In the Matter of Thomas E. Stewart

Supreme Court of Georgia·Decided May 15, 2017·No. S17Y0422·200

Opinion

301 Ga. 227 FINAL COPY

S17Y0422. IN THE MATTER OF THOMAS E. STEWART.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Report and

Recommendation of the Review Panel of the State Bar, recommending that

Thomas E. Stewart (State Bar No. 681875), who has been a member of the Bar

since 1995, receive a Review Panel reprimand for two violations of the Rules

of Professional Conduct arising out of his representation of a family of Mexican

citizens in their immigration cases. The special master, Patrick E. Longan,

recommended a public reprimand, the Bar sought disbarment or suspension, and

Stewart sought a Review Panel reprimand. Ultimately, we find that a public

reprimand is an appropriate level of discipline for Stewart’s conduct.

The State Bar filed its formal complaint in September 2014, alleging

violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 5.3, and 5.5 (a) of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for

a violation of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 5.3, and 5.5 is disbarment. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 1.4 is a public reprimand. Following a lengthy

evidentiary hearing, the special master entered a detailed report and

recommendation on May 13, 2016, setting forth the following findings of fact:

A family of Mexican citizens entered the United States legally but chose to

remain illegally. In 2008, the father asked Stewart’s non-lawyer assistant for

help in hiring an attorney to represent the family in connection with their

immigration cases. That same year, the son married a United States citizen, and

the non-lawyer assistant helped the son and his wife prepare the documentation

necessary to start the process for the son to obtain legal status. The assistant also

signed Stewart’s name to the necessary papers without Stewart’s knowledge or

permission and did not immediately tell Stewart he had done so. In January

2009, Stewart was hired by and met with the family. During that meeting, he did

not ask the daughter whether she had been a victim of a crime when, in fact, she

had been and would have been eligible to apply for a “U Visa,” which, if

approved, would have entitled her to remain in the United States for a certain

amount of time. And while Stewart discussed the possibility of the daughter

filing a “cancellation of removal” form known as “42B,” the special master

ultimately found that Stewart never planned to file a 42B for the daughter (even

2 though he withdrew her asylum request) and erroneously filed one for the father,

who was not eligible for such relief. The special master also found that between

the January 2009 meeting and March 2013, when the daughter collected her file

from Stewart and hired new counsel, Stewart did not communicate directly with

her or the family and that all communication went through Stewart’s non-lawyer

assistant.

In March 2011, the father died, and Stewart did not contact the family to

discuss the effect that the father’s death had on their immigration cases and did

not inform the Immigration Court of the father’s death. In June 2011,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement announced a policy of prosecutorial

discretion under which certain immigration cases would be treated as “low

priority” and “administratively closed” as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.

The special master found that the mother and daughter informed Stewart’s non-

lawyer assistant that they were not interested in taking advantage of that policy

of prosecutorial discretion because it would not convey legal status and that

Stewart took no effort to communicate further with them about it. Then, in June

2012, President Obama announced the policy of Deferred Action for Childhood

Arrivals (“DACA”), a program for which the son and daughter were excellent

3 candidates. The special master found that although Stewart did not personally

inform the son and daughter about DACA, his non-lawyer assistant informed the

daughter about it and also told her what documents she would need to collect for

DACA; however, the non-lawyer assistant failed to inform her that without the

documentation to apply for DACA, she would have no means of avoiding an

order of deportation at her February 2013 hearing in Immigration Court. At the

February 2013 hearing, the daughter had no alternative but to accept an order

of voluntary departure from the United States. The daughter subsequently hired

new counsel to try and reopen her immigration case and to apply for DACA.

The rest of the family also fired Stewart.

With regard to Stewart’s efforts to ensure his non-lawyer assistant’s

conduct was compatible with Stewart’s professional responsibilities, Stewart

testified that he gave his assistant checklists of what the assistant was allowed

to do and met with him regularly about Stewart’s cases. As to Stewart’s

supervision of his non-lawyer assistant, the special master found that the

evidence was mixed since Stewart testified at the hearing that he tried his best

to monitor his assistant’s work but in his deposition testified that he never

monitored his assistant’s work.

4 The special master found that Stewart violated his duties of consultation

and communication under Rules 1.2 and 1.4, but did not violate Rule 1.3

because he did not “wilfully abandon” or “wilfully disregard” a legal matter

entrusted to him or fail to act with a reasonable degree of promptness in these

clients’ immigration matters. The special master also concluded that the State

Bar failed to show by clear and convincing evidence a violation of Rules 5.3 or

5.5 (a) in Stewart’s dealings with his non-lawyer assistant, particularly where

the record showed that Stewart instructed his non-lawyer assistant not to

practice law, that the non-lawyer assistant helped the son apply for legal status

without Stewart’s knowledge or permission, that Stewart severely reprimanded

his assistant for this conduct, and that the non-lawyer assistant had not done

anything similar since then. The special master further found that although

Stewart directed his non-lawyer assistant to help the client family with the

completion of their yearly work permits, there was insufficient evidence to

establish that what the assistant did constituted the practice of law or that

Stewart helped his assistant in rendering these services. The special master noted

that the State Bar did not cite any authority that the non-lawyer assistant’s

essentially ministerial acts (taking passport pictures, helping the family complete

5 forms, collecting the necessary fees, and filing documents with the appropriate

authority) constituted the practice of law in Georgia. Thus, the special master

concluded that the State Bar failed to show that Stewart violated Rule 5.5 (a).

After considering the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, see

In the Matter of Finley, 268 Ga. 251, 255 (488 SE2d 74) (1997), the special

master found that Stewart acted merely with negligence, and that although the

evidence did not support the conclusion that Stewart engaged in a pattern of

neglect in his failures to consult and communicate sufficiently with these clients,

it nevertheless showed that he caused injury because his failures to consult and

communicate with the daughter left her with no choice at the February 2013

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In the Matter of Thomas E. Stewart, (Ga. 2017).

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