Ingebretsen v. Manha

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Ingebretsen v. Manha

218 A.D.2d 784, 631 N.Y.S.2d 72, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8988

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 28, 1995

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 218 A.D.2d 784 (Ingebretsen v. Manha) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ingebretsen v. Manha, 218 A.D.2d 784, 631 N.Y.S.2d 72, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8988 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.), entered January 27, 1994, which, upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and against her, dismissed the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the conduct of the trial, which includes limiting the scope of direct, cross, and redirect examination (see, Feldsberg v Nitschke, 49 NY2d 636). A witness’s answers may not be challenged concerning collateral matters through the production of extrinsic evidence for the sole purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility (see, Fishman v Scheuer, 39 NY2d 502). In the case herein, the trial court acted within the scope of its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of the defendant’s witness.

Moreover, the re-direct examination of a witness should be confined to the matters brought out on cross-examination (see, Richardson, Evidence § 523 et seq. [Prince 10th ed]; Feldsberg v Nitschke, 49 NY2d, at 645, supra). The court properly acted within its discretion in limiting the re-direct examination of the plaintiff’s witness.

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Mangano, P. J., Joy, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.), entered January 27, 1994, which, upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and against her, dismissed the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the conduct of the trial, which includes limiting the scope of direct, cross, and redirect examination (see, Feldsberg v Nitschke, 49 NY2d 636). A witness’s answers may not be challenged concerning collateral matters through the production of extrinsic evidence for the sole purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility (see, Fishman v Scheuer, 39 NY2d 502). In the case herein, the trial court acted within the scope of its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of the defendant’s witness.

Moreover, the re-direct examination of a witness should be confined to the matters brought out on cross-examination (see, Richardson, Evidence § 523 et seq. [Prince 10th ed]; Feldsberg v Nitschke, 49 NY2d, at 645, supra). The court properly acted within its discretion in limiting the re-direct examination of the plaintiff’s witness.

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Mangano, P. J., Joy, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

218 A.D.2d 784, 631 N.Y.S.2d 72, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8988, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ingebretsen-v-manha-nyappdiv-1995.

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