Judgment rendered August 27, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 56,497-CA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
IN THE MATTER OF TWO (2) Defendant-Appellant CANINES SEIZED FROM SUSAN GRAHAM, RAYVILLE, LOUISIANA
Appealed from the Fifth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Richland, Louisiana Trial Court No. 50,077
Honorable Stephen Gayle Dean, Judge
JAMES EDWARD PATTON, II Counsel for Defendants-Appellants, Susan Graham and In the Matter of Two Canines Seized from Susan Graham
AMANDA MICHELE WILKINS Counsel for Assistant District Attorney Plaintiff-Appellee, State of Louisiana
Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ. HUNTER, J.
Defendant, Susan Graham, appeals a district court judgment which
granted the State’s motion to seize two of her dogs, declared the dogs
dangerous and an immediate threat to public health and safety, and ordered
them to be humanely euthanized at defendant’s cost. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
Defendant, Susan Graham, is the owner of nine or ten dogs. In 2022,
one of Graham’s dogs bit a meter reader who worked for the local water
company.1 The Richland Parish Sheriff’s Office (“RPSO”) issued Graham
summons for unlawful ownership of a dangerous dog. She pled guilty to the
violation and was placed on misdemeanor probation. Under the terms of her
probation, Graham was required to post warning signs around her premises
and to keep her dogs either on leashes or within appropriate secure
enclosures.
On January 22, 2025, Graham and her next-door neighbor, Julie
Smith, were outside their respective residences. Two of Graham’s dogs,
named Yellow and Red, were in the yard with Graham; the dogs were
neither on a leash nor enclosed in a secure enclosure. Graham asked Julie
for a cigarette, and Julie went inside her residence to retrieve the cigarette.
Meanwhile, Molly, Julie’s seven-year-old daughter, arrived home by school
bus and went inside her home. Moments later, Molly exited her residence
carrying the cigarette her mother had directed her to give to Graham. As
Molly approached Graham, Yellow and Red attacked the child, inflicting
1 The dog accused of biting the meter reader was not involved in the attack on the child in the instant case. multiple serious bites. Julie heard Molly’s screams, ran outside, and
managed to rescue Molly from the dogs. Graham was standing nearby but
did not attempt to intervene, claiming she did not see the dogs bite Molly or
hear the child’s screams. Molly suffered serious injuries, including
lacerations and puncture wounds to both arms and her right leg. She was
transported via ambulance to St. Francis Medical Center in Monroe,
Louisiana, where she underwent treatment for the dog bites.
Deputy Jonathan Bryan, of the RPSO, was dispatched to the scene.
He encountered Julie, who described the dogs involved in the attack as a
brown mixed-breed dog and a yellow mixed-breed dog.
The following day, Dustin King, Julie’s husband, contacted the RPSO
and reported that he had seen one of Graham’s dogs, which he described as a
“blonde” mixed breed, running around his yard without a leash. By the time
Deputy Bryan arrived, the dog had been returned to its kennel. The deputy
spoke to Graham, who admitted she had allowed one of her dogs outside
without a leash to “use the restroom”; however, Graham denied allowing the
dog to enter the neighbors’ yard. During her conversation with Deputy
Bryan, Graham stated her brown and white dog was one of the dogs that
attacked Molly the day before.2 Graham also told Deputy Brown that two of
her dogs, Yellow and Red, were the only two dogs outside with her when
Molly was bitten. Subsequently, King, who was not present when the dogs
bit Molly, pointed out the dogs he believed were involved. Deputy Bryan
2 During her testimony at the hearing, Graham stated she did not recall identifying the dog to Deputy Bryan.
2 noticed two dogs, a brown and white dog and a blond or yellow dog, were in
kennels on Graham’s property. The deputy took photographs of them.3
The RPSO issued a summons to Graham, citing her with unlawful
ownership of dangerous dogs. Yellow and Red were seized, and Graham
and her daughter drove them to a local veterinary clinic where they have
been held since that time.
On January 27, 2025, the State of Louisiana, through the District
Attorney for the Fifth Judicial District, filed a “Motion and Order for Seizing
and to Set Hearing to Dispose of Vicious Dogs,” pursuant to La. R.S.
14:102.18 and 14:102.13; Graham was named as the defendant. The State
sought a declaration that the dogs were vicious and a determination “that
when unprovoked and in an aggressive manner, ha[ve] inflicted bodily
injury on a human being.” The State also requested that the dogs be
euthanized “because they are a threat to public safety.” The trial court
ordered Graham to appear and show cause why the dogs “should not be
declared vicious and disposed of according to law.”
