Industrial Commission v. Wilbanks

274 P.2d 99, 130 Colo. 36, 1954 Colo. LEXIS 244
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedJuly 19, 1954
DocketNo. 17,404
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 274 P.2d 99 (Industrial Commission v. Wilbanks) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Industrial Commission v. Wilbanks, 274 P.2d 99, 130 Colo. 36, 1954 Colo. LEXIS 244 (Colo. 1954).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Bradfield

This is a workmen’s compensation case brought to our Court by writ of error to review a judgment of the dis[37]*37trict court of the City and County-of Denver. In the trial court defendant in error was claimant, and plaintiffs in error were defendants. We will herein designate defendant in error as claimant, plaintiffs in error, the Industrial Commission of Colorado, ex officio Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado as the Commission, and Department of Employment Security as the Department.

June 20, 1953, claimant filed his application for unemployment compensation at Loveland, Colorado, under the Colorado Employment Security Act, ’53 Cum. Supp., to ’35 C.S.A., c. 167A, and was found eligible for benefits for July, August and to September 19, 1953.

On September 18, 1953 claimant was offered employment as a carpenter at the Harmony Ranch (Scott Hayes), at Estes Park, Colorado, on a nonunion job, at $2.00 per hour. Claimant was a member of 'A.F. of L. Carpenter’s Union, Local 1340. He reported to the job and was advised he would be paid union wages, but not time and a half or overtime or double time for Sundays. Claimant worked Saturday, Monday and one hour and a half on Tuesday at $2.00 per hour. He then quit work because it did not pay time and a half for overtime and later refused a re-offer of the same work for the same reason.

Thereupon the Department found claimant had voluntarily left work with the Hamony Ranch without good cause and later failed to accept an offer for suitable employment by the Harmony Ranch, and reduced the maximum benefits payable to him in the amount of $272.75. Claimant was disqualified from benefits for four weeks, September 20, 1953 to October 17, 1953 for voluntary quitting without good cause, and further was disqualified for six weeks, October 11, 1953 to November 21, 1953 for his refusal of the offer of suitable employment. From this finding and ruling of the Department claimant appealed to the Referee for a reversal, on the ground, “My employer was not paying the Union scale. I con[38]*38sider this good cause for quitting and not accepting a second referral of the job.” The union scale called for time and a half for overtime. The Referee sustained the determination of the Department.

From this ruling of the Referee, claimant appealed to the Commission which sustained the Referee and thereafter denied a review of its decision thereon. From the findings and judgment of the Commission, claimant appealed to the district court of the City and County of Denver; the trial court reversed the Commission’s findings and judgment. To review this judgment of the district court, the Commission procured a writ of error from our Court.

The trial court found:

“1. The finding of the defendant Industrial Commission of Colorado that the prevailing wage scale for carpentry work in the Estes Park area is $2.00 per hour is not supported by, and is contrary to, the evidence in the case.

“2. The evidence conclusively established that the prevailing wage scale for carpentry work in the Estes Park area is not less than $2.35 per hour with time and one-half for work performed in excess of 8 hours per day or 40 hours per week.

“3. It is undisputed that the employment offered to claimant paid $2.00 per hour without overtime pay for work performed in excess of 8 hours per day or 40 hours per week.

“4. The wages and working conditions on the job offered to the claimant were substantially less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the Estes Park area.”

’53 Cum. Supp., to ’35 C.S.A., c. 167A, provides:

“Section 5. An individual shall be disqualified for benefits — (a) If the department finds that such individual has * * * [1] left work voluntarily without good cause, or * * * [3] failed without good cause * * * to accept suitable work when offered him.

[39]*39* * * no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:

“* * * (fo) jf the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality.”

Section 6 (k), Vol. IY-B, ’35 C.S.A. provides:

“* * * jn any jucjiciai proceedings under this section, the findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence and in absence of fraud, shall be conclusive. * * *”

The findings and decision of the Commission, sustaining the findings of the Referee and the Department, were that claimant became disqualified for quitting his work without good cause and for his refusal to accept an offer of employment under section 5 (a) (1) and (3). The trial court entered a summary judgment reversing the findings and decision of the Commission and in lieu thereof substituted its own findings and judgment. The case was submitted to the Commission, to the district court, and here, on the testimony introduced before the Referee.

At the Referee’s hearing, claimant appeared in person and by Davis E. Graham, Business Agent, Carpenter’s Local No. 1340.

The claimant testified:

“The Referee: Q. You were working on a job for the Harmony Ranch in September. Tell us what happened on that job. A. * * * he said it’s not a Union job but we’re paying Union wages. So I * * * worked on Saturday, the first day, and Monday, then Tuesday, and we understood that they wouldn’t pay any overtime, but we’d work Saturdays. He wanted us to work after eight hours in a day. So, on that set-up, why — it was the cause of me quitting because under our agreements and rules and regulations of the Union, any time after eight [40]*40hours is overtime, and 'any time over our forty hours * * * is overtime. Time and a half, which I’ve been accustomed to get. Q. And so when you were advised that it was a non-union job and they wouldn’t pay overtime on it you quit your job? A. No. Not that it was not a Union job. I quit because they would not pay the time and a half. * * * They worked me on Saturday. They didn’t have to do it, but if they did they should have paid me my time and a half.

“The Referee: Q. * * * That wouldn’t make any difference whether the job paid the Union wage or whether it didn’t pay the Union wage, it is not the controlling factor. And whether or not it paid any overtime is not the controlling factor, as long as it did pay the prevailing wage for that type of work in the community. * * * Well, the rate of pay was $2.00 — was the Union wage rate of $2.00 per hour, which is the prevailing rate up here?”

Mr. Graham (Business Agent, Carpenter’s Local No. 1340) (statement): “I believe that I’m right in saying that the area practice in Estes Park is $2.00 per hour, all overtime is at the rate of time and a half. * * *”

John Klein testified in part: “A. I am Business Agent for the local Union at Estes Park, Carpenter’s. Q. Mr. Klein, what is the prevailing rate for carpenters in the Estes Park area? A. $2.00 an hour and time and a half for all over forty hoürs per week. * * * Q. What do other contractors up there pay? A. They pay from $2.00 up, sir. Q. What do the individuals who employ carpenters around there pay? A. The same. Q. $2.00 an hour? A. The same.”

Mr. Henry Wagner testified in part: “Q. Mr.

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Stensvad v. Industrial Commission
445 P.2d 898 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1968)

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Bluebook (online)
274 P.2d 99, 130 Colo. 36, 1954 Colo. LEXIS 244, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/industrial-commission-v-wilbanks-colo-1954.