Innerarity v. Kennedy
Opinion
The material question for the _ Court to determine, is, whether the deed of William E. Kennedy to the plaintiff should not have been permitted to go in evidence to the jury in the Court below. The deed contains several recitals, descriptive of the lot conveyed, and declaratory of the cause of the conveyance, none of which it is conceived impair its validity -r and then conveys the lot to the plaintiff, as administrator of J. E. Collms, deceased, and covenants that if the grantor’s title to the lot shall be confirmed, or a certificate of confirmation issue therefor from the United States Government, that then he will, if necessary, make further assurance of title. The lot conveyed is south of the thirty first degree of north latitude, east of the Pearl, and west of the Perdido river. The .grantor in the deed refers to his title as emanating from the Spanish Governor, Gayoso, in seventeen hundred and ninety-eight. This deed, in the opinion of the Court, conveys to the plaintiff, all title which was vested in the grantor, and there is nothing, on the face of it, which discovers that the legal title was not vested in him. The covenant for further assurance, if further assurance were unnecessary to pass the legal title, would be rejected; whether it was, the Court is unprepared from the facts to say.
The deed, it has been remarked, makes a conveyance to the plaintiff as administrator of J. E. Collins, deceaed, and hence the defendant has argued, is not admissible for the plaintiffin this action in his individual capacity. This argument, it is believed is not sustainable; describing the plaintiff as administrator, can be viewed only as a designate personal.
1 Peters 693.
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2 Stew. 156 (Innerarity v. Kennedy) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.