A hearing was held on January 30, 2025. Following the hearing, the
trial court declared the dogs to be dangerous dogs that were an immediate
threat to public health and safety. More specifically, the court found that the
State met its burden of proving the dogs were “dangerous dogs,” as defined
in La. R.S. 14:102.14, because, when unprovoked, they bit a person causing
injury. The court stated as follows:
*** Counsel for Graham argues that the State must prove there was no provocation of the dogs by Molly and that no testimony was offered by the State to do so. The Court reads the wording of
3 It was later revealed that the blond/yellow dog that Deputy Bryan photographed was a different dog, Milo, which was not involved in the attack. 3 the statute differently. The wording “when unprovoked, in an aggressive manner” implies that it would be assumed that there would ha[ve] been no provocation to the dogs unless otherwise proven or implied from the circumstances.
The Court found no definition of “provocation” in the applicable statutes governing the prosecution of this matter. “Provocation” in its normal use of the word is defined as “an action or statement that is intended to make someone angry,” “an action that is intended to cause a reaction, esp. anger or annoyance.” See Cambridge Dictionary. Implicit in the term is the intent to cause a reaction. Graham, apparently the only eyewitness to the attack other than Molly herself, testified to no actions by Molly that could have reasonably been considered “provocative” as she approached just prior to the attack. There was no indication from Graham’s testimony that Molly’s actions in running towards Graham and her dogs were anything but normal childish actions which conceivably may have surprised the dogs, but nothing in the testimony or other evidence gives rise to an inference or any indication that Molly provoked the dogs in any way. The fact that the dogs attacked Molly without being provoked and bit her several times before her mother arrived at the scene clearly demonstrates to the Court that the dogs were acting “in an aggressive manner” as contemplated by the statute. ***
The trial court ordered the dogs to be “humanely euthanized” in
accordance with La. R.S. 14:102.16(C) and 102.18(D) and (E), stating:
[I]t is apparent to the Court that the two subject dogs, Yellow and Red, are not only dangerous dogs but that they pose an immediate threat to public safety and health: this is evident from the dogs act[ing] aggressively in attacking a child without provocation, along with the fact that their owner completely disregards the mandates of law in allowing these dogs to be unleashed and outside of a secure enclosure at the time of the attack and that she admittedly is physically unable to intervene to stop the dogs [if they] should attack a neighbor or member of the public. Unfortunately, Graham has demonstrated that she is unwilling to act responsibly while keeping these dogs on her premises, despite her having previously been found to be the owner of a dangerous dog while residing at the same property on which the attack in this case occurred. She has ignored the obvious need to keep her dogs inside her dwelling or within secure enclosures when found outside her dwelling. Although she admitted knowing that she would be unable to catch or control the dogs when they were loose, she was not responsible enough to even leash the dogs while they were outside her
4 dwelling or outside a secured enclosure in order to at least attempt to restrain them if needed. *** [C]onsidering Graham has failed repeatedly to properly restrain or enclose her dogs to prevent them from attacking persons, especially children, living nearby or entering her property, the Court does not believe that she will follow any directives of the Court or comply with conditions the Court may establish for the restraint and confinement of the subject dogs as provided by law. For these reasons and for the reasons explained above, the Court finds that the subject dogs pose an immediate threat to public health and safety in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 14:102.16. ***
The trial court further cast Graham with all costs and expenses of keeping
the dogs, including the expenses of euthanizing and properly disposing of
them.
Graham appeals.
DISCUSSION
Graham contends the trial court erred in finding that her dogs are
dangerous dogs. She argues La. R.S. 14:102.14 defines a “dangerous
dog” as a “any dog which, when unprovoked, bites a person causing an
injury.” More specifically, Graham takes issue with the trial court’s use of a
dictionary to define the term “provocation.” According to Graham, the
statute does not state the provocation must be intentional, and Molly could
have unintentionally provoked the dogs by running toward Graham. She
argues the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in interpreting the term
“provoke” to mean an intentional act. Graham asserts she is entitled to a de
novo review because the incorrect interpretation of the word tainted the
entire proceeding.
A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact in
the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Kinnett v.
5 Kinnett, 20-01134 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So. 3d 1149. However, where the
trial court makes a legal error that interdicts the fact-finding process, the
manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and the appellate court may
conduct an independent de novo review of the record. Hicks v. USAA
General Indem. Co., 21-00840 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So. 3d 1106. A legal error
occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law, and such errors
are prejudicial. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So. 2d 731.
