. 94, ¶ 4, 774 N.W.2d at 794). Clearly, that is no longer the case, as the
reference to SDCL 23A-28-2(4) is now explicit in several places in the juvenile
statutes, and the broader juvenile restitution language referred to in those cases
was eliminated by the Legislature. It is reasonable to assume that the changes to
the statutes were made, at least in part, in response to this Court’s decisions. “We
presume the Legislature acts with knowledge of our judicial decisions.” AEG
Processing Ctr. No. 58, Inc. v. S.D. Dep’t of Rev., 2013 S.D. 75, ¶ 12, 838 N.W.2d
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843, 848 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Court also “presume[s] that the
Legislature changed the wording of the statute for a reason.” State v. Schroeder,
2004 S.D. 21, ¶ 12, 674 N.W.2d 827, 831. For these reasons, we conclude that,
because the underlying premise for M.D.D.’s and K.K.’s holdings—that the terms of
chapter 23A-28 do not apply to juvenile proceedings—has changed, the holdings of
those cases have been abrogated by the legislative amendments. We therefore
apply the ruling we announced in Joyce to juvenile restitution determinations and
hold that there must be a “causal connection” between the criminal act for which
the juvenile was adjudicated and the victim’s damages.
[¶32.] In applying the definition of “victim” in SDCL 23A-28-2(5) as a person
“who has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal
activities,” we must, in turn, apply the definition of “criminal activities.” This term
is defined in SDCL 23A-28-2(2) as “any crime for which there is a plea of guilty or
verdict of guilty upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered and any
other crime . . . which is admitted by the defendant[.]”
[¶33.] In the context of the juvenile proceeding here, the criminal
activities would include any crime for which J.W. was adjudicated or that he
admitted committing. J.W. admitted to being an accessory to a crime under
SDCL 22-3-5(4). Because there is no transcript of the adjudication hearing in
the record, the factual basis for the admission recited at the hearing is not
available to this Court. Thus, we consider only the amended petition, which
alleged that J.W.:
did commit the public offense of ACCESSORY TO A CRIME, in that [he] did, with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the
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discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of S.E. . . . and D.B. . . . for the commission of a felony, render assistance to S.E. and D.B. by obstructing anyone by force, intimidation, or deception in the performance of any act which might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of S.E. and D.B., in violation of SDCL 22-3-5(4)[.]
This type of offense is often referred to as accessory after the fact. See Dutton, 2023
S.D. 29, ¶ 11, 993 N.W.2d at 140 (“[A]n accessory after the fact is a party who,
knowing a felony has been committed, helped the principal, the individual who
committed the crime, in a way that obstructs justice.”).
[¶34.] Importantly, the only premise that can be gleaned from the existing
record is that the accessory crime for which J.W. was charged and adjudicated was
based on his initial lies to the police about allegedly seeing other kids running away
from the scene.8 Like in Joyce, this act of deception occurred after the damage to
the trailer was done. The appellate record does not contain any admissions by J.W.
to starting the fire or to aiding and abetting such acts. Therefore, because the
8. Although the parties’ briefs submitted to the circuit court on the issue of restitution are not evidence, we note that both refer to J.W.’s admissions to deceiving law enforcement about who started the fire when discussing the factual basis for the accessory crime. The State’s brief noted that J.W. specifically “admitted to concealing the other two juveniles’ identities so they would not be discovered.” Similarly, in J.W.’s brief, he admitted that he obstructed law enforcement by deception when he lied to them on the scene about two other alleged children running away from the trailer and up the hill. While the State made further arguments in its brief about J.W. going into the trailer and failing to take actions to minimize the damage after the fire was set, J.W. maintained, in his brief, that any other alleged involvement in the crime, outside of his admitted deception after law enforcement arrived, was disputed. He noted that prior to the parties reaching an agreement on the accessory charge, he had denied the second-degree burglary and aiding and abetting reckless burning charges in the initial petition and requested an adjudicatory hearing. These charges were eliminated in the amended petition. -19- #30810
damage to the trailer did not occur “as a result of” J.W.’s criminal act, he is not
liable for restitution.
[¶35.] We reverse and vacate the circuit court’s restitution order imposed as
part of J.W.’s disposition. In light of our decision on this first issue, it is
unnecessary to address the second issue.
[¶36.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, SALTER, and MYREN, Justices,
concur.
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