UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TONIA INGRAM, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 18-1598 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 10 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHILD AND : FAMILY SERVICES AGENCY, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Tonia Ingram, a former employee of the District of Columbia Child and Family Services
Agency (“CFSA”), brought this lawsuit challenging discriminatory and retaliatory practices by
CFSA that she alleges eventually led to her termination. Ingram suffers from severe anxiety, and
she alleges that CFSA discriminated against her on the basis of that disability, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213, and D.C. Human Rights
Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 to -1404.04. Ingram further alleges that CFSA
retaliated against her after she complained about the discrimination by terminating her
employment, in violation of the ADA and DCHRA. CFSA has now moved to dismiss Ingram’s
complaint in its entirety, arguing that Ingram has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as
to her ADA retaliation claim, never engaged in a protected activity that would form the basis for
a DCHRA retaliation claim, and does not qualify as disabled under the ADA and DCHRA. The
Court agrees only as to the first argument. First, Ingram concedes that she has failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies as to the ADA retaliation claim, and the Court therefore dismisses it. However, taking all inferences in her favor—as it must at the motion to dismiss stage—the Court
finds that Ingram has sufficiently alleged that she engaged in a protected activity, and it
accordingly denies the motion to dismiss Ingram’s DCHRA retaliation claim. And because
Ingram has alleged facts sufficient to plausibly infer that she was regarded as disabled by CFSA,
the Court also denies the motion to dismiss as to her ADA and DCHRA disability discrimination
claims. 1
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2
A. Ingram’s Background and Employment at CFSA
Ingram is a licensed clinical social worker with over fifteen years of experience. Compl.
¶¶ 13–14, ECF No. 1. She suffers from severe anxiety, which she was formally diagnosed with
in the 2000s. Id. ¶ 11. Ingram has been prescribed anxiety medication to help deal with the
condition and she “also seeks mental health counseling as needed.” Id. While Ingram worked at
CFSA, she mentioned her condition to some of her coworkers, including to her supervisors, but
she never informed the agency’s human resources department (“HR”) of the condition. See id.
¶ 12.
In September 2011, Ingram was hired by CFSA as an investigator social worker. Id.
¶ 15. The position required Ingram to “assess[] and investigate[] allegations of neglect and
physical and sexual assault of children living in the District of Columbia.” Id. ¶ 16. Ingram
1 In her opposition, Ingram also appears to be requesting leave to amend her complaint. Because it is unclear to the Court whether this request for leave is in the alternative to Ingram’s other arguments, and because Ingram has neither filed a motion for leave to amend nor complied with the meet-and-confer requirements of this Court’s local rules, see D.D.C. R. 7(m), the Court does not address the request in this opinion. Ingram remains free to file a motion for leave to amend her complaint if she so desires. 2 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaint and construes them liberally in the Plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000).
2 performed well on the job, obtaining a “Hero Award” in 2014 for providing excellent service and
receiving an invitation to participate in a CFSA rapid response team tackling backlogged cases in
2015. See id. ¶ 17. In 2016, Ingram was promoted to the position of supervisory social worker,
in which she would “supervis[e] a team of four Child Protective Social Workers.” Id. ¶ 19.
After her promotion, Ingram’s new supervisor became Cherlitheia Irving, a program manager at
CFSA. See id. ¶¶ 18–19.
Ingram initially had a cordial relationship with Irving. See id. ¶ 20. While Irving was
formally assigned as Ingram’s supervisor, Ingram “did not report to her regularly” and Irving
would advise Ingram “to seek consultation with another Program Manager because Irving
supervised too many people to advise [Ingram].” Id. However, Irving and Ingram began
meeting more regularly around November 2017, at which point “the relationship began to sour.”
Id. ¶ 21. Although Irving gave Ingram a satisfactory performance evaluation in December 2017,
id. ¶ 22, she shortly thereafter began harassing her, id. ¶ 23.