Generally, when the trial court makes errors that are prejudicial, such that
they materially affect the outcome of the trial and deprive a party of
substantial rights, and if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court
will conduct its own de novo review of the record. Melerine v. Tom’s
Marine & Salvage, LLC, 20-00571 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So. 3d 806.
La. R.S. 14:3 provides:
The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.
Further, as a general matter, criminal statutes are given a genuine
construction according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual
sense, in context, and with reference to the purpose for the provision. La.
R.S. 14:3; State v. Interiano, 03-1760 (La. 2/13/04), 868 So. 2d 9; State v.
Muschkat, 96-2922 (La. 3/4/98), 706 So. 2d 432; State v. Griffin, 495 So. 2d
1306 (La. 1986).
A “dangerous dog” is defined as “any dog which, when unprovoked,
bites a person causing an injury.” La. R.S. 14:102.14(A)(2). However, the
6 statute does not define the terms “unprovoked,” “provoked,” or
“provocation.”
In State v. Jenkins, 338 So. 2d 276 (La. 1976), the defendant claimed
he was prejudiced by the use of the dictionary definition of the word
“threat.” The Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating:
We note, first of all, that unless the legislature has attached a particular meaning to a term different from that usually understood in common parlance the common definition of the word will be presumed to be the one intended. State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415, 34 So. 2d 909 (1948); State v. Robertson, 241 La. 249, 128 So. 2d 646 (1961). In these two cases, this Court looked to Webster’s Dictionary to determine the common meaning of statutory language, and, absent special circumstances, we see nothing wrong with this method of interpreting laws.
Id. at 282.
Applying these principles to the instant case, we find the trial
court did not apply incorrect principles of law or make any prejudicial
errors of law. The trial court did not create a wholly new definition of
the word but rather used the dictionary to ascertain the generally
prevailing meaning of a common term. Consequently, we fail to see
any legal error on the part of the trial court regarding its use of the
dictionary definition of the term “provocation.” In the absence of any
legal error on the part of the trial court, we decline to conduct a de
novo review of this matter. Therefore, we find the trial court’s factual
findings are subject to the manifest error standard of review.
Under the manifest error standard of review, the issue to be resolved
by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but
whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart v. State
through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617 So. 2d 880 (La. 1993); Cosse v. Allen-
7 Bradley Co., 601 So. 2d 1349 (La. 1992); Housley v. Cerise, 579 So. 2d 973
(La. 1991); Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1990).
Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences
are more reasonable than the factfinder’s, reasonable evaluations of
credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon
review where conflict exists in the testimony. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d
840 (La. 1989); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978).
However, where documents or objective evidence so contradict the
witness’s story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible
on its face, that a reasonable factfinder would not credit the witness’s story,
the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a
finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Rosell, supra.
Nonetheless, the reviewing court must always keep in mind that if the trial
court or jury’s findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its
entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even if convinced that had it
been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently. Housley v. Cerise, supra; Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
supra.
A “dangerous dog” includes “[a]ny dog which, when unprovoked,
bites a person causing an injury.” La. R.S. 14:102.14(A)(2). In every case
where a dog is established to be a dangerous dog, the court shall enter an
order declaring the dog to be dangerous and shall direct the owner of the dog
to comply with conditions established for the restraint and confinement of
the dog as provided by law. La. R.S. 14:102.13(D). Alternatively, a dog
determined by the court to be a dangerous dog may be humanely euthanized
8 if it is determined that the dog poses an immediate threat to public health
and safety. La. R.S. 14:102.16(C).
Furthermore, La. R.S. 14:102.18 provides, in pertinent part:
A. Any law enforcement officer or animal control officer may seize any dog which when unprovoked, in an aggressive manner, causes the death of or inflicts bodily injury on a human being. Any dog seized pursuant to the provisions of this Section may be impounded pending the outcome of the hearing held in accordance with this Section. *** D. A dog determined by the court to have, when unprovoked, in an aggressive manner, caused the death of or inflicted bodily injury on a human being may be humanely euthanized by the animal control agency, a licensed veterinarian, or a qualified technician. ***
In the instant case, Deputy Bryan testified that on January 22, 2025,
he was dispatched to a property regarding a dog bite complaint. When he
arrived, he encountered Molly’s mother, Julie Smith, who told him she was
inside her house when she heard Molly screaming. She ran outside,
observed two of Graham’s dogs attacking Molly, ran over and freed Molly
from the dogs, and carried her inside. Deputy Bryan testified he observed
lacerations underneath Molly’s left armpit and on the back of her left arm
and puncture wounds on her right leg and arm. Molly was transported to St.
Francis Medical Center in Monroe via ambulance. Deputy Bryan further
testified he determined Graham was the owner of the dogs involved in the
attack, and he issued a summons to her for two counts of ownership of a
vicious dog.
