Ingrande v. Kijakazi

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 11, 2025
• Docket: 3:22-cv-01574
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 MICHAEL I., Case No.: 22-cv-1574-DEB 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR 13 ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of U.S.C. § 406(b) 14 Social Security,1

15 Defendant. [DKT. NO. 16] 16 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. No. 16. Neither Plaintiff nor the Commissioner oppose the Motion. 19 Dkt. No. 19 (Commissioner’s Statement of Non-Opposition). 20 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Motion. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 In October 2022, Plaintiff Michael I. filed a complaint seeking judicial review of 23 the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of his application for 24 disability benefits. Dkt. No. 1. The parties stipulated to a voluntary remand pursuant to 25 sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 402(g). Dkt. No. 10. The Court remanded the action for 26

27 1 Frank Bisignano is substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

28 1 further administrative proceedings. Dkt. No. 11. Pursuant to a joint motion, the Court 2 awarded Plaintiff $1,245.24 in attorney fees under the Equal Access for Justice Act 3 (“EAJA”). Dkt. No. 15. 4 On remand, the Social Security Administration awarded Plaintiff past due benefits 5 of $150,159.00. Dkt No. 16-1. The Commissioner withheld $37,539.75 from the past-due 6 benefits in the event Plaintiff’s counsel requested payment of fees. Dkt. No. 16 at 2. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act governs counsel’s request for fees. Under 9 that provision, attorneys may seek “a reasonable fee” for cases in which they have 10 successfully represented Social Security claimants. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). This fee 11 cannot exceed “25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is 12 entitled . . . .” Id.; see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002) (“Within the 13 25 percent [statutory] boundary . . ., the attorney for the successful claimant must show 14 that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.”). 15 The Court “must ‘approach [§ 406(b)] fee determinations by looking first to the 16 contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 17 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In 18 evaluating the reasonableness of the fee award, the Court must consider “the character of 19 the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 20 (citations omitted). The amount of work performed at the administrative level is an 21 appropriate consideration “insofar as it [gives] the district court a better understanding of 22 factors relevant to its reasonableness inquiry.” Mudd v. Barnhart, 418 F.3d 424, 428 (4th 23 Cir. 2005); see Fields v. Kijakazi, 24 F.4th 845, 854 (2d Cir. 2022) (“courts should 24 consider the nature and length of the professional relationship with the claimant— 25 including any representation at the agency level—when determining whether a requested 26 fee can truly be deemed a windfall.”); Milam v. Barnhart, 387 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 27 (W.D. Va. 2005) (reasoning that 51.5 attorney hours spent on a case at the administrative 28 level demonstrated the complexity of the case). “[I]f the district court is going to make 1 substantial cuts to a winning lawyer’s fee request, it needs to explain why with sufficient 2 specificity that the lawyer can meaningfully object and we can meaningfully review the 3 objection.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008) (“gut 4 feelings are not enough”). “Congress was mindful that fee awards should be sufficient to 5 encourage adequate representation of claimants.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (citing 6 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 806). 7 Finally, the Court must offset the § 406(b) fee award by any fees granted under the 8 EAJA. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (“Fee awards may be made under both 9 prescriptions [i.e., the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)], but the claimant’s attorney must 10 ‘refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.’”) (citation omitted). 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $37,539.75 in attorney fees, offset by the $1,245.24 EAJA 13 fees, for a net award of $36,294.51. Dkt. No. 16 at 3. The Court has conducted an 14 independent inquiry of the proposed fee award and finds it is reasonable and does not 15 constitute a windfall. 16 Plaintiff and counsel agreed to a contingent-fee agreement where counsel receives 17 25 percent of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. Dkt. No. 16 at 2–3; Dkt. No. 16-2. Counsel is 18 requesting attorney fees of $37,539.75—the maximum allowed under the contingency 19 agreement and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Dkt. No. 16 at 2. Counsel’s representation resulted in 20 Plaintiff receiving a favorable decision and an award of past-due benefits totaling 21 $150,159. Dkt. No. 16, Ex. A. Counsel “assumed significant risk” in accepting this case, 22 “including the risk that no benefits would be awarded or that there would be a long court 23 or administrative delay in resolving” the case. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152; see also 24 Moreno v. Berryhill, No. CV 13-8492-PLA, 2018 WL 3490777, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 25 2018) (explaining the “risk of nonpayment inherent in a contingency agreement”). 26 Counsel persuaded the Commissioner to agree to a remand of this case without 27 briefing, avoiding additional fees related to a district court review. Upon administrative 28 review, counsel spent more than 60 attorney hours achieving a successful award for | several years of past due benefits. Dkt. No. 16 at 3-4. Although attorney hours spent 2 before the agency are not part of the fee award here, that time helps the Court evaluate 3 |! “the overall complexity of the case, the lawyering skills necessary to handle it effectively, 4 the risks involved, and the significance of the result achieved in district court.” Mudd, 5 F.3d at 428. Moreover, Plaintiff's first attorney abandoned the case, suggesting 6 || Plaintiff could not have prevailed without this counsel’s advocacy. Id. at 5. 7 Finally, the Court does not find a reduction is warranted. See Crawford, 586 F.3d 8 1151 (“The court may properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, or ? benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.”) (citation omitted). 10 ||There is no evidence of substandard performance or delay, and the requested fees are IT | «not excessively large in relation to the benefits achieved” or the “time spent on the 12 case.” Id. Instead, counsel’s actions were highly effective. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Counsel’s Motion for 15 Rees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $37,539.75. Dkt. No. 16. 16 The Commissioner is DIRECTED to certify payment of a fee award 17 || of $37,539.75, made payable to Ashish A. Agrawal of Chermol and Fishman, 11450 18 || Bustleton Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19116, out of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits 19 in accordance with agency policy. 20 The Court further ORDERS Plaintiff’s counsel to refund Plaintiff $1,245,24 to 21 |! offset the EAJA fees previously awarded. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: June 11, 2025 24 dalo 5 Honorable Daniel E. Butcher 46 United States Magistrate Judge

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