MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as May 18 2017, 10:04 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Adam C. Squiller Attorney General of Indiana Auburn, Indiana Andrea E. Rahman Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Indiana Bureau of Motor May 18, 2017 Vehicles and the State of Indiana, Court of Appeals Case No. 57A03-1608-MI-1946 Appellants-Defendants, Appeal from the Noble Superior v. Court. The Honorable Robert E. Kirsch, Judge. Adam Staton, Trial Court Cause No. 57D01-1604- MI-34 Appellee-Plaintiff.
Friedlander, Senior Judge
[1] The State and the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) appeal from the
Noble Superior Court’s order granting specialized driving privileges to Adam
Staton. We affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 1 of 7 [2] Although several issues are advanced in this appeal, the dispositive issue is
whether the State and the BMV waived their right to appeal the portion of the
Noble Superior Court’s order addressing Staton’s conviction in LaGrange
County and subsequent lifetime suspension by failing to object at the hearing.
[3] On two separate occasions, Staton was found to be an Habitual Traffic Violator
(HTV) for driving a vehicle while he knew his driving privileges were validly
suspended. The first determination was to expire on January 13, 2023, and the
second determination was to expire on November 13, 2023. The State and the
BMV do not contest the portion of the trial court’s order pertaining to these two
determinations acknowledging that those suspensions were imposed by the
BMV, and therefore, were administrative, rather than issued by a court order.
[4] In a separate action, Staton’s license was suspended for ninety-nine years, or
what could reasonably be characterized as a lifetime suspension, as a result of
his felony conviction for operating while an HTV. That conviction for the
felony offense was entered by the LaGrange Superior Court under cause
number 44D01-1306-FD-114.
[5] On April 22, 2016, Staton filed a verified petition for specialized driving
privileges under Indiana Code section 9-30-16-1 (2015), in Noble Superior
Court, the county of his residence. A hearing on the petition was scheduled for
May 10, 2016. The Noble County Prosecutor and the BMV were served with
summonses and notices of the hearing. The Noble County Prosecutor appeared
on behalf of the State and the BMV, but the BMV did not otherwise appear.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 2 of 7 [6] The Noble County Prosecutor had no objection to the granting of the petition.
In its order authorizing specialized driving privileges, the trial court noted all
three HTV determinations including the conviction from LaGrange Superior
Court leading to “a lifetime or indefinite bureau imposed suspension.”
Appellants’ App. p. 6.
[7] The BMV filed a motion to intervene and a motion to correct error on June 9,
2016. The trial court granted the BMV’s motion to intervene and scheduled a
hearing on the motion for July 26, 2016. On July 27, 2016, the trial court
issued an order denying the BMV’s motion to correct error. This appeal
followed.
[8] When a party appeals from the denial of its motion to correct error, we review
the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Old Utica Sch. Pres., Inc. v. Utica
Twp., et al., 7 N.E.3d 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We will conclude
there has been an abuse of discretion when we find that the trial court’s decision
is contrary to the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.
[9] The State and the BMV argue that the trial court erred by denying the motion
to correct error. They allege that the trial court erred by characterizing Staton’s
suspension based on his conviction in LaGrange Superior Court as an
administrative, BMV-ordered suspension. They further contend that because
that suspension was, in their opinion, court-ordered, any petition for specialized
driving privileges with respect to that suspension should have been filed in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 3 of 7 LaGrange County. As such, they assert that the Noble Superior Court had no
authority to grant Staton specialized driving privileges on a license suspension
ordered by another court of equal jurisdiction.
[10] As for the merits, Staton argues that his ninety-nine-year suspension was
administratively imposed and that the trial court was within its authority to
grant specialized driving privileges with respect to each of his suspensions.
Staton additionally argues that the State and the BMV waived any challenge to
the trial court’s order by failing to file a motion to dismiss the petition with
respect to the lifetime suspension and by failing to object when the evidence
was heard at trial.
[11] The dispositive argument here is that the State and the BMV waived any
challenge to the trial court’s order by not only failing to object to the issuance of
the special license, but affirmatively stating at the hearing that there was no
objection.
