In the Matter of T.J. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 3, 2025
• Docket: 02-24-00530-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00530-CV ___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF T.J.

On Appeal from the 323rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 323-118714-22

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant T.J. appeals the juvenile court’s decision to transfer him to the

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to complete his

10-year sentence for capital murder. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(d)(3)(A)(i).

T.J. contends in his sole point that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s

ruling. We disagree and affirm the juvenile court’s transfer order.

I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

The Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD or Juvenile Department) may refer a

youth to the juvenile court for transfer to the Department of Criminal Justice

(Criminal Department) if the youth is between 16 and 19 years old, is serving a

determinate sentence, and has not completed his sentence and if the youth’s conduct

“indicates that the welfare of the community requires the transfer.” Tex. Hum. Res.

Code Ann. § 244.014(a). Upon such referral, the juvenile court must conduct a

hearing, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(a), and after the hearing, the juvenile court

must either (1) order him returned to the Juvenile Department or (2) transfer him to

the Criminal Department to complete his sentence, see id. § 54.11(i); In re K.J., No. 02-

23-00189-CV, 2023 WL 6889969, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 19, 2023, pet.

denied) (mem. op.).

When deciding whether to transfer a youth to the Criminal Department, the

juvenile court may consider several factors, including

2 • the experiences and character of the person before and after commitment to the [Juvenile Department];

• the nature of the penal offense that the person was found to have committed and the manner in which the offense was committed;

• the abilities of the person to contribute to society;

• the protection of the victim of the offense or any member of the victim’s family;

• the recommendations of the youth commission and the prosecuting attorney;

• the best interests of the person; and

• any other factor relevant to the issue to be decided.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(k). The State is not required to present evidence of

each factor, and the juvenile court is not required to consider all the listed factors and

may assign different weights to those factors that it does consider. In re A.I.G., 711

S.W.3d 270, 276 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.).

We review a juvenile court’s decision to transfer a child to the Criminal

Department for an abuse of discretion. See id. Generally, a court abuses its discretion

if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts to a clear and

prejudicial error of law. Id. When deciding whether an abuse of discretion occurred,

appellate courts review the entire record to determine if the juvenile court acted

without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. If some evidence supports

the juvenile court’s decision, it has not abused its discretion. Id.; see Sherman v.

3 Sherman, 650 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.) (noting that no

abuse of discretion occurs if some substantive and probative evidence supports the

trial court’s decision or if reasonable minds could differ as to the result). Stated

differently, a trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or

when it rules based on factual assertions not supported by the record. A.I.G., 711

S.W.3d at 276–77. The juvenile court—as the factfinder at the transfer hearing—is

the sole judge of witness credibility and may choose to believe or disbelieve all or only

portions of a witness’s testimony. In re J.A.G., 697 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2024, no pet.).

Because a ruling must be supported by the record, the sufficiency of the

evidence is a component of an abuse-of-discretion review. See In re J.H., 698 S.W.3d

101, 105 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.). When considering a legal

sufficiency challenge, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding

and indulge every reasonable inference that supports it. Id. at 106.

II. Discussion

We first address—independently of T.J.’s arguments—why the juvenile court

did not abuse its discretion by transferring T.J. to the Criminal Department. We then

address T.J.’s sufficiency complaints and explain why they have no merit.

A. No Abuse of Discretion

When the transfer hearing began, the juvenile court took judicial notice that it

had previously found that T.J. had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the

4 offense of capital murder. In T.J.’s confession, he admitted to shooting and killing a

man in the course of committing or attempting to commit a robbery. See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2). The nature of the underlying offense is one of the factors

listed in the Texas Family Code that the juvenile court can consider, see Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 54.11(k), and this offense was serious. If convicted as an adult, the

punishment is death or life imprisonment without parole. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 12.31(a).

The manner of committing the offense is another factor listed in the Texas

Family Code that the juvenile court can consider. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 54.11(k). At the hearing, the State called as its only witness the Gainesville State

School Juvenile Department’s clinical director, Daniel Krall. Through Krall, the State

introduced into evidence a “master file,” consisting of over 1,000 pages.1 And the

master file outlined the manner in which the underlying offense was committed.

