Industrial Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

58 F.2d 123, 3 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 930, 11 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 151, 1932 U.S. App. LEXIS 4652
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMay 3, 1932
Docket6137
StatusPublished

This text of 58 F.2d 123 (Industrial Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Industrial Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 F.2d 123, 3 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 930, 11 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 151, 1932 U.S. App. LEXIS 4652 (5th Cir. 1932).

Opinion

WALKER, Circuit Judge.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed against the petitioner corporation, a manufacturer of lumber, a deficiency of income and profits taxes for the year 1920, that deficiency being a result of the rejection by the commissioner of the petitioner’s closing inventory for that year, and the disallowance by the commissioner of deductions claimed by the petitioner from the total shown by an alternative inventory submitted by the petitioner after the rejection of the inventory originally submitted. The dosing inventory originally submitted by the petitioner, which kept its books on the accrual basis, purported to be “at cost or market, whichever is lower,” as authorized by regulation. Regulations 45, art. 1582. In taking that inventory petitioner ascertained the cost and the then prevailing market value of each item and listed that item at the lower of the two figures, with a result that where cost of the article was lower than market it was listed at cost, and where cost of the article was higher than market it was listed at market. What the petitioner treated as the cost of lumber of any grade was the so-called average cost, which was arrived at by ascertaining the total cost — including that of the raw material (the timber), sawing, handling and similar expenses —of all lumber of all grades that had reached, the same stage of manufacture, and then dividing that total by the- total number of feet of all grades manufactured; the amount so ascertained being treated as the cost of a foot of lumber of any grade, with a result that a given number of feet of lumber of the highest grade was assigned the same cost as the same number of feet of the lowest grade which had reached the same stage of manufacture. Petitioner’s stock contained five grades of lumber, the grades being determined by the presence or absence of knots or other defects, the highest grade being designated “B — and—better,” and the other grades being 1, 2, 3, and 4; the last stated being the lowest. The prices of different grades of lumber vary, according to condition and market demands, from $120 a thousand feet for the highest finished grade to $8 a thousand feet for the lowest grade. The findings of fact included the following as to petitioner’s business: “About 25 per cent of its product as it came fresh cut from the mill was in the form of railroad bridge timbers and beams, which were sold green, while the remaining 75 per cent required further processing before marketing. Under the methods followed by the petitioner about one-third of this residue, or 25 per cent of the whole, was cured in kilns, while the remainder or 50 per cent of the whole, was air dried in the yards. Kiln drying required from three to five days and air drying from three to four months. After curing, the stock not held for sale in the rough was sent to the planing mills where it was dressed and trimmed in final preparation for market.”

After the commissioner had refused to accept the above-described inventory originally submitted, the petitioner submitted another inventory, in which the items were listed at market; the total at market being less than the total at cost. In that inventory, the petitioner claimed deductions from the total listed market value of the goods inventoried of stated amounts for, respectively, shrinkage and breakage, degrading, and discount. Those deductions were disallowed by the commissioner. The rulings of the commissioner were sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals.

It appears from the record that a ground relied on for rejecting the closing inventory originally submitted by the petitioner was that the evidence showed that petitioner in making, that inventory applied to the several items listed the actual sale price for market, but not the actual cost price for cost. With reference to inventories the applicable statute provides: “That whenever in the opinion of the Commissioner the use of inventories is necessary in order clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer, inventories shall be taken by such taxpayer upon such basis as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe as conforming as nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in the trade or business and as most clearly reflecting the income.” Section 203, Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057, 1060.

Regulations adopted in the exercise of authority conferred by the cited act, § 1309 (40 Stat. 1143), include those set out in the margin. 1

*125 The burden was on the petitioner to prove that the amount it assigned to an item listed in the inventory as the cost of that item was, at least approximately, the actual cost of it. In the absence of evidence tending to prove that the cost per foot of the .raw material which went into lumber of one grade was the same as the cost per foot of the raw material which went into lumber of a different grade, the petitioner was not warranted in assuming that those costs were the same, though the other elements of the total costs were the same. It is a matter of common knowledge, of which judicial notice may be taken, that ordinarily the cost to a lumber manufacturer of tbe raw material — stumpage or logs — from whieb lumber is produced, is based upon estimates as totbe amounts and grades of lumber that may be expected to be produced from it, tbe price or cost of timber a large percentage of which may be expected to go into high grade lumber being higher than that of timber having the same footage, but from which a substantially smaller percentage of high grade and high priced lumber may be expected to be produced. It is not unusual for estimates made by timber cruisers to be availed of by prospective purchasers of timber. It reasonably may be inferred or supposed that ordinarily the estimates which in *126 fluenee an experienced and prudent lumber manufacturer in agreeing on the price to be paid for timber bought in effect amount to roughly determining the values of the different parts of the timber -which, respectively, will, in the process of manufacturing, go into different grades of lumber, with the results that the agreed on price for the timber is the aggregate of the values assigned to the different parts of it which are expected to go into different grades of lumber, and that substantially different costs per foot will be attributed to the different parts of the timber which, respectively, will go into different grades of lumber. There was no evidence tending to prove that the actual cost per foot of the raw material which went-into grade “B — and—better” lumber listed in the inventory was, even approximately, the same as the cost per foot of the raw material which went into No. 4 lumber, or any of the other numbered grades of lumber manufactured by the petitioner. There was no evidence tending to prove that the petitioner, in determining the cost of the raw material from which was produced the several items of lumber listed in its original inventory conformed to an accounting practice which had been adopted or followed in the lumber manufacturing trade or business, or to a practice which previously had been followed by the petitioner itself in its business. It is not denied that it was impracticable for the petitioner to determine accurately the costs properly assignable to each grade of lumber listed in its inventory.

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58 F.2d 123, 3 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 930, 11 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 151, 1932 U.S. App. LEXIS 4652, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/industrial-lumber-co-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca5-1932.