Inc. Village of Rockville Centre v. Town of Hempstead

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Inc. Village of Rockville Centre v. Town of Hempstead

278 A.D.2d 279, 718 N.Y.S.2d 214, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12946

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided December 11, 2000·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

In an action to recover certain overcharges paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants for waste disposal services, the [280] plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), dated June 4, 1999, as granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss their first cause of action as barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, nothing in the instant record establishes that the defendants lulled the plaintiffs into inaction in order to allow the Statute of Limitations to expire (see, Marino v Buck, 231 AD2d 931; East Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v City of New York, 218 AD2d 628). Further, “ ‘in order for the equitable estoppel doctrine to apply, a fiduciary relationship must exist between the parties’ ” (Marino v Buck, supra, at 931; see, East Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v City of New York, supra; Cabrini Med. Ctr. v Desina, 64 NY2d 1059, 1062). No such relationship exists here.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ first cause of action as time-barred. Santucci, J. P., S. Miller, McGinity and Smith, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover certain overcharges paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants for waste disposal services, the [280] plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), dated June 4, 1999, as granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss their first cause of action as barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, nothing in the instant record establishes that the defendants lulled the plaintiffs into inaction in order to allow the Statute of Limitations to expire (see, Marino v Buck, 231 AD2d 931; East Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v City of New York, 218 AD2d 628). Further, “ ‘in order for the equitable estoppel doctrine to apply, a fiduciary relationship must exist between the parties’ ” (Marino v Buck, supra, at 931; see, East Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v City of New York, supra; Cabrini Med. Ctr. v Desina, 64 NY2d 1059, 1062). No such relationship exists here.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ first cause of action as time-barred. Santucci, J. P., S. Miller, McGinity and Smith, JJ., concur.

Inc. Village of Rockville Centre v. Town of Hempstead, 278 A.D.2d 279, 718 N.Y.S.2d 214, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12946 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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278 A.D.2d 279 (Inc. Village of Rockville Centre v. Town of Hempstead) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

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