INDUSTRIAL STATE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. Camp

284 F. Supp. 900, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12617
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedJune 10, 1968
DocketCiv. A. 5687
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 284 F. Supp. 900 (INDUSTRIAL STATE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. Camp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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INDUSTRIAL STATE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. Camp, 284 F. Supp. 900, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12617 (W.D. Mich. 1968).

Opinion

OPINION

FOX, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Industrial State Bank and Trust Company (hereinafter referred to as Industrial State), brings this suit to review the decision of the Comptroller of the Currency granting defendant’s, First National Bank and Trust Company of Kalamazoo (hereinafter referred to as First National), application for a certificate for a branch bank at 3450 Sprinkle Road, Kalamazoo, Michigan.

Plaintiff contends that the Comptroller’s action was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, in that he failed to find necessity as required by Section 34 of the Michigan Financial Institutions Act (M.S.A. § 23.762) , 1 Defendants assert that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that the Comptroller’s action was consonant with the law and not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

In Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F.Supp. 394 (E.D.Mich., 1965), aff’d 377 F.2d 496 (C.A. 6, 1967), after an evaluation of the pertinent provisions of the National Banking Act, 2 the Michigan Financial Institutions Act, and a review of the history of the National Banking Act, Judge Talbott Smith concluded: “It will be observed in the above statutory enactment [12 U.S.C. § 36(e)] that the law of the state involved is to be determinative as to the problem of branching. National Banks were given the same opportunity for branching as state banks, *902 thus perpetuating the dual banking system.” 244 F.Supp. at 401.

In First National Bank of Logan, Utah v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 87 S.Ct. 492, 17 L.Ed.2d 343 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that state laws governing branch banking are absorbed by 12 U.S.C. § 36 (c) and binding on the Comptroller.

The Court said:

“It appears clear from this résumé of the legislative history of § 36(c) (1) and (2) that Congress intended to place national and state banks on a basis of ‘competitive equality’ insofar as branch banking was concerned. Both sponsors of the applicable banking Acts, Representative McFadden and Senator Glass, so characterized the legislation. It is not for us to so construe the Acts as to frustrate this clear-cut purpose so forcefully expressed by both friend and foe of the legislation at the time of its adoption. To us it appears beyond question that the Congress was continuing its policy of equalization first adopted in the National Bank Act of 1864.” 385 U.S. at 261, 87 S.Ct. at 497.

Thus, “competitive equality” means an equal opportunity for state or national banks to compete within the provisions of state laws controlling branch banking. A national bank may branch either as an inside or outside branch providing it conforms with the requirements of state law.

In the instant case, the Comptroller contends that the provision of the Michigan Financial Institutions Act requiring the state banking commission to be satisfied as to necessity for the establishment of'a branch and the prospects of its successful operation are not binding upon him.

This argument is answered by Justice Clark in the Walker case, supra, when he said:

“The Comptroller argues that Utah’s statute ‘expressly authorizes’ state banks to have branches in their home municipalities. He maintains that the restriction, in the subsequent paragraph of the statute limiting branching solely to the taking over of an existing bank, is not applicable to national banks. It is a strange argument that permits one to pick and choose what portion of the law binds him. Indeed, it would fly in the face of the legislative history not to hold that national branch banking is limited to- those States the laws of which permit it, and even there ‘only to the extent that the State laws permit branch banking.’ Utah clearly permits it ‘only to the extent’ that the proposed branch takes over an existing bank.
“The Comptroller also contends that the Act supersedes state law only as to ‘whether’ and ‘where’ branches may be located and not the ‘method’ by which this is effected. We believe that where a State allows branching only by taking over an existing bank, it expresses as much ‘whether’ and ‘where’ a branch may be located as does a prohibition or a limitation to the home office municipality. As to the restriction being a ‘method,’ we have concluded that since it is part and parcel of Utah’s policy, it was absorbed by the provisions of § 36(c) (1) and (2), regardless of the tag placed upon it.” 385 U.S. 261-262, 87 S.Ct. 497. (Emphasis supplied.)

Defendants argue that in Walker the Supreme Court was faced with an express statutory provision of Utah law, whereas under Michigan law the state banking commissioner makes a purely subjective determination as to the need or necessity of a particular branch bank. In support of their position, defendants cite Leuthold v. Camp, 273 F.Supp. 695 (D.Mont., 1967; appeal pending) in which the court rejected the state banking commissioner’s argument that the Comptroller must abide by state administrative regulations.

Administrative regulations are not the equivalent of statutory laws. M.S.A. § 23.762 expressly states that the state banking commissioner must be satisfied that there is necessity for the establishment of a branch before granting approval.

*903 The Supreme Court in Walker stated explicitly that it believed the purpose of the National Banking Act was “ * * * to place national and state banks on a basis of ‘competitive equality’ insofar as branch banking was concerned.” 385 U.S. at 261, 87 S.Ct. at 497. If state banks must establish necessity before being permitted to branch in Michigan, national banks should also be required to meet the same test, if as between national and state banks competitive equality is to be achieved.

In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 373 F.2d 283 (C.A. 6, 1967), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that it believed the Walker decision supports the conclusion that Michigan’s restriction as to necessity is binding on the Comptroller.

The Comptroller did not expressly make a finding on necessity in approving defendant First National’s application for a branch bank. We recognize that such a finding could be implicit in his decision and that if there is substantial evidence to support such a finding his action must be affirmed. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 248 F.Supp. 324, 332 (W.D.Mich., 1965), rev’d on other grounds 373 F.2d 283 (C.A. 6, 1967).

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284 F. Supp. 900, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12617, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/industrial-state-bank-and-trust-company-v-camp-miwd-1968.