According to the information contained within the file, T.J. agreed to sell a gun

to the victim; the victim made a partial payment before meeting T.J.; and when the

victim drove up to make the final exchange, T.J. shot the victim multiple times and

killed him. T.J. then took the victim’s money. T.J. was thus convicted of capital

murder based on his own conduct and not on the conduct of another for whom he

was criminally responsible. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01 (“Parties to Offenses”).

The file also contained a seven-page summary that provided the Juvenile 1

Department’s recommendation and the reasons for it.

5 The director’s recommendation is also a relevant consideration. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 54.11(k). On direct examination, after admitting the master file, the

State asked Krall for the Juvenile Department’s recommendation, and Krall

responded, “The recommendation of the agency is that [T.J.] should be transferred to

the . . . Criminal [Department].”

In explaining the basis of his recommendation, Krall testified that T.J. had not

yet completed the Serious Violent Offender Treatment Program2 and that T.J. would

not be able to complete it before his nineteenth birthday. Krall further explained that

several behavioral incidents by T.J. had caused him to be transferred to the Evins

Facility, a facility that did not offer the Serious Violent Offender Treatment Program.

According to the file summary, after completing the Redirect Program3 at the Evins

Facility, T.J. was sent to the Giddings State School but then returned to the Evins

Facility to complete the Redirect Program for a second time. After the second

completion, T.J. was sent to the Gainesville State School where he remained until the

transfer hearing.

2 The Juvenile Department’s recommendation summary describes the program as follows: “The [Serious Violent Offender Treatment Program] treats youth who are committed to TJJD for crimes such as capital murder, murder[,] and other offenses involving the use of a weapon or deadly force.” 3 The Juvenile Department’s recommendation summary defined the Redirect Program as “a security program designed to deliver intensive behavior management interventions in a structured environment for youth who have engaged in certain serious rule violations.”

6 T.J.’s conduct after his commitment to the Juvenile Department is also a

relevant factor for the juvenile court to consider. See id. And the recommendation

summary stated that T.J.’s own conduct prevented him from completing the Serious

Violent Offender Treatment Program: “[T.J.] has been unable to enroll and participate

[in] this program due to his behavior and placement in the [Redirect and Intensive

Intervention Program].”

The welfare of the community was another proper factor, see Tex. Hum. Res.

Code Ann. § 244.014(a), and the Juvenile Department’s recommendation summary

reported that T.J. posed a danger to other juveniles: “[T.J.’s] behavior and refusal to

respond to intervention suggest that he is both a disruption and a danger to other

youth while in TJJD.”

The prosecutor’s recommendation was a relevant consideration as well. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(k). During final arguments, the State recommended

that the juvenile court follow Krall’s recommendation and transfer T.J. to the

Criminal Department.

On appeal, T.J. argues—and correctly so—that at the transfer hearing, his

counsel presented evidence and arguments favorable to him. But as the factfinder,

the juvenile court could have given this favorable evidence little or no weight and

could have given considerable weight to the ample unfavorable evidence outlined

above. See J.A.G., 697 S.W.3d at 393. Because the presence of unfavorable evidence

7 supports the juvenile court’s ruling, we hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its

discretion. See A.I.G., 711 S.W.3d at 276.

B. T.J.’s Sufficiency Complaints

We now address T.J.’s two sufficiency complaints.

First, he argues that although Krall testified during the hearing and gave his

recommendation, his recommendation was conclusory. Specifically, T.J. argues that

nothing in Krall’s testimony explained how he had arrived at his recommendation and

that his recommendation carries no evidentiary weight. See Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d

526, 536 (Tex. 2010) (stating that if no basis for an opinion is offered, the opinion is

merely a conclusory statement and cannot be considered probative evidence).

Second, T.J. maintains that the juvenile court could not have reviewed the

entire 1,000-page master file after its admission and before the juvenile court’s ruling

and that the ruling could not have been based on the master file. And, to further

support that argument, T.J. contends that the juvenile court was not authorized to

review the master file before the hearing.

