Inett Poindexter v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 9, 2000
• Docket: 13-00-00073-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-00-073-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

___________________________________________________________________

INETT POINDEXTER

, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, Appellee.

___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 347th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________________

O P I N I O N

Before Chief Justice Seerden and Justices Dorsey and Rodriguez

Opinion by Chief Justice Seerden

Inett Poindexter, appellant, appeals from her plea of guilty, pursuant to a plea bargain, to the charge of theft. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 31.03(a) & (e)(4)(A) (Vernon 1999). By a single issue, she challenges the effectiveness of her appointed counsel's representation.

Appellant pleaded guilty to theft of property with a value in excess of $1500, but less than $20,000 on December 21, 1999. At the plea hearing, appellant was properly admonished and acknowledged that her plea was entered freely and voluntarily. At the time the plea was entered, appellant's judicial confession and stipulation to evidence were admitted without objection. At no time during this hearing did appellant suggest that her plea was involuntary. After accepting the plea, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced her in accordance with the plea bargain.

By her sole issue, appellant contends that she was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to make an independent investigation as to the value of the items taken. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure limit our jurisdiction over appeals from plea-bargained convictions. Rule 25.2(b)(3) provides:

If the appeal is from a judgment rendered on the defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . the notice must:

(A) specify that the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect;

(B) specify that the substance of the appeal was raised by a written motion and ruled on before trial; or

(C) state that the trial court granted permission to appeal.

Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3). In addition, this Court has recently joined the majority of our sister courts in holding that the voluntariness of the plea may be challenged on appeal, even if the appellant files only a general notice of appeal. See Marshall v. State, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5427, *6 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2000, n.p.h.) (citations omitted). Thus, in order to appeal from a plea-bargained conviction, an appellant must file a notice of appeal which complies with rule 25.2(b)(3) or present an argument that her plea was involuntary.

Here appellant has not suggested that her plea was involuntarily-made as a result of counsel's allegedly-defective performance. Moreover, appellant's notice of appeal does not indicate that her allegations are jurisdictional; that they were raised by a written pre-trial motion and ruled upon; or that the trial court has granted her permission to appeal her conviction. Therefore, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3). Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

ROBERT J. SEERDEN, Chief Justice

Do not publish

.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.

Opinion delivered and filed

this 9^th day of November, 2000.