Interchange Partners, L.L.C. v. City of West Des Moines

918 N.W.2d 502
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedApril 18, 2018
Docket17-0082
StatusPublished

This text of 918 N.W.2d 502 (Interchange Partners, L.L.C. v. City of West Des Moines) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Interchange Partners, L.L.C. v. City of West Des Moines, 918 N.W.2d 502 (iowactapp 2018).

Opinion

VOGEL, Presiding Judge.

At the heart of this litigation is whether a city can finance the construction of roadway culverts by establishing a district under Iowa Code section 384.38(3)(a) (2015), then collect fees from certain properties within the district. The City of West Des Moines (the City), enacted ordinances to allow for this form of financing. Interchange Partners, L.L.C. (Interchange) brought suit to contest the City's action. The district court ruled in Interchange's favor, concluding (1) the property does not have the required connection to a city utility, (2) the placement of culverts under the City's streets does not constitute a city sewer, and (3) the connection fee is not equitably apportioned among all persons in the district benefiting from the culverts.

The City appeals the district court's decision. As an initial matter, the City claims the district court, and this court on appeal, lack subject matter jurisdiction because certiorari is the exclusive means to challenge the City's ordinance and Interchange's failure to petition for a writ of certiorari within thirty days of the enactment of Ordinance No. 2117 is fatal. The City also claims the district court erred in finding Ordinance Nos. 2024 and 2117 were illegal because the City validly created a city sewer utility, properties within the district have the proper connection to this utility, and the calculation and apportionment of the fee is equitable. 1 Concluding we do have jurisdiction to hear the appeal and the district court did not err in interpreting Iowa Code section 384.38(3)(a), we affirm the district court's ruling.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On October 14, 2013, the City approved and passed Ordinance No. 2006 "to establish the method and requirements for the establishment of individual stormwater connection fee districts to fund the design and construction of certain stormwater drainage facilities on major streets." The stated intent of the ordinance includes "to set forth the method of recovery of proportional cost shares from those property owners who develop property within the" district.

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 384.38(3)(a), and after notice and public hearing regarding Ordinance No. 2024, the City established the Sugar Creek Stormwater Connection Fee District on April 11, 2014. The ordinance requires payment of the connection fee pursuant to the following:

1. For property being platted the fee is due and payable before approval of the final plat.
2. For property subject to a site plan the fee is due and payable before approval of the site plan.
3. For all other property the fee is due and payable before issuance of a building permit.

No fees were assessed to properties already developed or land considered to be undevelopable. Possibly due to only a portion of its property being located within the district, Interchange was not provided notice of Ordinance No. 2024. On October 5, 2015, the City enacted Ordinance No. 2117, which properly notified Interchange and confirmed its property is included in the district and, thus, subject to the connection fee.

The City intended to use connection fees from the district to fund the construction of seventeen structures-mostly roadway culverts-along natural drainage channels. The City acknowledged the new structures will not increase or decrease the runoff capacity from Interchange's properties, and the new structures will not improve the storm water flow capacity of the existing creek network.

On October 23, 2015, Interchange challenged the enactment of Ordinance No. 2117 "by and through Ordinance No. 2024" by filing a petition with the district court pursuant to Iowa Code section 384.66(1) asserting its "connection fee district" was wholly illegal, null, and void under Iowa Code section 384.38(3)(a). 2 Specifically, Interchange asserted the improvements, to be financed by the fees, are not city sewer or water utilities, Ordinance No. 2117 does not service its property because there is no utility to which its property could physically connect, and the assessment of the fees is inequitable across the newly created district.

The case proceeded to a bench trial before the district court where the court ruled in favor of Interchange. The district court held the City's Ordinances Nos. 2024 and 2117 are not compliant with the Iowa Code because the property does not have the required connection to a city utility, the placement of culverts under the City's streets does not constitute a city sewer, and there is no equitable apportionment of the costs as each person benefited by the culverts in the district is not required to pay the connection fee.

The City appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Review of rulings on subject matter jurisdiction is for correction of errors at law. Klinge v. Bentien , 725 N.W.2d 13 , 15 (Iowa 2006). The district court's ruling on the connection fee issue was based on an interpretation of Iowa Code chapter 384. Accordingly, we review the district court's ruling for correction of errors at law. State ex rel. Miller v. Smokers Warehouse Corp. , 737 N.W.2d 107 , 109 (Iowa 2007). Our review of the equity of property assessments is de novo. Nelson v. City of Hampton , 802 N.W.2d 224 , 230 (Iowa 2011). We give weight to the findings by the district court but are not bound by them. Id .

III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The City asserts this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the Iowa Code does not provide a specific means for appealing connection fees. It claims Interchange's exclusive remedy is to seek a writ of certiorari to test the legality of the City's quasi-judicial proceeding in enacting or adopting Ordinance No. 2117. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1402 ; Sergeant Bluff-Luton Sch. Dist. V. City Council of Sioux City , 605 N.W.2d 294 , 297 (Iowa 2000). Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See Klinge , 725 N.W.2d at 16 .

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Related

Klinge v. Bentien
725 N.W.2d 13 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2006)
State Ex Rel. Miller v. Smokers Warehouse Corp.
737 N.W.2d 107 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2007)
SHANNON BY SHANNON v. Hansen
469 N.W.2d 412 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1991)
Grove v. City of Des Moines
280 N.W.2d 378 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1979)
Sergeant Bluff-Luton School District v. City Council of Sioux City
605 N.W.2d 294 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2000)
Hearity v. Iowa District Court for Fayette County
440 N.W.2d 860 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1989)
Horak Prairie Farm, L.P. v. City of Cedar Rapids
748 N.W.2d 504 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2008)
Sueppel v. Eads
156 N.W.2d 115 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1968)
State v. Bartley
797 N.W.2d 608 (Court of Appeals of Iowa, 2011)

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Bluebook (online)
918 N.W.2d 502, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/interchange-partners-llc-v-city-of-west-des-moines-iowactapp-2018.