Ingraham v. Commercial Lead Co.

177 F. 341, 101 C.C.A. 317, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 24, 1910
DocketNo. 3,115
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 177 F. 341 (Ingraham v. Commercial Lead Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ingraham v. Commercial Lead Co., 177 F. 341, 101 C.C.A. 317, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379 (8th Cir. 1910).

Opinion

ADAMS, Circuit Judge.

This was a bill by a judgment creditor of the Commercial Lead Company, a corporation, to collect his judgment from stockholders alleged not to have paid for the stock held by them. Two common defenses were made by all the defendants, [342]*342except the Columbia Lead Company and E. A. Rozier. The' first consists of a denial that their stock was not fully paid, and the second of an averment that -the corporation owes them more than any possible stock liability on their part. The Circuit Court, after a hearing on the merits, dismissed the bill, and complainant appeals.

These- are the facts': -The corporation was organized in 1903 as a manufacturing and business company under the provisions of chapter 12, art. 9, of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1899 (pages 10G4-1082, Ann. St. 1906), to carry on the business of lead mining. Its capital was $60,000, divided into 6,000 full-paid shares of $10 each. "Its principal asset consisted of a lease of a valuable lead mine located in "St. Francois county, Mo. The expectation of the stockholders was that the capital would be sufficient to do all necessary development work and put the company upon a paying and profitable basis; but a protracted strike of the miners, the flooding of the mine, and the cost of development work soon exhausted the original capital and discouraged the "stockholders. They had incurred debts amounting to $60,000 or-$65,000. They had tried to borrow money, but could not do so on the credit of the corporation. They had tried to sell their leasehold, pay their debts, and quit business, but found it impossible to do so. They' then took the requisite steps under the law of Missouri to increase- their capital from $60,000 to $100,000, and attempted to sell the increased issue of capital stock, but had failed in doing that. Inspired by great confidence in the ultimate outcome of their venture, they then adopted a plan of raising $75,000 by loaning that amount, in sums proportionate to the amount of the original stock held by each stockholder, to the company. As an inducement and part consideration for making these loans the stockholders were to receive 50 per cent, of the amount loaned by them in the increased stock 'of the'company. Competent mining experts had assured them that by raising that amount of money the)’' would have enough to pay off existing debts arid $10,000 or $15,000 more, and that°by judiciously using this excess the'mine could be put upon a paying basis within 60 days. Conforming to this plan, the defendants, who were originally interested in the company either as directors or stockholders, and some few others, made loans to the company, receiving its promissory notes, bearing interest at 7 per cent, per annum, for the amount loaned by them, respectively, and also the percentage of stock agreed upon as a bonus. In this way $69,500 was secured. The remaining $5,500 could not be obtained without a greater bonus, and the same, by consent of the parties interested, was given.

This money was consumed in paying the old debts and in an attempt to resume mining operations. The result proved a .failure. The defendants lost all the money loaned by them, and a few new creditors, like .the complainant, have not yet collected their debts. The proof shows that the enterprise was originally undertaken in good faith for the purpose of organizing a business, but, like many other most promising mining ventures, proved disastrous; that afterwards an honest effort was made to resuscitate the company, by increasing its capital and making use of the stock in good faith to accomplish:

[343]*343that purpose. No stock-jobbing or speculating scheme was ever intended or practiced. The original capital had become so impaired that the stock representing it was valueless, and the new stock in the nature of the case could, not. be sold on the market for its face value. No independent investors would buy $40,000 work of new stock, when $60,000 of worthless old stock was to share in its benefits proportionately. Whether we view the transaction in the light of the prevailing conditions at the time the loans were made by the defendants, or in the light of the subsequent actual developments, we cannot doubt that the $75,000 loan to the corporation by the defendants was the full equivalent of the actual value of the notes and stock of the company received by them. The transaction, consisting nominally of loaning the money and taking the notes and increased stock of the company, was in reality the payment of $75,000 to the company for $10,000 of its increased stock and the promise (of doubtful value) of repayment by a company which then had no actual credit or financial standing.

The facts involved in the case of Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417, 11 Sup. Ct. 534, 535 (35 L. Ed. 227), were substantially like those in this. Mr. Justice Brown, there speaking for the court, said:

“The case then resolves itself into the question whether an active corporation. or as it is called in some cases, a ‘going concern,’ finding its original capital impaired by loss or misfortune, may not, for the purpose of recuperating itself and providing new conditions for the successful prosecution of its business, issue new stock, put it upon the market, and sell it for the best price that can be obtained. * * * To say that a corporation may not, under the circumstances above indicated, put its stock upon the market and, sell it to the highest bidder, is practically to declare that a corporation can never increase its capital by a sale of shares, if the original stock has fallen below par. * * * go long as the transaction is bona ikle, and' not a mere cover for ‘watering’ the stock, and the consideration ohtalucd represents the actual va lue of such stock, the courts have shown no disposition to disturb it * * * As the company in this ca.se found it impossible to negotiate its bonds at par without the stock, and as the stock was issued for the purpose of enhancing the value ol’ the bonds, and was taken by the subscribers to the bonds at a price fairly representing the value of both stock and bonds, we think the transaction should be sustained, and that the defendants cannot be called upon to respond for the par value of such stock, as if they had subscribed to the original stock of the company.”

The effort of learned counsel for complainant to distinguish between Handley v. Stutz and the case now under consideration, on the ground that the former did not involve the application of the laws of Missouri, is not satisfactory to us. In the case of Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118, 11 Sup. Ct. 476, 35 L. Ed. 104, which was before the Supreme Court at the same time it was considering Handley v. Stutz, a judgment creditor of an insolvent corporation, organized and doing business under the laws of the state of Missouri, sought to hold a stockholder liable for unpaid portions of stock held by him. It was there urged and conceded that capital stock of a corporation was a trust fund for the benefit of creditors, and the laws of Missouri and the decisions of the Supreme Court of that state on the subject were under consideration. In view of them all, conclusions were reached to the effect that, in determining whether stock is full-paid [344]*344or not, regard should be had to the actual value of the stock at the time it was issued and to the circumstances attending its disposition. It was said, among other things:

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Bluebook (online)
177 F. 341, 101 C.C.A. 317, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ingraham-v-commercial-lead-co-ca8-1910.