FILED Oct 23 2019, 8:38 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Brian J. Johnson Attorney General of Indiana Danville, Indiana Frances Barrow Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Indiana Bureau of Motor October 23, 2019 Vehicles, Court of Appeals Case No. Appellant-Respondent, 19A-MI-216 Appeal from the Marion Circuit v. Court The Honorable Sheryl Lynch, Thomas Douglass, Judge Appellee-Petitioner. The Honorable Mark Jones, Commissioner Trial Court Cause No. 49C01-1802-MI-6459
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 1 of 19 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Respondent, Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV), appeals the
trial court’s Order granting the Appellee-Petitioner, Thomas Douglass’
(Douglass), petition for judicial review, in which he seeks to set aside his ten-
year suspension of his driving privileges in Indiana and his habitual traffic
violator (HTV) determination.
[2] We reverse.
ISSUE [3] BMV presents three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the
following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by granting Douglass’
petition for judicial review.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] In 2014, Douglass was a resident of Marion County, Indianapolis, Indiana. At
the time, Douglass had a valid driver’s license. In May 2014, BMV initially
issued Douglass a duplicate license and a permanent driver’s license with an
expiration date of March 1, 2018, which was mailed to his home on May 29,
2014. In June 2014, Douglass moved to California. After surrendering his
Indiana driver’s license on June 9, 2014, the California Department of Motor
Vehicles (CA DMV) issued Douglass a California driver’s license.
[5] On August 20, 2014, BMV sent Douglass a letter to his last known address in
Indianapolis. The letter was titled “Habitual Traffic Violator Notice of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 2 of 19 Suspension” (Notice). The Notice informed Douglass that he had accumulated
three qualifying driving-related convictions within a ten-year period and, as a
result, he was deemed an HTV. Due to his HTV status, BMV informed
Douglass that it was suspending his driving privileges for ten years beginning
September 19, 2014. The Notice also informed Douglass that he could request
an administrative review within eighteen days.
[6] Approximately three and one-half years later, on January 5, 2018, CA DMV
sent a letter to Douglass’ home in California stating, “[w]e regret to inform you
that . . . [Indiana has] reported that your driving privilege is suspended or
revoked.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 9). CA BMV notified Douglass that
unless it received a clearance from BMV, it would “cancel” his California
driver’s license within thirty days. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 19).
[7] Although untimely, on January 23, 2018, through his attorney, Douglass wrote
a letter to BMV requesting an administrative review of the HTV determination
and the suspension of his driving privileges. In part, Douglass averred,
Normal practice is for a person’s new home state’s drivers licensing authority to inform a person’s prior home state that the person moved, in this case California should have notified Indiana in 2014 that effective June 9, 2014, [] Douglass was licensed in California. However, the remarks section of [] Douglass’ driving record does not contain a notation that he moved to California and was licensed there.
****
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 3 of 19 An error occurred because Indiana imposed a suspension for [] Douglass when he was no longer an Indiana resident on September 19, 2014. This error could have been avoided if California had notified Indiana in June 2014 that [] Douglass had moved to California. Nevertheless, the “home state” of California is supposed to impose suspensions on its residents based on their driving record. For example, I have had numerous clients who moved to Illinois or Michigan, and those states imposed [sic] suspensions for new residents based on the new residents’ driving violations that occurred out of state and prior to moving to Illinois and Michigan. The same scenario should have occurred here; meaning California instead of Indiana had the authority to impose suspension or revocations for [] Douglass starting June 9, 2014.
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 24-25).
[8] After conducting an administrative review, on January 30, 2018, BMV sent its
response to Douglass and his attorney, reiterating that Douglass had been
convicted of at least three prior driving-related offenses within the last ten years
and that qualified him as an HTV. BMV also determined, in part, that
At the time the suspension was imposed, the BMV had not received notice that you moved out of state. However, because you held an Indiana driver’s license at the time of the qualifying offenses, your driving privileges would still be suspended for HTV even if the BMV did have notice. The BMV did not suspend one specific credential, but rather your driving privileges as required by law.
Your record has now been updated to reflect your move to California based on the California driver’s license that your attorney provided.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 4 of 19 (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 34). (italics in original). Concluding no “material
error” existed in its Notice, BMV upheld the suspension of Douglass’ driving
privileges and the HTV determination. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 34).