On December 11, 2017, Irving expressed doubts about Ingram’s judgment regarding a
particular case where Ingram had indicated that removal of children from their parents’ custody
might be necessary (the “Gillis case”). Id. ¶¶ 24–25. While discussing the Gillis case, Irving
accused Ingram of “failure to listen and failure to accept constructive criticism” in a “harsh and
condescending manner.” Id. ¶ 27. According to Ingram, Irving then continued to harass her
specifically because of her anxiety, “us[ing] Ingram’s anxiety as a means of controlling the
narrative of [Ingram]’s work, conduct, and performance.” Id. ¶ 32. Irving “made it appear to
others in the organization that [Ingram] was no longer able to make sound clinical decisions due
to her anxiety,” and “mocked [Ingram] by making statements to upper management that she was
3 ‘running around acting anxious.’” Id. Irving also “falsely accused [Ingram] of harassing and
chastising workers because she suffers from anxiety.” Id. ¶ 33.
On December 13, 2017, Ingram reached out to Elizabeth Muffoletto, a program
administrator at CFSA. See id. ¶¶ 31, 35. Ingram “recounted the details of the harassment
caused by Irving” but “noted that there was no altercation, rather there was a difference in
opinion and a discussion with respect to the Gillis Case.” Id. ¶¶ 36–37. She told Muffoletto that
“this was the first time she had a removal case with Irving as supervisor, it was messy, and Irving
was unsupportive.” Id. ¶ 37. And she asked Muffoletto if she could be moved from Irving’s
supervision to another program manager, because “she perform[ed] better under” the other
program manager, who was more supportive. Id. ¶ 39. Muffoletto denied the transfer of
supervision. See id. Muffoletto also told Ingram that she “was acting paranoid and that her
thoughts were all over the place,” which Ingram explained was because her anxiety “was getting
bad and she was having difficulties articulating her thoughts.” Id. ¶ 38.
On January 12, 2018, Ingram had a supervision meeting with Irving. See id. ¶ 43. After
the meeting became contentious, Irving called Muffoletto into her office to “observe [Ingram’s]
behavior.” Id. ¶ 45. Irving accused Ingram of rejecting her supervision and feedback, see id.
¶ 49, and of failing to take appropriate notes in her cases, id. ¶ 50. Irving also told Ingram that
she was “running around the agency acting anxious” the night of the removal in the Gillis case.
Id. ¶ 52. Irving continued to criticize Ingram’s work over the next few weeks, accusing her of,
inter alia, “lying about a case” and “not managing her social workers” on January 18, 2018, id.
¶¶ 58–59. Ingram again complained to Muffoletto, who “took no action” as a result. Id. ¶ 63.
At some later point in February, Irving “accused [Ingram] of calling and harassing her social
4 workers after hours,” which “Irving alleged . . . was . . . because [Ingram’s] anxiety caused her
an irrational desire to close out cases.” Id. ¶ 69.
The relationship between Irving and Ingram ultimately got so bad that “Irving began to
take notes of every conversation with [Ingram] to create a ‘paper trail,’” with Ingram herself
“taking her own notes to paint a more accurate picture of the situation.” Id. ¶ 74. On March 9,
2018, Ingram “participated in a focus group with court-appointed monitors” and “briefly
informed them about her ongoing issue with Irving.” Id. ¶ 74. On March 14, Ingram was
informed by CFSA HR that she would be terminated, with no explanation for the termination
other than the fact that she was an at-will employee. Id. ¶ 78. Ingram was placed on
administrative leave starting March 15, and was formally terminated on March 29, 2018. See id.
¶¶ 78–80.
B. Procedural History
Ingram filed a formal charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on March 23, 2018. See id. ¶ 2. On April 5, 2018, the EEOC issued
Ingram a right to sue letter. See id. ¶ 5. Ingram filed suit on July 5, 2018, bringing claims for
disability discrimination and retaliation under both the ADA and DCHRA. See id. ¶¶ 84–95.
