Industrial Comm. v. Tripsansky

167 N.E. 373, 31 Ohio App. 397, 6 Ohio Law. Abs. 671, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 451

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 14, 1928
• Docket: 8857
• Status: Published

Opinion

SULLIVAN, PJ.

Prom an examination of the record there is no evidence of a reliable or convincing nature that death actually resulted from some other cause, excepting as a result of the work in which he was engaged.

In the affidavit the coroner stated that he made no physical examination and that there was no autopsy over the body and no inquiry was made as to the situation which surrounded him at the time of his employment, with respect to the floor, and the work in which he was engaged.

There is evidence given by another physician at a re-hearing before the Industrial Commission, in answer to a hypothetical question, “that due to the fact that there was an injury, it was probable that the man would die from concussion or fracture.”

The acting undertaker testified that he first saw the decedent at the morgue, and that he recognized that there was an injury on the back of the head as the pillow was stained, by leakage of blood from the head, which was congealed. He further stated that blood poured from the head during the process of embalming and that it crimsoned the pillow upon which the decedent lay.

This, and other testimony in the case, precludes us from coming to the conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient from one view of the case at least, to substantiate the verdict.

The Supreme Court in the case of Roma v. The Industrial Commission of Ohio, 97 OS. 247, laid down the rule relating to the substantial rights of the party in jeopardy and that it is the plain duty of the courts to disregard mere technicalities where, by observing them, doubtful administration of justice would result.

Under the evidence in the case it is clear that immediately prior to the death, the decedent was acting in the scope of his employment, and there is reasonable ground for the inference that as a direct result of his employment, the injury and death occurred. This is a plain, reasonable, and logical inference and under the rules of liberality of construction we are bound to follow the verdict of the jury on the facts and the judgment of law pronounced thereon by the court.

Under Sections 1465-61 there is a specific provision that every employee who is injured and the dependents of such as are killed in. the course of employment wheresoever such injury has occurred, shall be entitled to receive compensation as provided in Sections 1465-69. We think the evidence in this case warrants the applicability of these provisions of the statute.

(Vickery and Levine,' JJ., concur.)