Intel Corp. & Consolidated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner

67 F.3d 1445
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 16, 1995
DocketNos. 94-70105, 94-70158
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 67 F.3d 1445 (Intel Corp. & Consolidated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Intel Corp. & Consolidated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 67 F.3d 1445 (9th Cir. 1995).

Opinion

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought recovery of taxes from Intel Corporation and Consolidated Subsidiaries (“Intel”) for the years 1978 through 1980 in the respective amounts of $4,660,900, $6,539,152, and $24,676,625. Intel timely filed its petition in the Tax Court on September 19,1989.

[1446]*1446Settlement negotiations disposed of some issues, but others were unresolved. After a reeomputation of the deficiencies, the Tax Court on December 9, 1993 determined that Intel overpaid taxes in the amount of $87,476, $10,294,785, and $2,524,388 for the years 1978, 1979 and 1980 respectively. The Commissioner appeals from the decision of the Tax Court, under its heading “Export Source Issue,” while Intel appeals from the decision ordered under the heading “R & E Allocation Moratorium Issue.”

We affirm each of the Tax Court’s decisions.

I.

AN OVERVIEW

Few areas of federal income tax law rival in complexity the taxation of foreign source income. Not only must the indices of domestic and foreign source income be established, but its treatment by both the United States and the source nation must be determined.

The United States does not cede to the source nation the exclusive right to tax such income although it does provide a credit against the taxes it imposes for foreign taxes paid with respect to such income. To this extent and in this manner the United States does surrender a portion of its tax base to the foreign source. This “sharing of the tax base” with a foreign nation may be governed by tax treaties which supplant the tax regimes of both nations.

Moreover, deductions must also be apportioned between domestic and foreign sources in a rational manner. This too is not always a simple matter.

The dominant incentives applicable to a dispute between the Commissioner and a domestic taxpayer, such as Intel, having domestic and foreign income and deductions attributable to both sources are reasonably clear. The Commissioner ordinarily will seek to diminish the amount of foreign source income and allocate to that same source as large an amount of the deductions as feasible. In this manner the extent of cession of the United States tax base to a foreign nation is limited and the tax revenue to the United States is increased. The domestic taxpayer, on the other hand, reacts in the reverse fashion. Deductions should be brought home and income sent abroad.

These are the incentives that drive this case.

II.

SOURCING OF INTEL’S INCOME ON ITS FOREIGN SALES

Intel sells its products to customers abroad by arranging for title to pass within the foreign nation in which the customer takes delivery. The Commissioner seeks to enlarge the amount of income to be treated as having its source in the United States by insisting on applying what is known as the “Independent Factory or Production Price Method.”

Under this approach, Commissioner argues that despite the absence of a foreign branch in the country to which Intel’s products are shipped, and in which the title of such products passes, Intel should be compelled to treat as an amount realized on the sale equal to the “Independent Factory Price” and that any such gain should be United States income, not income having a source in the foreign country in which the product was sold.

Intel, on the other hand, contends that the point at which the title passes determines the source of at least a portion of the income. Intel rejects the Commissioner’s use of the “Independent Factory Price” method and argues for an apportionment method that allocates more income to the foreign nation in which the title to the property passed.

Both the Commissioner and Intel focus on Treasury Regulation § 1.863-3(b) (1981), in which three allocation methods of income having both domestic and foreign sources are set forth. The dispute centers on Examples (sometimes designated as Cases) 1 and 2, it being agreed the third example is not relevant. Example 1, the text of which is set out below,1 requires the use of the Independent [1447]*1447Factory Price allocation method, while Example 2, the text of which is also set out below, does not.2

The Commissioner contends that Intel must allocate its income from foreign sales pursuant to Example 1 even though it has no “independent distributor or other selling concerns” located in a foreign country. Were this proper, Intel’s independent factory or production price would be determined, and the property destined for foreign customers would be treated “as sold by the factory ... at the independent factory price so established.” 3

In rejecting the position of the Commissioner the Tax Court pointed out that section 863 of the Code has its origins in section 217(e) of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 244-45 (1923), the pertinent provisions of which have been retained without material alteration. Also, Examples (1) and (2) of the present Treas.Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(2) (1994) are substantially “Case 1 and Case 2” of Regs. 62, art. 327 (1922) promulgated pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1921.4

[1448]*1448Under these early regulations in a Case 2 situation the net income from cross-border sales was divided into two equal parts, one to reflect the gain from manufacturing and the other from marketing. The manufacturing portion was determined by multiplying one half the net income by a fraction: the numerator of which was the value of the taxpayer’s property, held or used to produce cross-border income within the United States, and the denominator of which was the value of such taxpayer’s property both within and without the United States. The marketing portion was determined by multiplying the remaining half of the net income by another fraction. This one had a numerator consisting of the gross sales of the taxable period within the United States and the denominator being the gross sales both within and without the United States. “Gross sales within the United States” were defined to mean “the aggregate amount of all sales made during the taxable year which were principally secured, negotiated or effected by employees, agents,. offices, or branches of the taxpayer’s business resident or located in the United States.” Case 2, Regs. 62, art. 327 (1922). While “gross sales without the United States” was not explicitly defined, it might suggest that, to source income in a foreign nation, some significant contact with that nation was necessary.

In this fashion these regulations implemented the purpose of Congress in enacting section 217(e) of the Revenue Act of 1921 to [1449]*1449secure a mixed source treatment of income derived from cross-border sales.

Intel’s contention that its cross border sales should be allocated in the manner set forth in Example 2 in the absence of any “independent distributors or other selling concerns” would appear to be even more unassailable after the adoption in 1957 of the so-called “title passage” rule in Treas.Reg. § 1.861-7 (1981). That regulation in subpart (c) states in relevant part:

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Related

Intel Corporation v. Commissioner
67 F.3d 1445 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
67 F.3d 1445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/intel-corp-consolidated-subsidiaries-v-commissioner-ca9-1995.