Interboro Insurance v. Perez

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Interboro Insurance v. Perez

112 A.D.3d 483, 976 N.Y.S.2d 378

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 12, 2013

StatusPublished

This text of 112 A.D.3d 483 (Interboro Insurance v. Perez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Interboro Insurance v. Perez, 112 A.D.3d 483, 976 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2013).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Wilma Guzman, J.), entered April 12, 2013, which denied plaintiffs motion for leave to enter a default judgment against all defendants and granted the cross motion of defendants-respondents KHL Acupuncture, EC. and South Shore Osteopathic Medicine, EC., to compel acceptance of their answers, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this action for a declaration that no-fault insurance coverage does not exist, based solely on defendant Perez’s failure to appear for an examination under oath (EUO), the motion court providently exercised its discretion in granting defendants-respondents’ cross motion to compel plaintiff to accept their belated answers (see CPLR 3012 [d]). The affirmation from respondents’ attorney sufficiently explained that the minimal delay was due to a computer inputting error in her office (Smoke v Windermere Owners, LLC, 109 AD3d 742 [1st Dept 2013]; Goldman v Cotter, 10 AD3d 289, 291 [1st Dept 2004]). We note that respondents’ counsel acted promptly upon discovering the error, there is no history of willful neglect, and plaintiff suffered no prejudice.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, a meritorious defense is not required to obtain relief under CPLR 3012 (d) (see Smoke, 109 AD3d at 742). In any event, respondents made such a showing by demonstrating that there is insufficient evidence that defendant Perez was properly notified of the EUOs. The affidavit of service submitted in support of plaintiffs motion for a default judgment was insufficient to satisfy its burden of establishing that the EUO scheduling letters were mailed in accordance with the no-fault implementing regulations (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]). Plaintiff also failed to provide objective proof of mailing establishing that the letters were mailed to Perez (see Matter of Szaro v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 13 AD3d 93, 94 [1st Dept 2004]). Accordingly, the motion court also properly denied plaintiffs motion for a default judgment (see CPLR 3215 [f]).

We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Gonzalez, EJ., Andrias, Saxe, Richter and Clark, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Wilma Guzman, J.), entered April 12, 2013, which denied plaintiffs motion for leave to enter a default judgment against all defendants and granted the cross motion of defendants-respondents KHL Acupuncture, EC. and South Shore Osteopathic Medicine, EC., to compel acceptance of their answers, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this action for a declaration that no-fault insurance coverage does not exist, based solely on defendant Perez’s failure to appear for an examination under oath (EUO), the motion court providently exercised its discretion in granting defendants-respondents’ cross motion to compel plaintiff to accept their belated answers (see CPLR 3012 [d]). The affirmation from respondents’ attorney sufficiently explained that the minimal delay was due to a computer inputting error in her office (Smoke v Windermere Owners, LLC, 109 AD3d 742 [1st Dept 2013]; Goldman v Cotter, 10 AD3d 289, 291 [1st Dept 2004]). We note that respondents’ counsel acted promptly upon discovering the error, there is no history of willful neglect, and plaintiff suffered no prejudice.

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, a meritorious defense is not required to obtain relief under CPLR 3012 (d) (see Smoke, 109 AD3d at 742). In any event, respondents made such a showing by demonstrating that there is insufficient evidence that defendant Perez was properly notified of the EUOs. The affidavit of service submitted in support of plaintiffs motion for a default judgment was insufficient to satisfy its burden of establishing that the EUO scheduling letters were mailed in accordance with the no-fault implementing regulations (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Bayshore Physical Therapy, PLLC, 82 AD3d 559, 560 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 705 [2011]). Plaintiff also failed to provide objective proof of mailing establishing that the letters were mailed to Perez (see Matter of Szaro v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 13 AD3d 93, 94 [1st Dept 2004]). Accordingly, the motion court also properly denied plaintiffs motion for a default judgment (see CPLR 3215 [f]).

We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Gonzalez, EJ., Andrias, Saxe, Richter and Clark, JJ.

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112 A.D.3d 483, 976 N.Y.S.2d 378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/interboro-insurance-v-perez-nyappdiv-2013.

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