Ingold v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Ingold v. State

746 So. 2d 495, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 14780, 1999 WL 1015148

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 10, 1999

DocketNo. 98-02955

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 746 So. 2d 495 (Ingold v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Ingold v. State, 746 So. 2d 495, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 14780, 1999 WL 1015148 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

The circuit court revoked David Ingold’s probation based on its finding that Ingold evinced “a general lack of concern and general lack of compliance with the terms of his probation.” The court did not reduce that finding to writing, nor did it make any other oral or written finding that Ingold had violated a specific condition of his probation. We reverse because the court’s finding did not rise to the level required to justify the revocation of In-gold’s probation.

Probation may be revoked only if the probationer has willfully and substantially violated a specific condition of his probation. See Fields v. State, 737 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Hightower v. State, 529 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Here, the evidence of Ingold’s technical violations reflected a less-than-assiduous attention to some of his probation obligations. But we agree with the circuit court’s apparent conclusion that the evidence did not warrant a finding that In-gold had willfully and substantially violated a specific condition.

Reversed.

WHATLEY, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., Concur.

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NORTHCUTT, Judge.

The circuit court revoked David Ingold’s probation based on its finding that Ingold evinced “a general lack of concern and general lack of compliance with the terms of his probation.” The court did not reduce that finding to writing, nor did it make any other oral or written finding that Ingold had violated a specific condition of his probation. We reverse because the court’s finding did not rise to the level required to justify the revocation of In-gold’s probation.

Probation may be revoked only if the probationer has willfully and substantially violated a specific condition of his probation. See Fields v. State, 737 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Hightower v. State, 529 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Here, the evidence of Ingold’s technical violations reflected a less-than-assiduous attention to some of his probation obligations. But we agree with the circuit court’s apparent conclusion that the evidence did not warrant a finding that In-gold had willfully and substantially violated a specific condition.

Reversed.

WHATLEY, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., Concur.

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746 So. 2d 495, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 14780, 1999 WL 1015148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ingold-v-state-fladistctapp-1999.

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