Additionally, Deputy Bryan stated he was dispatched back to
Graham’s property the following day for a report of one of her dogs running
loose in the neighbor’s yard. He also testified that Dustin King pointed out
the two dogs he believed had bitten Molly. Deputy Bryan stated he 9 interviewed Graham, who admitted to letting one of her dogs out “to use the
restroom” on her property, but she denied that the dog ventured onto King’s
property. Deputy Bryan also testified Graham informed him “it was the
brown and white dog alone that attacked [Molly] the previous day.”
Suzanne Smith, Graham’s daughter, testified she lives near her
mother, and she is familiar with her mother’s dogs. Smith stated she had
never seen Yellow or Red behave aggressively toward anyone, and her
children had never been afraid of them. She also testified she took
photographs of her mother’s property the day before the hearing; the
photographs depicted “Beware of Dog” signs displayed in various locations
around the property.4
Melissa Overman, Suzanne Smith’s best friend, testified that she
visited Graham nearly every day, and she was familiar with the dogs,
including Yellow and Red. She also stated Yellow and Red would bark
when she arrived, but she had never witnessed them acting aggressively
toward anyone. Overman testified the dogs were familiar with her, and she
described their barks as “playful,” but not vicious. She further testified
Yellow generally stays in the house with Graham, but Graham lets her
outside “to use the bathroom.” Overman admitted that she had never
observed Yellow being on a leash when Graham let her outside.
Graham testified that Red and Yellow were outside in the yard with
her at the time of the attack, and she admitted they were not on leashes. She
stated she was not in any condition to catch the dogs if they became excited
4 Smith also identified her mother’s dogs depicted in the photographs. One of the photographs, taken by Deputy Bryan the day after the attack, depicted a dog named “Milo,” which looked similar to Yellow. 10 and “took off.” She also testified she heard the dogs barking, but she did not
see them bite Molly or hear Molly screaming. Graham insisted she “was
there the whole time”; however, she claimed she did not know how Molly
received the dog bites depicted in the photographs. She stated her dogs are
not aggressive, Yellow and Red are “loving dogs,” and she had never seen
them bite or act aggressively toward anyone. Graham also testified that she
did not believe Molly intentionally provoked the dogs, but she may have
“scared” them by running across the yard. According to Graham, she could
not recall identifying Yellow and Red as the dogs that attacked Molly.5
After Graham’s testimony, the State called Deputy Jacob Stansbury to
testify as a rebuttal witness. He testified he and another deputy were
dispatched to Graham’s property to seize and impound the dogs involved in
the attack on Molly. He stated he and the other deputy did not know which
dogs were to be seized when they arrived at the property. Therefore, they
spoke to Graham and asked her which dogs were involved in the incident.
Deputy Stansbury testified that Graham indicated which dogs were involved,
and she and her daughter put the dogs into her vehicle and drove them to the
veterinary clinic. When asked how the deputies knew which two dogs were
to be seized and impounded, Deputy Stansbury replied as follows:
Well, we just – we took *** Ms. [Graham’s] account. We asked her, you know, which dogs [were involved]. Obviously, there [were] multiple dogs. Once – once she told us which dogs *** and we got them to Morris Vet, I captured two photos, one of each dog that was quarantined. And the pictures were shown to, I believe, the victim’s mother. And the mother clarified that those were the dogs that in fact attacked her.
5 Graham introduced exhibits, which showed she had kennels and several “Beware of Dog” signs on her property. One of the signs faced the property occupied by Molly’s family. 11 Pursuant to R.S. 14:102.18, the State was required to prove (1) the
dogs inflicted bodily injury or caused the death of a human being; (2) the
dogs were unprovoked; and (3) the dogs inflicted the bodily injuries in an
aggressive manner. Based on our review of the record, we find the evidence
supports the trial court’s conclusion that the dogs, Yellow and Red, in an
aggressive manner, inflicted bodily injury on a human being, Molly. The
trial court evaluated the evidence and concluded Molly did not provoke the
dogs to bite her. There was no evidence that Molly, a child running to give
Graham a requested cigarette from her mother, provoked the dogs to attack
her, either intentionally or unintentionally. The dogs were in the yard,
unleashed, at the time of the attack, and Graham admitted she habitually lets
the dogs out into the yard without leashes. The evidence also established
that despite the attack on Molly, Graham admitted that she had let at least
one of her dogs outside, unleashed, the very next day to “use the restroom.”