1. Conclusory testimony

As to T.J.’s contention that Krall’s testimony was conclusory, T.J. points out

that when the State questioned Krall on direct, the State asked him for his

recommendation, Krall gave it, and then the State passed the witness. But T.J. fails to

acknowledge that Krall’s testimony did not end there. The record shows that not only

did T.J.’s attorney cross-examine Krall at length about the basis of his opinion but

8 also that the juvenile court judge questioned Krall about his recommendation. Thus,

Krall’s testimony was not limited to a bare, conclusory recommendation, as T.J.

contends.

Additionally, Krall indicated that he had reviewed the master file, and the

master file was admitted into evidence along with its 1,000-plus pages pertaining to

T.J. and his commitment and its seven-page summary explaining the Juvenile

Department’s recommendation. Krall’s recommendation was, therefore, not

conclusory or without any explanation. Both Krall’s testimony and the master file

provided evidentiary support and an explanation for Krall’s recommendation.

We reject T.J.’s first argument that Krall’s recommendation was conclusory and

lacked evidentiary support or explanation. See J.H., 698 S.W.3d at 105.

2. Juvenile Court’s Review of the Master File

T.J. argues that the juvenile court did not have sufficient time to review the

master file before making its ruling and that nothing authorized the juvenile court to

review the master file before the hearing. Therefore, T.J. concludes that the master

file could not have provided any evidentiary support for the juvenile court’s ruling.

We disagree.

The Texas Family Code anticipates that the juvenile court—not the State—will

provide all the written materials that the court will consider at the transfer hearing to

the youth’s attorney on or before the fifth day before the hearing. Tex. Fam. Code

9 Ann. § 54.11(d).4 Thus, the Texas Family Code contemplates that the juvenile court

will know in advance what documentary evidence it will rely upon at the hearing.5

And nothing in Section 54.11(d) precludes the juvenile court from reviewing such

documentary evidence in advance of the hearing. See id. We reject T.J.’s suggestion

that the statute’s silence on the matter would dictate that a juvenile court is prohibited

from preparing for an upcoming hearing by reviewing a report that it has identified as

written matter it will consider at the hearing.

Consistent with this construction, the record indicates that the juvenile court

did review the master file in advance of the hearing. The juvenile court’s familiarity

with the contents of the master file at the hearing was demonstrated when the juvenile

Section 54.11(d) provides, 4

At a hearing under this section the court may consider written reports and supporting documents from probation officers, professional court employees, guardians ad litem appointed under Section 51.11(d), professional consultants, employees of the [TJJD], or employees of a post-adjudication secure correctional facility in addition to the testimony of witnesses. On or before the fifth day before the date of the hearing, the court shall provide the attorney for the person to be transferred or released under supervision with access to all written matter to be considered by the court. All written matter is admissible in evidence at the hearing.

Id. (emphasis added). 5 The record shows that the master file was sent to the juvenile court on November 7, 2024, and, although not entirely clear, indicates that the recommendation summary was sent on November 13, 2024. At the outset of the transfer hearing on November 20, 2024, the juvenile court took judicial notice of its file “and all of its contents.”

10 court drew on information solely contained within the master file to question Krall

about his opinion. For example, the juvenile court asked about an incident in which

T.J. had threatened another youth’s mother over the telephone.6 And the juvenile

court also asked about other incident reports contained within the master file,

including allegations of inappropriate touching of staff members and possession of

prohibited items. By making such inquiries, the juvenile court demonstrated that it

had reviewed the master file and that its decision was based, at least in part, on its

contents.

We reject T.J.’s second argument that the juvenile court was prohibited from

reviewing the master file prior to the hearing and had failed to review it prior to

ruling. See id.; J.H., 698 S.W.3d at 105.

III. Conclusion

Having rejected each of T.J.’s arguments, we overrule T.J.’s sole sufficiency

point and affirm the juvenile court’s order transferring him to the Criminal

Department.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice Delivered: July 3, 2025

6 Krall responded that the incident had resulted in an extortion finding and to T.J.’s return to the Evins Facility.