In the Matter of THORNHILL WAY I, Debtor-Appellant

636 F.2d 1151, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 11069
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedDecember 29, 1980
Docket80-1120
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 636 F.2d 1151 (In the Matter of THORNHILL WAY I, Debtor-Appellant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In the Matter of THORNHILL WAY I, Debtor-Appellant, 636 F.2d 1151, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 11069 (7th Cir. 1980).

Opinion

SPRECHER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal from the dismissal of a Chapter XII bankruptcy proceeding raises the question of whether Section 517 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 917, requires dismissal because the only real property owned by the debtor is subject to a mortgage insured pursuant to the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., which mortgage is now held by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

I

The debtor is an Illinois general partnership which is the “owner” of a 285-unit apartment complex with recreational facilities, located in Carol Stream, Illinois. 1 The property was encumbered on February 1, 1971 with a mortgage in the amount of $4,023,500, held by Draper and Kramer, Inc., which mortgage was assigned on September 14, 1973, to the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations Mortgage Investment Trust (Mortgage Investment Trust). From the time of its execution, the mortgage was insured pursuant to the National Housing Act. The debtor defaulted in making the mortgage payments.

On February 3, 1975, the Mortgage Investment Trust assigned to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) “all rights and interest arising under the mortgage and credit instrument so in default, and all claims against the mortgagor, or others, arising out of the mortgage transaction.” The insurance benefits were paid to the Mortgage Investment Trust in accordance with 12 U.S.C. § 1713(g). 2

On June 8, 1976, the United States, on behalf of HUD, commenced an action in the district court to foreclose the mortgage. On February 10, 1977, the United States through the Secretary of HUD, was placed in possession of the real estate.

*1153 On May 16, 1977, the debtor filed its Chapter XII Petition for a Real Property Arrangement. On January 19, 1978, the bankruptcy court dismissed the petition and proceeding on the basis of Section 517 of the Bankruptcy Act, upon finding that the United States, through HUD, “is the only secured creditor holding a security interest in the real estate which is the subject matter of the Chapter XII petition .. .. ”

The debtor appealed to the district court which on December 19, 1979, affirmed the bankruptcy court on the basis of Section 517. The debtor then appealed to this court, arguing that Section 517 does not apply.

II

A

Section 517 of the Bankruptcy Act 3 provides that “[njothing contained in this chapter [Chapter XII, Real Property Arrangements] shall be deemed to affect or apply to the creditors of any debtor under a mortgage insured pursuant to the National Housing Act and Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto .... ”

HUD is a creditor of the debtor in this Chapter XII proceeding. 4 “Creditors” under Chapter XII means “holders of claims,” and “claims” includes “all claims of whatever character, against a debtor or his property, whether or not such claims are provable ... and whether secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent.” 11 U.S.C. § 806(2) and (5). A mortgage is a claim against a debtor or his property 5 and the insurer of a mortgage has a fixed or contingent claim from the time of the assumption of the obligation to insure. American Surety Co. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513, 518, 53 S.Ct. 260, 262, 77 L.Ed. 466 (1933).

On February 1, 1971, the mortgage was insured pursuant to the National Housing Act. The same mortgage and the underlying credit instrument are now held by HUD through assignment. Thus, HUD falls within the exemptive language of Section 517 by qualifying as the creditor of a debtor under a mortgage insured pursuant to the National Housing Act.

If HUD were not exempt, a Chapter XII petition would not be subject to dismissal and HUD’s foreclosure proceeding would be stayed. 6 The debtor has argued that once the private mortgagee has been paid by HUD, the mortgage is no longer insured and Section 517 no longer applies. This argument ignores the fact that the private mortgagee assigned all rights and interest arising under an insured mortgage to HUD. 7 The argument is almost tanta *1154 mount to an argument that since the private mortgagee has been paid, the mortgage has been satisfied and the mortgagor should be released from its obligations. Here the debtor does not actually seek a release from the mortgage obligations, which of course would be absurd, but does seek a stay of the mortgage obligations, which Section 517, as we interpret it, prevents.

If Congress intended to limit Section 517 to private holders of insured mortgages it could have done so in many ways. Whereas the first clause of Section 517 refers broadly to creditors under an insured mortgage, the second clause 8 applies only to an obligation held by specific entities. Congress did not elect to limit the first clause to private holders of insured mortgages. Also the first clause is not limited by its terms to the time period “while such insurance on the mortgage remains outstanding,” as Congress carefully limited another section of the National Housing Act — 12 U.S.C. § 1731b(a). See, Rodeway Inns of America, Inc. v. Frank, 541 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945, 97 S.Ct. 1580, 51 L.Ed.2d 792 (1977).

Furthermore, a paragraph within the same section under which HUD paid the insurance proceeds and took assignment of the mortgage clearly refers to a mortgage after payment and assignment as a “mortgage insured” and an “insured mortgage.” 9

The plain language of the statute supports the position that Section 517 applies to the United States and HUD. 10

B

The debtor, relying upon legislative history, has argued that the primary purpose of the National Housing Act “was to provide housing for the American people through private

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Bluebook (online)
636 F.2d 1151, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 11069, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-matter-of-thornhill-way-i-debtor-appellant-ca7-1980.