[9] On February 20, 2018, Douglass filed a verified petition for judicial review and
motion for a preliminary injunction. A hearing on Douglass’ motion for a
preliminary injunction was conducted on March 5, 2018. On March 9, 2018,
the trial court issued an order granting Douglass’ preliminary injunction
whereby it ordered BMV to “lift/stay the suspension noted in [Douglass’]
driving record” until the resolution of the underlying cause. (Appellant’s App.
Vol. II, p. 45). A hearing on Douglass’ verified petition for judicial review was
held on August 22, 2018. On December 26, 2018, the trial court entered its
findings of facts and conclusions thereon stating, in part, that:
4. Indiana is a member of the [I]nterstate [D]river’s [L]icense [C]ompact. [Indiana Code section] 9-28-1-3 provides, in pertinent part:
The driver’s license compact is hereby enacted into law and entered into with all other jurisdictions joining therein in the form substantially as follows:
ARTICLE 2 DEFINITIONS
As used in this compact:
(a) “State” means a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 5 of 19 (b) “Home state” means the state which has issued and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor vehicle.
(c) “Conviction” means a conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle which is prohibited by state law, municipal ordinance, or administrative rule or regulation, or a forfeiture of bail, bond, or other security deposited to secure appearance by a person charged with having committed any such offense, and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority.
ARTICLE 3 REPORTS OF CONVICTION
The licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee. Such report shall clearly identify the person convicted; describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code, or ordinance violated; identify the court in which action was taken; indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered, or the conviction was a result of the forfeiture of bail, bond, or other security; and shall include any special findings made in connection therewith.
5. On June 9, 2014, California became [Douglass’] “home state”, and Indiana became only a “party state” insofar as [Douglass] in [sic] concerned.
6. There is no authority for a party state to suspend the driver’s license or driving privileges of someone whose privileges are
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 6 of 19 currently issued by another state, or in other words by that person’s new “home state”.
7. As a “party state”, Indiana must report the record to [Douglass’] home state, California, “which shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article 3 of this compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state . . .” Ind. Code § 9-28-1-3, Article 4.
8. At the time of BMV’s suspension of [Douglass’] privileges, its records contained a material error in that [Douglass] no longer held an Indiana driver’s license or driving privileges that were granted by Indiana, and in fact was (and is) a California residence and licensee.
9. BMV’s failure to recognize its error and failure to recognize California’s authority to grant driving privileges also constitutes a failure by BMV to give Full Faith and Credit to the California driving privileges given to [Douglass].
11. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the findings and suspension by BMV are unsupported by credible evidence, are arbitrary and capricious and violate the law, and are therefore hereby VACATED AND REVERSED. It is further ORDERED that BMV shall vacate its order finding that [Douglass] is a [HTV] and suspending [Douglass’] privileges. . .
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 9-11) (bold in original).
[10] BMV now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 7 of 19 DISCUSSION AND DECISION I. Standard of Review
[11] BMV argues that the trial court erred by granting Douglass’ petition for judicial
review. Judicial review of an administrative decision is limited under the
Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA). Huffman v. Office of Envtl.
Adjudication, 811 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ind. 2004). We may set aside an agency
action only if it is
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial evidence.
Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d). A trial court and an appellate court both review the
decision of an administrative agency with the same standard of review.
Terkosky v. Indiana Dept. of Educ., 996 N.E.2d 832, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
We defer to the agency’s expertise and will not reverse simply because we might
have reached a different result. Id. The burden of demonstrating the invalidity
of the agency action is on the party to the judicial review proceeding that is
asserting the invalidity of the action. Id. (citing I.C. § 4-21.5-5-14(a)). Review
of an agency’s decision is largely confined to the agency record, and the court
may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Id. We give deference to
the administrative agency’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 8 of 19 evidence, but review questions of law de novo. Id. On review, we do not
reweigh the evidence. Id.
[12] The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law. Nash v. State, 881
N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. If the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation. Id.