CFSA has now moved to dismiss the entire complaint for failure to state a claim. See Def.’s
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 10. Ingram has filed an opposition, see Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n
Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 12, and CFSA has filed its reply, see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 13. The
motion is now ripe for consideration.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To prevail on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff need only provide
a “short and plain statement of [her] claim showing that [she is] entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
5 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint” under that standard; it asks whether the
plaintiff has properly stated a claim. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
In considering such a motion, the complaint must be construed “liberally in the plaintiff’s favor
with the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Stewart v. Nat’l
Educ. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d
1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This means that a
plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are therefore insufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal
conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that
are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
IV. ANALYSIS
CFSA has moved to dismiss Ingram’s entire complaint for failure to state a claim. The
agency argues that Ingram’s ADA retaliation claim fails because Ingram has not exhausted her
administrative remedies, see Def.’s Mem. Supp. 6–9, that her DCHRA retaliation claim fails
6 because she has not alleged that she took part in a protected activity, see id. at 9–11, and that her
disability discrimination claims under the ADA and DCHRA fail because she has not alleged
that she is disabled under those Acts, see id. at 4–6. As an initial matter, the Court grants the
motion to dismiss Ingram’s ADA retaliation claim because she concedes that she has failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies. See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n 2. The Court reviews CFSA’s two
other arguments in turn. Finding neither persuasive, it denies the motion to dismiss as to both
Ingram’s DCHRA retaliation claim and her two disability discrimination claims.
A. Ingram Has Sufficiently Alleged that She Engaged in Protected Activity
First, the Court addresses CFSA’s argument that Ingram fails to state a retaliation claim
under the DCHRA because she “has not alleged a protected activity within the meaning of the
DCHRA.” Def.’s Mem. Supp. 9. While recognizing that Ingram complained about harassment
by Irving on several occasions, CFSA contends that she did not engage in protected activity
because she “fails to plausibly assert that her complaints to management mentioned alleged
discriminatory conduct by Irving.” Id. at 10. That argument certainly has merit, and the issue is
a close call. But, taking all inferences in Ingram’s favor at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court
finds that her allegations are sufficient—though barely—to suggest that she complained about
discrimination. The Court therefore denies CFSA’s motion to dismiss the DCHRA retaliation
claim.
DCHRA retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework, pursuant to which a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
See, e.g., Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Carpenter v. Fed. Nat’l
Mortgage Ass’n, 174 F.3d 235 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999). And “[t]he elements of a retaliatory claim
are the same under the DCHRA as under the federal employment discrimination laws.” Leftwich
7 v. Gallaudet Univ., 878 F. Supp. 2d 81, 97 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Howard Univ. v. Green, 652
A.2d 41, 45 (D.C. 1994)). To make a prima facie case of retaliation under the DCHRA, a
plaintiff must therefore allege “(1) that she engaged in protected activity; (2) that she was
subjected to adverse action by the employer; and (3) that there existed a causal link between the
adverse action and the protected activity.” Walden v. Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Inst.,
177 F. Supp. 3d 336, 343 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Powell v. Am. Red Cross, 518 F. Supp. 2d 24,
36 (D.D.C. 2007)).
Protected activity “encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures such as
complaining to management or human resources about the discriminatory conduct.” Peters v.
District of Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 200 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Richardson v. Gutierrez,
477 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2007)). However, “[n]ot every complaint garners its author
protection.” Id. at 205 (alteration in original) (quoting Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226,
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). “While no ‘magic words’ are required, the complaint must in some way
allege unlawful discrimination, not just frustrated ambition.” Broderick, 437 F.3d at 1232.
Here, CFSA argues that Ingram cannot establish her prima facie case of retaliation
because she did not engage in any protected activity. Def.’s Mem. Supp. 9–10. Although
Ingram complained to Muffoletto about Irving’s conduct on repeated occasions, CFSA contends
that the complaint does not make any allegations that Ingram complained of discriminatory
conduct specifically. See id. at 10. In her opposition, Ingram retorts that the December 13, 2017
meeting with Muffoletto was a protected activity because she complained about harassment by
Irving on the basis of Ingram’s anxiety. Pl.’s Opp’n 4. Although it is a very close call, the Court
sides with Ingram.
