Insight Investments, LLC v. Stonebriar Commercial Finance LLC

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided March 19, 2025·No. 15-24-00133-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-24-00133-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/19/2025 4:49 PM No. 15-24-00133-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN I N THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/19/2025 4:49:07 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk Insight Investments, LLC, Appellant, v.

Stonebriar Commercial Finance LLC, Appellee.

On Appeal from the 380th District Court, Colin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 380-06242-2022 Honorable Benjamin N. Smith, presiding

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE’S MOTION TO VACATE AND TRANSFER

LeElle B. Slifer State Bar No. 24074549 Newman Nahas State Bar No. 24091576 Dylan French State Bar No. 24116393 WINSTON & STRAWN LLP 2121 North Pearl St., Ste 900 Dallas, Texas 75202 Telephone: (214) 453-6500 Facsimile: (214) 453-6400 lslifer@winston.com dfrench@winston.com Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Stonebriar Commercial Finance LLC

1 This Court should vacate its January 24, 2025 Order, and

Appellant’s Response does not show otherwise. The Response does not

dispute that an order issued by a court without jurisdiction is void ab

initio. The Response also concedes this Court is prohibited from deciding

this appeal. Yet, the Response maintains that this Court still somehow

had jurisdiction to review the Trial Court’s supersedeas ruling.

Unsurprisingly given the incoherence of this position, the Response’s

arguments all fail.

First, the Response incorrectly asserts that the prohibition against

this Court deciding this appeal is not jurisdictional. Appellant cites Tex.

Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal District, but that

case undermines rather supports its assertion because it concerned a

restriction that parties could waive by agreement. 694 S.W.3d 752, 759-

760 (Tex. 2024). That is not the case here. See Kelley v. Homminga,

2025 WL 826530, at *4 (Tex. Mar. 14, 2025) (“The “properly filed” cases

cannot be transferred out, while the “inappropriately filed” cases must

be.”) (emphasis added). Here, the restriction on this Court deciding this

appeal arises from the nature of the subject matter and thus cannot be

cured by agreement of the parties.

1 Accordingly, since this Court lacks the power to decide this appeal,

it was also without jurisdiction to review the Trial Court’s supersedeas

ruling. “The rules provide for review of the trial court's ruling on the

bond as part of the appeal from the final judgment in the case.” Transcon.

Realty Invs., Inc. v. Orix Cap. Markets LLC, 470 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.

App. 2015). When, as here, there is a final judgment and the court lacks

jurisdiction to review the final judgment, it is also without jurisdiction to

review an order superseding it. The two go hand-in-hand. See Gailey v.

Gutierrez, No. 01-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 127557, at *1 (Tex. App. Jan.

10, 2013) (“The record shows that the trial court signed the final

judgment in this case on February 16, 2010. Appellants did not appeal

the final judgment. Because there is not a pending appeal from the final

judgment in this case, we do not have jurisdiction to review the trial

court's order striking appellants' supersedeas bond.”) (emphasis added).

Second, Appellant unsoundly suggests that because the Patrick

Kelley decision agreed that this Court has state-wide jurisdiction, it

follows that this Court must have jurisdiction to review the Trial Court’s

supersedeas ruling here. 1 But this is a sleight of hand, and a poor one at

1 Compare Patrick Kelley, 2025 WL 826530, at *3 (“We agree the Fifteenth Court

has jurisdiction over civil cases appealed from every county”) with id. (“But this

2 that. As the Patrick Kelley decision proceeds to clarify, that state-wide

jurisdiction is confined to “certain civil cases,” not all civil cases. Patrick

Kelley, 2025 WL 826530, at *3 (emphasis added); id. at *4 (“‘properly

filed’” appeals must have a narrower meaning than all civil appeals”).

Here, Appellant’s case is not among the “certain civil cases” that this

Court has jurisdiction to hear. So, the language to which Appellant

points is simply irrelevant. The fact that this Court could have had

jurisdiction over a different case arising out of Collin county, hardly

means it has jurisdiction in this case.

Indeed, Appellant’s position here would entail the absurd result

that any appellant involved in any civil matter anywhere in Texas may

come to the Fifteenth Court to obtain review of a supersedeas order,

irrespective of whether this Court may decide the appeal. This is

contrary to Texas law. See Standiford v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2015 WL

5097113, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 28, 2015) (“Because there is not a pending

appeal from the judgment in this case, we do not have jurisdiction to

review the county court's order setting supersedeas bond.”)

jurisdictional premise alone does not establish that the Legislature intended to grant every civil appellant the option of litigating in the Fifteenth Court. To the contrary, several textual clues indicate that this is not what the Legislature intended at all”)

3 Finally , Appellant unsoundly suggests that the mere fact that this

Court is authorized to transfer this appeal means it therefore had

jurisdiction to issue the January 24, 2025 Order. This flips the reasoning

of Patrick Kelley on its head. The fact that this Court can (and must)

transfer this appeal does mean it therefore has jurisdiction to do other

things. To the contrary, it is precisely because this Court lacks

jurisdiction to do anything else that it is required to transfer. Id. at *4

(“When appeals regarding matters falling outside this jurisdiction are

noticed to the Fifteenth Court, they are ‘inappropriately filed’ and must

be transferred.”) (emphasis added). Thus, any actions other

than transfer (such as ruling on a supersedeas order) are outside of

this Court’s authorized jurisdiction and thus void.

Accordingly, for these reasons and those set forth in Stonebriar’s

initial Motion, which are wholly unrebutted by Appellant’s Response,

this Court should vacate its January 24, 2025 Order.

Dated: March 19, 2025 /s/Newman Nahas LeElle Slifer State Bar No. 24074549 Newman Nahas State Bar No. 24091576 Dylan French State Bar No. 24116393 WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

4 2121 North Pearl St., Ste 900 Dallas, Texas 75202 Telephone: (214) 453-6500 Facsimile: (214) 453-6400 lslifer@winston.com nnahas@winston.com dfrench@winston.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Stonebriar Commercial Finance LLC

5 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

document has been served on March 19, 2025 to all counsel of record via

E-Filing.

/s/ Newman Nahas Newman Nahas

6 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Lucy Fowler on behalf of Newman Nahas Bar No. 24091576 LFowler@winston.com Envelope ID: 98658008 Filing Code Description: Other Brief Filing Description: REPLY IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES MOTION TO VACATE Status as of 3/19/2025 4:53 PM CST

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