Interest of J.B.

2019 ND 258
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 29, 2019
Docket20190111
StatusPublished

This text of 2019 ND 258 (Interest of J.B.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Interest of J.B., 2019 ND 258 (N.D. 2019).

Opinion

Filed 10/29/2019 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2019 ND 258

In the Interest of J.B.

Kathleen K. Murray, State's Attorney, Petitioner and Appellee v. J.B., Respondent and Appellant

No. 20190111

Appeal from the District Court of Wells County, Southeast Judicial District, the Honorable James D. Hovey, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Justice.

Tyler Morrow, Grand Forks, ND, for respondent and appellant.

Kathleen Murray, State's Attorney, Fessenden, ND, for petitioner and appellee. Interest of J.B. No. 20190111

Jensen, Justice.

[¶1] J.B. appeals from an order denying his petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. J.B. argues the district court erred in determining he remains a sexually dangerous individual because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. We conclude clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s finding J.B. has serious difficulty controlling his behavior, and we affirm.

I

[¶2] In 2005, the district court found J.B. was a sexually dangerous individual and committed him to the care, custody, and control of the executive director of the North Dakota Department of Human Services. In July 2018, J.B. petitioned for discharge from commitment and requested a hearing. Dr. Deirdre M. D’Orazio completed an annual evaluation of J.B., and a report from the evaluation was filed. Dr. D’Orazio stated in her report that it was her professional opinion that J.B. continues to meet the criteria as a sexually dangerous individual. Dr. D’Orazio also completed an addendum to her report before the discharge hearing to provide a current opinion about whether J.B. continued to meet the definition of a sexually dangerous individual because more than five months had passed since the prior evaluation was completed.

[¶3] J.B. moved for an independent examiner to be appointed, and the district court appointed Dr. Stacey Benson. Dr. Benson’s report and evaluation was not filed and she did not testify at the hearing.

[¶4] After a January 2019 discharge hearing, the district court denied J.B.’s petition. The court found there was clear and convincing evidence J.B. remains a sexually dangerous individual and ordered that he continue to be committed.

1 II

[¶5] We review civil commitments of sexually dangerous individuals under a modified clearly erroneous standard. In re R.A.S., 2019 ND 169, ¶ 5, 930 N.W.2d 162. “[W]e will affirm the district court’s decision unless it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, or we are firmly convinced the decision is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. The State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner remains a sexually dangerous individual. Id.

[¶6] The State must prove three statutory elements to show the petitioner remains a sexually dangerous individual:

[1] [The individual] engaged in sexually predatory conduct and [2] . . . has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction [3] that makes that individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others.

R.A.S., 2019 ND 169, ¶ 5, 930 N.W.2d 162; see also N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8). In addition to the three statutory elements, to satisfy substantive due process, the State must also prove:

[T]he committed individual has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. . . . We construe the definition of a sexually dangerous individual to mean that proof of a nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness encompasses proof that the disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling behavior and suffices to distinguish a dangerous sexual offender whose disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist in the ordinary criminal case.

In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 3, 876 N.W.2d 25 (quoting In re Wolff, 2011 ND 76, ¶ 7, 796 N.W.2d 644); see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).

“The district court may consider sexual and non-sexual conduct demonstrating an individual’s serious difficulty controlling behavior, but the presence of a mental disorder or condition alone does not satisfy the requirement of clear

2 and convincing evidence the individual is likely to engage in further sexually predatory conduct.” R.A.S., 2019 ND 169, ¶ 7, 930 N.W.2d 162. “[T]he evidence must clearly show . . . a serious difficulty in controlling sexually predatory behavior.” In re J.M., 2019 ND 125, ¶ 16, 927 N.W.2d 422 (quoting In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 10, 713 N.W.2d 518). The court must make specific findings upon which its conclusion is based. R.A.S., at ¶ 7.

[¶7] J.B. does not argue the district court erred in finding the State met its burden of proving the three statutory elements to prove he remains a sexually dangerous individual, but he claims the court’s factual basis was not sufficient to support its finding that he has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. He contends the only evidence that supports the court’s finding was that he had one write-up for failing to get up for breakfast and empty his breakfast tray. He asserts that evidence was not sufficient and the court’s findings do not support its conclusion that the State provided clear and convincing evidence that he has serious difficulty controlling his behavior.

[¶8] The district court concluded clear and convincing evidence established J.B. continues to have serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The court found:

The addendum to Dr. D’Orazio’s report indicates that [J.B.] continues to have difficulty conforming to the rules at the Level 3 Community Transition Center, where he [has] required redirection for swearing and going against staff orders not to speak with a specific female staff person that he finds attractive. He continues to have difficulty listening to feedback, taking the perspective of others, interrupting others, and engaging in obtrusive behaviors.

The court further found:

[J.B.’s] deviant behavior started at an early age and is atypical. He has been institutionalized for the majority of his life. [J.B.] continues to relate to people with anger, resentment, and conflict. Between the date of Dr. D’Orazio’s original report and the hearing, [J.B.] continued to have difficulty consistently getting along with his peers and required redirection. He also received one behavioral write-up during that time frame for irresponsible treatment,

3 interfering behavior, and failure to follow rules and directions. Considering [J.B.’s] insufficient progress in completing the sex offender treatment program and continued behavioral issues, the Court finds that without the benefit of the structured environment in which he is currently placed that he would have serious difficulty controlling his sexual behavior. He requires slow incremented return to the community, which he is receiving.

Based on its findings, the court concluded J.B. has serious difficulty controlling his behavior and remains a sexually dangerous individual.

[¶9] The only evidence presented to the district court was through Dr. D’Orazio’s reports and her testimony. J.B. did not present any conflicting evidence.

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Related

Kansas v. Crane
534 U.S. 407 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Interest of Johnson
2016 ND 29 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2016)
Matter of J.M.
2019 ND 125 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2019)
Matter of R.A.S.
2019 ND 169 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2019)
Feland v. J.M.
2006 ND 96 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2006)
Burdick v. Wolff
2011 ND 76 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2011)
Lawyer v. J.M.(In re J.M.)
927 N.W.2d 422 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2019)
Burdick v. R.A.S. (In re R.A.S.)
930 N.W.2d 162 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2019 ND 258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/interest-of-jb-nd-2019.