8 To be sure, the complaint is very light on the details of just how much Ingram told
Muffoletto at the December 13, 2017 meeting. Some of Ingram’s allegations point to a personal
dispute unconnected to discrimination, with Ingram allegedly telling Muffoletto that her problem
with Irving came from “a difference of opinion . . . about the Gillis Case,” Compl. ¶ 37, that
Irving was “unsupportive,” id., and that Ingram wanted to be removed from Irving’s supervision
because “she perform[ed] better” under another supervisor, who was more supportive, id. ¶ 39.
But Ingram does allege that she believed at the time that “Ingram’s harassment was directed at
her because of her anxiety,” id. ¶ 32, and that she “cried as she recounted the details of the
harassment caused by Irving” at the meeting with Muffoletto, id. ¶ 36. Taking all inferences in
Ingram’s favor, it could be inferred that Ingram’s recounting of the details of harassment she
believed was caused by her anxiety would have involved disclosing this perceived discrimination
to Muffoletto. Although there are few relevant allegations for the Court to rely on, it construes
the complaint liberally and finds that Ingram has sufficiently alleged that the December 13, 2017
meeting was a protected activity at this early stage. Because CFSA does not make any other
argument for dismissal, the Court denies the motion to dismiss as to the DCHRA retaliation
B. Ingram Has Sufficiently Alleged that She is Disabled
Next, the Court turns to Ingram’s disability discrimination claims pursuant to the ADA
and DCHRA. CFSA argues that the claims fail as a matter of law because Ingram has not
sufficiently alleged that she is disabled within the meaning of the two statutes. See Def.’s Mem.
Supp. 4–6. And, in a footnote, CFSA also appears to contend that Ingram’s claims should be
dismissed because she has not alleged that she requested a reasonable accommodation for her
anxiety. See id. at 6 n.4. The Court finds neither argument persuasive—indeed, CFSA appears
9 to misstate the law regarding what constitutes a disability discrimination claim. It accordingly
denies the motion to dismiss Ingram’s disability discrimination claims. 3
As with Ingram’s DCHRA retaliation claim, both her ADA and DCHRA disability
discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
See, e.g., Giles v. Transit Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015). To establish
a prima facie case of discrimination under both the ADA and DCHRA, a plaintiff must show
“that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, she was qualified for the position at issue
with or without a reasonable accommodation, and she suffered an adverse employment action
because of her disability.” Walden, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 341 (citing Giles, 794 F.3d at 5).
‘“Disability’ is a[] term of art . . . that carries a specific meaning.” Adams v. Rice, 531
F.3d 936, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In order to qualify as disabled under the ADA, an individual
must have “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such an individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;” or (C) must be “regarded as
having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Importantly, “[a]n individual meets the
requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that
. . . she has been subjected to [discrimination] because of an actual or perceived physical or
3 The Court notes that the complaint leaves unclear whether Ingram truly intended to bring a disability discrimination claim or whether she intended to bring a claim for hostile work environment. The complaint repeatedly references Irving’s “harassment” of Ingram, e.g. Compl. ¶ 32 (“Irving’s harassment was directed at [Ingram] because of her anxiety.”); id. ¶ 85 (“Defendant violated Plaintiff’s rights to nondiscrimination under the ADA by allowing Irving to continue harassing Plaintiff after multiple notifications.”). And, in stating her claims for disability discrimination, Ingram alleges that the harassment was “severe and pervasive,” id. ¶¶ 86, 90, an element of a hostile work environment claim, see, e.g., Floyd v. Lee, 968 F. Supp. 2d 308, 334 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that, to prevail on hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff had to establish that alleged harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment” (quoting Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, Chairman, 709 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2013))).
