Ingram v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
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Opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3 * * *
4 Theresa Ingram, Case No. 2:24-cv-02253-BNW-CDS
5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.
7 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, et al., 8 Defendant. 9 10 Pro se Plaintiff Theresa Ingram brings this lawsuit and moves to proceed in forma 11 pauperis (IFP). See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 12 showing an inability to prepay fees or costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the Court will 13 grant her request to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court now screens Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF 14 No. 1-1). 15 I. ANALYSIS 16 A. Screening standard 17 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 18 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 19 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 20 granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for 22 failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 23 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient 24 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft 25 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only 26 dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 27 1 his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 3 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of 4 material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler 5 Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 6 Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 7 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 8 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 9 Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se 10 plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s 11 deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 12 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege that (1) the conduct 13 complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and that (2) the 14 conduct deprived a person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws 15 of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, 16 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Section 1983 is the appropriate avenue to remedy an 17 alleged wrong only if both of these elements are present. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 18 1354 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). 19 B. Screening the complaint 20 Plaintiff alleges she has been “prosecuted mentally, physically, and emotionally” for more 21 than a decade based on the illegal surveillance by METRO of her “home, [her] phone, in every 22 aspect of [her life].” ECF No. 1-1. As a result, she brings claims under the following federal and 23 state statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 18 U.S.C. § 249, NRS § 199.130, NRS 24 § 197.200, NRS § 199.210, NRS § 197.130, and NRS § 200.575. 25 The problem with Plaintiff’s claims is that private civil causes of action are rarely implied 26 under criminal statutes. Abcarian v. Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th 2020). Plaintiff makes no 27 showing that any of the criminal statutes she cites impliedly contain private rights of action. 1 statutes. See, e.g., Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (no private right of 2 action or basis of civil liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242); Sordean v. United States, 1995 WL 3 86548, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1995) (no private right of action or civil liability under 18 U.S.C. 4 § 247); Ross v. Orange Cty. Bar Ass’n, 369 Fed. Appx. 868, 869 (9th Cir. 2010) (no private right 5 of action or civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1341); Partin v. Gevatoski, 2020 WL 4587386, at *3 6 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2020) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1661); Jordan v. State ex rel. 7 Dep’t of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 69, 110 P.3d 30, 48 (2005) (finding that 8 NRS 197.200, which makes it a criminal offense for “an officer to unlawfully and maliciously, 9 under pretense or color of official authority, commit oppression by arresting or detaining another 10 against his will,” does not create a civil cause of action), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz 11 Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008); Dyson v. Utigard, 163 12 F.3d 607, 607 (9th Cir.1998). 13 Thus, this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed without leave to 14 ammend.
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