[12] The petition itself referenced only one of Staton’s suspensions. The trial court’s
order reveals, however, that during the hearing all three license suspensions 1 were discussed.
[13] The State and the BMV respond to this argument by characterizing their
position as a challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the
1 There is no transcript of the hearing at which the merits of the special driving privileges were addressed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 4 of 7 suspension issued after Staton’s conviction in LaGrange County. They claim
that they have not waived their argument because a challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time.
[14] Subject matter jurisdiction involves the power of a court to hear a class of cases.
Foor v. Town of Hebron, 742 N.E.2d 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Jurisdiction over
the case is the power of the court to hear a particular case within the class of
cases over which the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Unlike
subject matter jurisdiction, however, a party waives the issue of jurisdiction
over a specific case by failing to raise that issue in a timely manner. Georgetown
Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Keele, 743 N.E.2d 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Venue
statutes and rules prescribe the location at which trial proceedings are to occur
from among the courts empowered to exercise jurisdiction. In re Adoption of
J.T.D.,
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MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as May 18 2017, 10:04 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Adam C. Squiller Attorney General of Indiana Auburn, Indiana Andrea E. Rahman Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Indiana Bureau of Motor May 18, 2017 Vehicles and the State of Indiana, Court of Appeals Case No. 57A03-1608-MI-1946 Appellants-Defendants, Appeal from the Noble Superior v. Court. The Honorable Robert E. Kirsch, Judge. Adam Staton, Trial Court Cause No. 57D01-1604- MI-34 Appellee-Plaintiff.
Friedlander, Senior Judge
[1] The State and the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) appeal from the
Noble Superior Court’s order granting specialized driving privileges to Adam
Staton. We affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 1 of 7 [2] Although several issues are advanced in this appeal, the dispositive issue is
whether the State and the BMV waived their right to appeal the portion of the
Noble Superior Court’s order addressing Staton’s conviction in LaGrange
County and subsequent lifetime suspension by failing to object at the hearing.
[3] On two separate occasions, Staton was found to be an Habitual Traffic Violator
(HTV) for driving a vehicle while he knew his driving privileges were validly
suspended. The first determination was to expire on January 13, 2023, and the
second determination was to expire on November 13, 2023. The State and the
BMV do not contest the portion of the trial court’s order pertaining to these two
determinations acknowledging that those suspensions were imposed by the
BMV, and therefore, were administrative, rather than issued by a court order.
[4] In a separate action, Staton’s license was suspended for ninety-nine years, or
what could reasonably be characterized as a lifetime suspension, as a result of
his felony conviction for operating while an HTV. That conviction for the
felony offense was entered by the LaGrange Superior Court under cause
number 44D01-1306-FD-114.
[5] On April 22, 2016, Staton filed a verified petition for specialized driving
privileges under Indiana Code section 9-30-16-1 (2015), in Noble Superior
Court, the county of his residence. A hearing on the petition was scheduled for
May 10, 2016. The Noble County Prosecutor and the BMV were served with
summonses and notices of the hearing. The Noble County Prosecutor appeared
on behalf of the State and the BMV, but the BMV did not otherwise appear.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 2 of 7 [6] The Noble County Prosecutor had no objection to the granting of the petition.
In its order authorizing specialized driving privileges, the trial court noted all
three HTV determinations including the conviction from LaGrange Superior
Court leading to “a lifetime or indefinite bureau imposed suspension.”
Appellants’ App. p. 6.
[7] The BMV filed a motion to intervene and a motion to correct error on June 9,
2016. The trial court granted the BMV’s motion to intervene and scheduled a
hearing on the motion for July 26, 2016. On July 27, 2016, the trial court
issued an order denying the BMV’s motion to correct error. This appeal
followed.
[8] When a party appeals from the denial of its motion to correct error, we review
the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Old Utica Sch. Pres., Inc. v. Utica
Twp., et al., 7 N.E.3d 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We will conclude
there has been an abuse of discretion when we find that the trial court’s decision
is contrary to the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.