If, however, the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable
construction, we must construe the statute in accordance with apparent
legislative intent. Id. The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of
the statute, giving all words their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise
indicated by the statute. Chambliss v. State, 746 N.E.2d 73, 77 (Ind. 2001). We
will presume that the legislature intended the language used in the statute to be
applied logically and to avoid an unjust or absurd result. Nash, 881 N.E.2d at
1063.
[13] The trial court granted Douglass’ petition for judicial review after finding that
“[a]t the time of BMV’s suspension of [Douglass’] privileges, its records
contained a material error in that [Douglass] no longer held an Indiana driver’s
license or driving privileges that were granted by Indiana, and in fact was (and
is) a California resident and licensee.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 11). The
trial court further determined that “[t]here is no authority for a party state to
suspend the driver’s license or driving privileges of someone whose privileges
are currently issued by another state, or in other words, by that person’s new
‘home state.’” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 11).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 9 of 19 [14] BMV asserts that the trial court erred by reversing its suspension of Douglass’
driving privileges and HTV determination because Indiana law mandates the
agency to suspend the driving privileges of a licensee for a period of ten years,
in light of qualifying convictions. BMV also argues that the Interstate Driver’s
License Compact does not deprive a party state, in this case Indiana, of the
power to suspend driving privileges even if the nonresident licensee has a valid
driver’s license issued by another state. In response, Douglass contends that
BMV lacked authority to suspend his Indiana driving privileges since he was no
longer a resident of Indiana, and only his home-state, California, had authority
to suspend his driving privileges.
[15] This matter involves the interaction of two statutes, i.e., the Indiana HTV and
driving privilege suspension laws, and Interstate Driver’s License Compact.
II. Indiana HTV and Driving Privilege Suspension Laws
[16] Indiana Code section 9-30-10-4(b) provides in relevant part:
A person who has accumulated at least three (3) judgments within a ten (10) year period for any of the following violations, singularly or in combination, and not arising out of the same incident, is a habitual violator[.]
[17] The qualifying judgments include: (1) operation of a vehicle while intoxicated;
(2) operation of a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least
eight-hundredths (0.08) gram of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of the
blood or two hundred ten (210) liters of the breath; (3) operating a motor
vehicle while the person’s license to do so has been suspended or revoked; (4)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 10 of 19 operating a motor vehicle without ever having obtained a license to do so; (5)
reckless driving; (6) criminal recklessness involving the operation of a motor
vehicle; (7) drag racing or engaging in a speed contest in violation of law; and
(8) any felony under an Indiana motor vehicle statute or any felony in the
commission of which a motor vehicle is used. I.C. § 9-30-10-4(b).
[18] Our Legislature has determined that before BMV suspends a person’s driving
privilege based on their HTV status, it must mail the notice of the suspension to
the person’s last known address. I.C. § 9-30-10-5(a). The notice must inform
the driver that he may be entitled to administrative review through the BMV
and that he may seek judicial review of BMV’s determination. I.C. § 9-30-10-
5(c). The suspension takes effect thirty days after BMV has mailed the notice.
I.C. § 9-30-10-5(b).
[19] BMV contends that the trial court’s decision was “wrong” because it is
authorized under statute to “suspend the driving privilege of an HTV such as
Douglass for 10 years” in light of qualifying judgments. (Appellant’s Br. p. 13).
We agree. The record shows that between October 1, 2007, and November 12,
2013, Douglass was convicted of three qualifying judgements, operating with an
alcohol concentration of .08 or more, operating while intoxicated with a prior
within five years, and operating while intoxicated. Based on these qualifying
judgments and notwithstanding the fact that he had relocated to California and
had established his residency, on September 19, 2014, BMV sent Douglass the
Notice to his last known address in Indianapolis informing him that he was an
HTV, and that it was suspending his driving privileges for ten years.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 11 of 19 [20] Douglass is mistaken that BMV could not determine that he was an HTV and
suspend his driving privileges since he was no longer an Indiana resident. The
“primary purpose of suspending a person’s driving privileges in Indiana for
being an HTV is to remove from the highway those drivers who have proven
themselves to be unfit to drive, and who pose a substantial threat to the safety of
others.” Orndorff v. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 982 N.E.2d 312, 321 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012), trans. denied. Indiana Code section 9-14-8-3(3) vests authority to
BMV to suspend or revoke the “current driving privileges or driver’s license of
any individual” upon “any reasonable ground appearing on [BMV’s] records”
[21] As stated, Indiana Code section 9-30-10-4(b) provides that BMV may suspend
the driving privileges of “a person who has accumulated at least three (3)
judgments within a ten (10) year period” in Indiana. (Emphasis added). This
section is clear and unambiguous, and it applies to both nonresident and
resident drivers in Indiana. Moreover, Indiana Code section 9-25-3-2 provides,
in part, that
(a) Whenever under Indiana law . . . , the [BMV] may suspend or revoke the driver’s license or driving privileges of or forbid the operation of a motor vehicle in Indiana by an operator who is a nonresident.