10 mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity.” Id. § 12102(3)(A); see also Alexander v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 826 F.3d 544,
548 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that a “regarded-as claim ‘does not require a showing of an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity’” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3)).
And Congress has made clear that “[t]he definition of disability . . . shall be construed in favor of
broad coverage under th[e] [ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).
CFSA argues that an individual is disabled under the ADA when she has “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” Def.’s Mem. Supp.
5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)), and that Ingram has not alleged she is disabled under the ADA
because she “does not allege that her ‘severe anxiety’ substantially limits a major life activity,”
id. The obvious problem with CFSA’s argument is that it misstates the standard for what
constitutes a disability by disregarding the two other ways in which an individual can qualify as
disabled. And here, the Court agrees with Ingram that she has met that standard, at least at the
motion to dismiss stage, because there are sufficient allegations to create the inference that
CFSA regarded Ingram as disabled. Ingram alleges that Irving harassed her because of her
anxiety. See Compl. ¶ 32. She accuses Irving of using her anxiety “as a means of controlling the
narrative of [her] work, conduct and performance[,] . . . ma[king] it appear to others in the
organization that [Ingram] was no longer able to make sound clinical decisions due to her
anxiety,” and “mock[ing] [Ingram] by making statements to upper management that she was
‘running around acting anxious.’” Id. She also alleges that Irving “accused [her] of calling and
harassing her social workers after hours . . . because her anxiety caused her an irrational desire to
close out cases.” Id. ¶ 69. And she alleges that Muffoletto told her she “was acting paranoid and
. . . her thoughts were all over the place” when she discussed her concerns about Irving. Id. ¶ 38.
11 Construing the complaint liberally, these allegations create the plausible inference that CFSA
regarded Ingram’s anxiety as a mental impairment, satisfying the “regarded as” definition of
disability, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).
In a footnote, CFSA also argues that Ingram “failed to allege any facts showing that at
any point she requested or required any reasonable accommodations.” Def.’s Mem. Supp. 6 n.5.
In doing so, CFSA appears to confuse the prima facie case for failure to accommodate with the
prima facie case for disability discrimination. As discussed above, establishing a prima facie
case of disability discrimination under the ADA or DCHRA does not require a plaintiff to
request a reasonable accommodation. Instead, all a plaintiff must show is “that she was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, she was qualified for the position at issue with or without a
reasonable accommodation, and she suffered an adverse employment action because of her
disability.” Walden, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 341. Such an adverse employment action can take many
forms, including “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing
significant change in benefits.” Id. at 342 (quoting Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552
(D.C. Cir. 2009)). Whether Ingram made a request for a reasonable accommodation is therefore
not relevant to her disability discrimination claims. 4 And because CFSA does not make any
4 The Court once again notes that it is unclear whether Ingram intended to bring a claim for failure to accommodate in her complaint. On one hand, Ingram formally brings claims only for disability discrimination and retaliation. See Compl. ¶¶ 84–95. On the other hand, she alleges that she “asked if Muffoletto could accommodate her” at the December 13, 2017 meeting, id. ¶ 39, which suggests she may have intended to make such a claim. To the extent Ingram still intends to file a motion for leave to amend, clarifying exactly what claims she brings would be helpful both to the Court and to the parties in efficiently resolving this case.
12 other argument for dismissal, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the ADA and DCHRA
discrimination claims. 5
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is
separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: August 21, 2019 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge
5 The complaint does not explicitly allege what adverse action suffered by Ingram forms the basis for her disability discrimination claims. But CFSA fails to otherwise make any argument as to adverse action, and it is not the Court’s role “to act as an advocate for [the parties] and construct legal arguments on [their] behalf.” Beach TV Props., Inc. v. Solomon, 383 F. Supp. 3d 25, 33 (D.D.C. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Real Prop. Identified as: Parcel 03179-005R, 287 F. Supp. 2d 45, 61 (D.D.C. 2003)). Regardless, Ingram’s termination easily qualifies as an adverse action. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002).