[9] The State and the BMV argue that the trial court erred by denying the motion
to correct error. They allege that the trial court erred by characterizing Staton’s
suspension based on his conviction in LaGrange Superior Court as an
administrative, BMV-ordered suspension. They further contend that because
that suspension was, in their opinion, court-ordered, any petition for specialized
driving privileges with respect to that suspension should have been filed in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 3 of 7 LaGrange County. As such, they assert that the Noble Superior Court had no
authority to grant Staton specialized driving privileges on a license suspension
ordered by another court of equal jurisdiction.
[10] As for the merits, Staton argues that his ninety-nine-year suspension was
administratively imposed and that the trial court was within its authority to
grant specialized driving privileges with respect to each of his suspensions.
Staton additionally argues that the State and the BMV waived any challenge to
the trial court’s order by failing to file a motion to dismiss the petition with
respect to the lifetime suspension and by failing to object when the evidence
was heard at trial.
[11] The dispositive argument here is that the State and the BMV waived any
challenge to the trial court’s order by not only failing to object to the issuance of
the special license, but affirmatively stating at the hearing that there was no
objection.
[12] The petition itself referenced only one of Staton’s suspensions. The trial court’s
order reveals, however, that during the hearing all three license suspensions 1 were discussed.
[13] The State and the BMV respond to this argument by characterizing their
position as a challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the
1 There is no transcript of the hearing at which the merits of the special driving privileges were addressed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 4 of 7 suspension issued after Staton’s conviction in LaGrange County. They claim
that they have not waived their argument because a challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time.
[14] Subject matter jurisdiction involves the power of a court to hear a class of cases.
Foor v. Town of Hebron, 742 N.E.2d 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Jurisdiction over
the case is the power of the court to hear a particular case within the class of
cases over which the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Unlike
subject matter jurisdiction, however, a party waives the issue of jurisdiction
over a specific case by failing to raise that issue in a timely manner. Georgetown
Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Keele, 743 N.E.2d 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Venue
statutes and rules prescribe the location at which trial proceedings are to occur
from among the courts empowered to exercise jurisdiction. In re Adoption of
J.T.D., 21 N.E.3d 824 (Ind. 2014).
[15] The petition was filed pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-30-16-4. The statute
provides as follows:
(a) An individual whose driving privileges have been suspended by the bureau by an administrative action and not by a court order may petition a court for specialized driving privileges as described in section 3(b) through 3(d) of this chapter. (b) A petition filed under this section must: (1) be verified by the petitioner; (2) state the petitioner’s age, date of birth, and address; (3) state the grounds for relief and the relief sought;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 5 of 7 (4) be filed in the appropriate county, as determined under subsection (d); (5) be filed in a circuit or superior court; and (6) be served on the bureau and the prosecuting attorney. (c) A prosecuting attorney shall appear on behalf of the bureau to respond to a petition filed under this section. (d) An individual whose driving privileges are suspended in Indiana must file a petition for specialized driving privileges as follows: (1) If the individual is an Indiana resident, in the county in which the individual resides. (2) If the individual was an Indiana resident at the time the individual’s driving privileges were suspended but is currently a nonresident, in the county in which the individual’s most recent Indiana moving violation judgment was entered against the individual. [16] The State and BMV do not contest the trial court’s authority to issue specialized
driving privileges for the two ten-year suspensions. They claim that those
suspensions were issued by administrative action, and the petition was properly
filed in a superior court in the county of Staton’s residence. They do challenge
the issuance of driving privileges with respect to the lifetime suspension,
claiming that it was court-ordered in LaGrange County. Consequently, their
argument challenges jurisdiction of the case with respect to the lifetime
suspension, and not the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. As such, any
challenge based upon whether the lifetime suspension was administratively
issued or court-ordered is waived because it was not timely made.
[17] Judgment affirmed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 6 of 7 Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 57A03-1608-MI-1946 | May 18, 2017 Page 7 of 7