(c) The [BMV] shall transmit to the motor vehicle bureau or state officer performing the functions of a bureau in the state in which a nonresident resides a certified copy of the following:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 12 of 19 (1) A conviction of, or an administrative action concerning, the nonresident that has resulted in the suspension of the nonresident’s driving privilege in Indiana.
(2) An unsatisfied judgment rendered against a nonresident that has resulted in the suspension of the nonresident’s driving privilege in Indiana.
(Emphasis added). These three sections, read together, permit BMV to enforce
its laws as to problematic drivers operating vehicles in Indiana regardless of
residency.
[22] BMV also argues that it suspended Douglass’ privileges based on his conduct
occurring in Indiana and further claims that there is a difference between
suspending a person’s driver’s license and driving privileges. “Driving
privileges” means “the authority granted to an individual that allows the
individual to operate a vehicle of the type and in the manner for which the
authority was granted.” I.C. § 9-13-2-48.3. “Driver’s license” means any type
of license issued by the state authorizing an individual to operate the type of
vehicle for which the license was issued, and in the manner for which the
license was issued, on a highway. I.C. § 9-13-2-48. Here, BMV correctly
determined that Douglass was an HTV, and it rightfully suspended Douglass’
driving privileges in Indiana and not his driver’s license. Moreover, as we will
discuss in the section below, under the Interstate Driver’s License Compact,
although Indiana lacked the authority to suspend his California license, nothing
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 13 of 19 under the Compact prevents BMV from enforcing its driving privilege
suspension laws against nonresidents.
III. Interstate Driver’s License Compact
[23] Indiana and California are party states to the Interstate Driver’s License
Compact. See I.C. § 9-28-1-3, Cal. Veh. Code, § 15000. Article 1 of the
compact, which includes a declaration of policy, makes clear that the compact
is intended to “promote compliance with the laws, ordinances and
administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles”
in each of the party states, and to make the “reciprocal recognition” of the
license to drive “more just and equitable” by considering compliance with the
rules of the road as a “condition precedent” to the issuance or continuance of
the license to drive. See I.C. § 9-28-1-3.
[24] Article 2 of the compact defines the “home state” as “the state which has issued
and has the power to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to
operate a motor vehicle.” I.C. § 9-28-1-3, Article 2. Article 3 of the compact
addresses both the reporting obligation of a party state when a qualifying
conviction occurs in that state, as well as the obligation of a licensing/home
state in receipt of a report and it provides that:
The licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee. Such report shall clearly identify the person convicted, describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated, identify the court in which action was taken,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 14 of 19 indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered or the conviction was a result of forfeiture of bail, bond or other security and shall include any special findings made in connection therewith.
[25] Article 4 of the compact, which addresses the effect of a conviction occurring
out-of-state, provides that the home state’s licensing authority receiving the
report must give that out-of-state conviction the same effect as it would if that
conduct occurred in the home state. I.C. § 9-28-1-3. Article 6 then states that
nothing in the compact “shall be construed to affect the right of any party state
to apply any of its other law relating to licenses to drive to any person or
circumstance.” I.C. § 9-28-1-3. To ensure an orderly exchange of information
between states, Article 7 provides that the head of the licensing authority of a
party state shall be the administrator of the compact for that state and shall
furnish information to the administrator of each party state. I.C. § 9-28-1-3.
Finally, Article 9, which addresses “construction and severability,” directs that
the compact shall be “liberally construed so as to effect the purposes thereof.”