In finding that the dogs pose an immediate threat to public health and safety
and ordering them to be euthanized, the trial court appropriately considered
Graham’s total disregard of the prior mandate to keep her dogs leashed or in
secure enclosures. The trial court stated:
*** [C]onsidering that Graham has failed repeatedly to properly restrain or enclose her dogs to prevent them from attacking persons, especially children, living nearby or entering her property, the Court does not believe that she will follow any directives of the Court or comply with conditions the Court may establish for the restraint and confinement of the subject dogs as provided by law. For these reasons, and for the reasons explained above, the Court finds that the subject dogs pose an immediate threat to public health and safety[.] ***
We agree. Consequently, we find the trial court’s findings – the dogs,
Yellow and Red, attacked Molly without provocation, and they inflicted 12 bodily injury on her in an aggressive manner – were not manifestly
erroneous or clearly wrong. Additionally, considering the appropriate
standard of review and the entirety of the record, we are constrained to
conclude that the trial court did not manifestly err in finding that the dogs,
Yellow and Red, pose an immediate threat to public health and safety and
ordering them to be humanely euthanized.
Graham also argues the trial court erred in overruling her objections
and allowing Deputy Bryan to render hearsay testimony as to what Molly’s
mother Julie, and her husband, Dustin King, told him during the
investigation of the dogs’ attack. She argues neither Julie nor King testified
at the trial, and the testimony by Deputy Bryan was hearsay because it
pertained to the central issue in this case.
The Code of Evidence shall serve as guides to the admissibility of
evidence. In hearings on motions and other summary proceedings involving
questions of fact not dispositive of or central to the disposition of the case on
the merits, or to the dismissal of the case, the specific exclusionary rules of
evidence and other provisions shall be applied only to the extent that they
tend to promote the purposes of the proceeding. La. C.E. art. 1101(B)(8).
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
La. C.E. art. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of
Louisiana, this Code of Evidence, or other legislation. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible. La. C.E. art. 402.
13 “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. La. C.E. art. 801(C). Hearsay is not admissible
except as otherwise provided by the Louisiana Code of Evidence or other
legislation. La. C.E. art. 802. Whether evidence is relevant and admissible
is within the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Succession of
Davisson, 50,830 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/22/16), 211 So. 3d 597, writ denied,
17-0307 (La. 4/7/17), 218 So. 3d 111; Hooker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
38,244 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d 869.
When an investigating officer testifies concerning events which lead
to the arrest of a defendant, or in this case, the issuance of a summons,
statements made to the officer during the course of the investigation are not
hearsay, if they are merely offered to explain the officer’s actions. State v.
Clark, 44,612 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/23/09), 22 So. 3d 240; State v. Zeigler,
40,673 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/06), 920 So. 2d 949. A trial court’s error in
admitting evidence of a testifying police officer, when such testimony
arguably contains hearsay, is subject to the harmless error analysis. Id.
Our review of the record reveals Deputy Bryan testified that Molly’s
mother, Julie Smith, was the complainant on January 22, 2025, regarding the
dog attack, and Dustin King was the complainant on January 23, 2025,
regarding one of Graham’s dogs running in his yard. Over the objections of
Graham’s counsel, Deputy Bryan was allowed to testify about his
conversations with Julie and King and their recount of events. His testimony
explained his understanding of the occurrences which transpired and his
subsequent investigation of both complaints, including his interactions with 14 Graham. Deputy Bryan did not testify to the veracity of what Julie and King
told him. Rather, much of his testimony focused on the actions he took in
response to the information they provided, i.e., interviewing Graham and
subsequently issuing a summons. Based on the facts and circumstances
herein, we find the trial court did not err in denying the hearsay objections to
Deputy Bryan’s testimony.
Nevertheless, even if the trial court erred in allowing the testimony,
reversal is mandated only when there is a reasonable possibility that the
hearsay evidence surely contributed to the trial court’s ruling. In this case,
our review of the record shows the evidence was sufficient to support the
trial court’s ruling, even without consideration of the deputy’s testimony as
to the statements made by Julie and King. Even without the benefit of the
statements, the evidence established Yellow and Red attacked Molly, biting
her multiple times. Deputy Bryan saw and photographed Molly’s injuries.
Further, Graham, who denied witnessing the attack, later admitted to Deputy
Bryan that at least one of her dogs (subsequently identified as Red) was
involved. Graham also identified which dogs were in the yard with her at
the time of the attack, and she and her daughter transported the dogs to the
veterinary clinic. Consequently, we conclude any error in allowing Deputy
Bryan’s testimony, regarding statements made by Julie and King, was
harmless.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant, Susan Graham.
AFFIRMED.