Indiana National Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp.

457 F. Supp. 1028, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13485
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedOctober 13, 1977
DocketIP 75-195-C
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 457 F. Supp. 1028 (Indiana National Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Indiana National Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1028, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13485 (S.D. Ind. 1977).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

NOLAND, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action arises from a cash tender offer which defendant Mobil Oil Corporation (“Mobil”) made in August of 1974 for *1031 the securities (common and preferred stock) of Marcor, Inc. (“Marcor”). The plaintiffs, The Indiana National Bank (“INB”) and Merchants National Bank & Trust Company of Indianapolis (“Merchants”), are national commercial banks located in Indianapolis, Indiana, who attempted to tender Marcor securities on behalf of their customers and trust accounts.

Plaintiffs were eligible to and did exercise the delayed delivery option contained in the Mobil offer. It is conceded that plaintiffs satisfied the first phase of the delayed delivery option by delivering proper Letters of Transmittal during the offer period. The dispute is over the second phase which required plaintiffs to deliver the stock certificates in accordance with their guarantees by the close of the eighth business day after Mobil publicly announced the number of shares it would purchase.

Plaintiffs contend that Mobil failed to make the required public announcement. They also maintain that the tender offer omits material information concerning how the “public announcement” would be made in violation of § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”). Finally, they contend that by virtue of their completion of the first phase they are entitled to have their tendered securities purchased pro rata under the provisions of § 14(d)(6) of the Act. On the other hand, Mobil has denied any breach of contract and steadfastly maintained that neither provision of the Act has any application to the instant controversy. In addition, Mobil raised several affirmative defenses.

WILLIAMS ACT CLAIMS

The Williams Act of 1968 amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”) to include sections 14(d)(6) and 14(e). The design and purpose of the Williams Act is to protect the shareholder of a target corporation who is confronted by a cash tender offer. Rondeau v. Masinee Paper Corporation, 422 U.S. 49, 58, 95 S.Ct. 2069, 2075-2076, 45 L.Ed.2d 12 (1975); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22-23, 35, 97 S.Ct. 926, 940, 946, 51 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Company, 489 F.2d 579, 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1974). This purpose is accomplished by disclosure requirements designed to provide the shareholder with the information necessary for his investment decision. Other provisions of the Williams Act benefit the tendering shareholder by giving him a limited right to withdraw his tendered securities, § 14(d)(5), a right to pro rata purchase of his tendered securities when the offer is oversubscribed, § 14(d)(6), and a right to increased consideration if such is given to other tenderors, § 14(d)(7). Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 23, 97 S.Ct. 926, 940, 51 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977). In addition, “the Williams Act also contains a broad antifraud prohibition . . . Section 14(e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) . . .” Id., 430 U.S. 24, 97 S.Ct. 940. The Williams Act does not, however, explicitly provide a private cause of action for redress of alleged violations. Id, 430 U.S. 24, 97 S.Ct. 941. And while it is generally accepted that there is an implied private right of action under § 14(e), see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Company, supra, at 596, n.20, it is a question of first impression with regard to the § 14(d)(6) claim. The Court, however, shall not reach that issue because, assuming that an implied private action exists, plaintiffs have failed to establish their claim.

The Court finds little, if any, substance in the § 14(d)(6) claims. First, it is conceded that Mobil purchased those tendered shares which Mobil determined to be properly tendered on a pro rata basis with adjustments to avoid fractions. The dispute is not whether Mobil complied with the general requirements of § 14(d)(6), but rather it is whether the securities which plaintiffs attempted to tender were properly tendered and thus within the class of “deposited” securities entitled to equal treatment under the oversubscription provisions of § 14(d)(6). Second, § 14(d)(6) was enacted to remove the pressures of the first-come, first-purchased practices. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., supra, 430 U.S. 1, 23, 97 S.Ct. 926, 940, 51 L.Ed.2d 124. *1032 This was accomplished by establishing a minimum ten day offer period and requiring that all proper tenders during that period, or any extension thereof, be treated equally with regard to consideration, § 14(d)(7), and with regard to the offeror’s duty to purchase pro rata if the offer became oversubscribed. The first-come, first-purchased dilemma is not present here. Third, there is no evidence of any Congressional intent to legislate what is a proper tender. A tender is proper if it meets the requirements of the tender offer, and not otherwise. And finally, it is the Court’s .opinion that “deposited”, as used in § 14(d)(6), is equivalent to “properly tendered”. Thus, a tenderor is entitled to have his secuigties purchased pro rata if, and only if, his tender has met the conditions of the tender offer. Here plaintiffs failed to meet those conditions when they failed to deliver the Marcor certificates by the close of business on September 6, 1974.

The Court also finds little, if any, substance in the § 14(e) claims asserted by the plaintiffs. The purpose of § 14(e) is to assure full and fair disclosure of material information concerning the offeror to the target shareholder. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., supra; Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 109 (7th Cir. 1970); Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 268 (2nd Cir. 1975). Since the purpose of the Williams Act is to assure an informed investment decision, the test for materiality is whether a reasonable investor might have considered the information important in making his investment decision whether to tender or hold his securities. Sonesta International Hotels Corporation v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 251 (2nd Cir. 1973); Missouri Portland Cement Company v. H.K. Porter Company, Inc., 535 F.2d 388, 393 (8th Cir. 1976); General Host Corporation v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 749, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Texasgulf, Inc. v.

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Bluebook (online)
457 F. Supp. 1028, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13485, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/indiana-national-bank-v-mobil-oil-corp-insd-1977.