Ingersoll v. Curran

188 Misc. 1003, 70 N.Y.S.2d 435, 1947 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2414
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 13, 1947
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 188 Misc. 1003 (Ingersoll v. Curran) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ingersoll v. Curran, 188 Misc. 1003, 70 N.Y.S.2d 435, 1947 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2414 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1947).

Opinion

Booksteih, J.

The proceeding is in the nature of mandamus. The petitioner asserts that the Wilson-Pakula Law (L. 1947, ch. 432) is unconstitutional and seeks to compel the respondent, the Secretary of State, to discharge his official duties, as though it had not been enacted. The allegations of fact in the petition are accepted as true as no answer has been interposed and the respondent moves to dismiss the petition.

While the petition states that the petitioner is not an enrolled member of the Democratic Party, the petition has been amended to allege specifically that he is an enrolled member of the American Labor Party in the 23d Senatorial district of the State of New York; that he is a duly qualified elector therein and is eligible to be a candidate for the office of State Senator which is to be filled at the general election on November 4, 1947, a vacancy existing in that office due to the resignation of the former incumbent. Petitioner asserts that he intends to circulate a designating petition among the enrolled members of the Democratic Party enabling him to have his name placed upon the primary ballot for the primary election to be held on July 29, 1947. Circulation of such designating petitions commences on May 13,1947, and they must be filed by June 24,1947. Petitioner claims that under the Wilson-Pakula Act his designating petition will not be valid and he cannot therefore be a nominee of the Democratic Party unless the Democratic Party Committee for the 23d Senatorial District votes to authorize him to be a designee and nominee, a situation which he does not envision and which, for the purposes of disposing of this matter we shall assume will not come to pass.

The law in question was signed by the Governor on March 25, 1947, and added to the Election Law a new section 136-a. It is sufficient for present purposes to state that it provides that no petition, designating any person as a candidate for party nomi[1005]*1005nation at a primary election, shall he valid unless the person so designated shall he enrolled as a member of the party referred to in said designating petition, at the time of the filing thereof. The same law thereafter provides that by appropriate action of the appropriate party committee, the designation and nomination of a person as a candidate for any office who is not enrolled as a member of a particular party may be authorized. Petitioner claims that this law violates section 1 of article I and section 1 of article II of the State Constitution.

Section 1 of article I reads as follows: No member of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.”

Section 1 of article II reads as follows: Every citizen of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a citizen for ninety days, and an inhabitant of this state for one year next preceding an election, and for the last four months a resident of the county, city, or village and for the last thirty days a resident of the election district in which he.or she may offer his or her vote, shall be entitled to vote at such election in the election district of which he or she shall at the time be a resident, and not elsewhere, for all officers that now are or hereafter may be elective by the people, and upon all questions which may be submitted to the vote of the people * * * .”

Political bodies are voluntary organizations of people who believe generally in the principles enunciated and the candidates offered to the people by the particular party of their choice. It is true that over the years the Legislature has enacted many laws regulating the conduct of political parties in order to correct abuses which had arisen. The voluntary nature of political parties nevertheless continues to be recognized. No qualified voter is required to enroll in any particular political party. He has the freedom of choice of enrolling in a particular party or refraining from enrolling. .

Petitioner argues strenuously that the law in question is an invasion of the rights of suffrage of a duly qualified voter; that the invasion of the rights of suffrage of a duly qualified voter would be a violation of the Constitution and that since nominations are an important process in the matter of the ultimate election of candidates, a limitation on the rights of the voter in nominating candidates also contravenes the constitutional provisions referred to.

This court cannot agree with the proposition thus advanced.

[1006]*1006An unenrolled voter cannot participate in a primary election. Therefore it might be argued that the rights of a person who will be qualified to vote at the general election has been invaded by his statutory preclusion from participating in a party primary election. This preclusion is not an invasion of the rights of such a voter. It is a situation which under his right of free choice he elected to occupy. So, toó, a person who is enrolled as a Democrat cannot vote in the Republican Party primary election or in the American Labor Party primary election and vice versa. But petitioner argues that the law in question does restrict the rights of suffrage of an enrolled member of a political party because it precludes him from signing a designating petition for a person of his choice who is not a member of his political party or perhaps, to put it more accurately, if he does sign such petition, such act is a nullity. Disregarding for the moment the ultimate end sought to be effectuated by the Legislature in the enactment of this law, to wit, the prevention of raids upon any political party by or on behalf of persons who have elected not to be members of such political party, the fact still remains that the enrolled voter of any political party who desires to have as his nominee a person who is not an enrolled member thereof can do so by the simple expedient which is still reserved by the Election Law of writing in such person’s name upon the primary ballot at the primary election. Thus, if there is a real demand by the members of any political party for the nomination of an individual who is not ah enrolled member of that party, the majority of the enrolled voters of such party may nominate such person at the primary election even if the name of such person does not appear upon the printed ballot, due to the provisions of the law now in question. It is no answer to say that the enrolled voters of a poitical party will not, in sufficient numbers, write in the name of such a candidate. If there is merit in the contention that the Legislature cannot deprive a qualified voter of his right of suffrage at the general election and that accordingly the Legislature cannot do so with reference to a qualified enrolled voter with respect to his right of suffrage in the matter of making a nomination at the primary election, it would seem that there is a complete answer in the fact that under the law as it now exists, the ultimate right of voting for any person of his choice whether a member of his political party, or not, is reserved to every qualified voter who, at the general election, can write in the name of his choice; and, in like manner, every .qualified enrolled voter of each party, on primary day, can vote for the candidates whose names are printed on the [1007]*1007ballot and in the ease of more than one name being printed on the ballot then for the one of his choice or, if he is not content with the names printed on the ballot, he can write in the name of the person of his choice.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

MATTER OF MASTER v. Pohanka
891 N.E.2d 285 (New York Court of Appeals, 2008)
Yevoli v. Cristenfeld
37 A.D.2d 153 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1971)
Hanofee v. Board of Elections
47 Misc. 2d 787 (New York Supreme Court, 1965)
Jokinen v. Allen
15 Misc. 2d 124 (New York Supreme Court, 1958)
Stevenson v. Gilfert
100 A.2d 490 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1953)
McNamara v. Heffernan
192 Misc. 967 (New York Supreme Court, 1948)
Ingersoll v. Heffernan
188 Misc. 1047 (New York Supreme Court, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
188 Misc. 1003, 70 N.Y.S.2d 435, 1947 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2414, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ingersoll-v-curran-nysupct-1947.