I.C. § 9-28-1-3.
[26] The value of the compact in traffic safety is obvious. See Matter of Johnson, 226
N.J. Super. 1, 6, 543 A.2d 454, 456 (App. Div. 1988). The Interstate Driver’s
License Compact was developed to give states a means for cooperative action to
control problem drivers. Id. Essentially, it provides for an orderly method for
exchange of information to keep unsafe drivers from accumulating violations in
many jurisdictions and escaping action on the part of the state in which the
driver holds a license. Id. Indeed, drivers who commit serious traffic law
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 15 of 19 violations when away from home should not escape action by the state in which
they are licensed. Id.
[27] BMV argues that the Interstate Driver’s License Compact “does not deprive
party States of the power to restrict nonresidents’ driving privileges.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 9). Douglass counters BMV’s claim by stating that he was a
resident of California, California was his home state, and that CA DMV was
the only licensing agency that could pursue an administrative action against
him.
[28] In the definition section, the compact does not describe a “home state” as the
state of residence, but rather, as “the State which has issued and has the power
to suspend or revoke the use of the license or permit to operate a motor
vehicle.” I.C. § 9-28-1-3, Article 2. Following his move to California, Douglass
surrendered his Indiana driver’s license and was issued a California driver’s
license on June 9, 2014. At that point, Indiana was deprived of its home-state
licensing status under the Interstate Driver’s License Compact to suspend or
revoke Douglass’ driver’s license. However, Indiana was not pursuing a license
revocation with Douglass; rather, it was pursuing a suspension of Douglass’
driving privileges in Indiana.
[29] BMV posits that the trial court’s decision “suggests under this scenario,” only
California and not Indiana can suspend or revoke Douglass’ driving privileges.
(Appellant’s Br. p. 15). Then citing Article 6 of the Interstate Driver’s License
Compact, BMV argues that “[n]othing in the compact requires this result.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 16 of 19 (Appellant’s Br. p. 15). We are persuaded by BMV’s interpretation of Article 6
of the compact which articulates that
Except as expressly required by provisions of this compact, nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect the right of any party state to apply any of its other laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance, nor to invalidate or prevent any driver license agreement or other cooperative arrangement between a party state and a nonparty state.
I.C. § 9-28-1-3. Additionally, Article 9 which addresses “construction and
severability,” directs, in part, that
This compact shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.
I.C. § 9-28-1-3. (Emphasis added).
[30] The language in Article 6 indicates that the compact is not intended to
supersede the application of other—possibly more stringent—motor vehicle
laws in Indiana. It is illogical to presume that the legislature intended with the
entry of the compact, that Indiana would not enforce its traffic laws against
nonresidents. Indeed, this court has held that the “statutes governing driving
privileges ‘promote highway safety [,]’ which ‘is a compelling state interest.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 17 of 19 Brown v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1219, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted).
Indiana has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from the dangers
posed by intoxicated drivers who disobey Indiana traffic laws. BMV echoes
this sentiment by arguing that “Douglas accumulated three drunk driving
convictions in Indiana, and the BMV properly applied Indiana law to suspend
his driving privileges.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. pp. 8-9).
[31] After having examined our HTV and driving privilege suspension laws and the
Interstate Driver’s License Compact, we agree with BMV’s assertion that it had
the right to pursue a suspension of Douglass’ driving privileges even though he
was a no longer a resident of Indiana. We therefore reverse the trial court’s
order canceling Douglass’ HTV determination and the reinstatement of
Douglass’ driving privileges in Indiana. Our conclusion harmonizes with the
legislative mandate of Indiana Code section 9-30-10-4 which authorizes BMV
to determine that a person is an HTV and proceed in suspending a person’s
driving privileges in light of qualifying judgments. Moreover, nothing under
the Interstate Driver’s License Compact requires party states, such as Indiana,
from enforcing its laws against a nonresident regardless of whether they have a
valid license issued by their home-state.
CONCLUSION [32] Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s order overturning Douglass’
HTV determination and the reinstatement of Douglass’ driving privileges in
Indiana.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 18 of 19 [33] Reversed.
[34] Vaidik, C. J. and Bradford, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-216 | October 23, 2019 Page 19 of 19