This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-1355
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: T. K. H., B. M. P., G. J. S., Parents.
Filed February 9, 2026 Affirmed; motion denied Cochran, Judge
Wadena County District Court File No. 80-JV-25-76
T.K.H., Cambridge, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Amanda N. Heifort, Assistant County Attorney, Center City, Minnesota (for respondent Wadena County Human Services)
Angela J. Sonsalla, Perham, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Mary Weaver)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge. ∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant mother challenges the district court’s order denying her motion for a new
trial following the termination of her parental rights. Appellant argues the district court
abused its discretion when it denied the motion because she demonstrated that (1) she
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, which violated her right to a fair trial;
∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. (2) she was denied her constitutional right to due process; (3) fraud on the court occurred
through false testimony and fabricated reports at trial; and (4) the district court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the order terminating her parental rights due to improper venue.
Because appellant has not met her burden to demonstrate the district court abused its
discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant T.K.H. is the mother of two children—Child 1, born in 2016, and Child 2,
born in 2020. The children have different fathers. The respective fathers of the children,
G.J.S. and B.M.P., take no part in this appeal.
Respondent Wadena County Human Services (WCHS) became involved in the
spring of 2024 when law enforcement received reports regarding mother and the children.
Those reports expressed concerns that mother and her children were living out of mother’s
vehicle and that mother had a history of drug use. The reports also expressed concern about
mother’s mental health.
Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) Petition
On April 23, 2024, Child 1 and Child 2 were placed into emergency protective care
at the request of WCHS based on concerns that the children were “found in surroundings
or conditions which endanger the child[ren]’s health or welfare.” On the welfare-hold
request form, WCHS noted that mother was a “flight risk” and that she “[a]bsconded from
child protection in Illinois . . . .” The form also noted that Child 1, then age seven, was not
enrolled in school and that mother tested positive for controlled substances on March 14,
2024.
2 On April 25, 2024, WCHS filed a CHIPS petition. The petition raised concerns
about mother and the children living out of mother’s car, mother’s chemical dependency,
mother’s neglect of the children, and Child 1’s absence from school. That same day,
mother applied for, and the court appointed, an attorney (Attorney 1) to represent mother.
The following day, an emergency protective care hearing was held, and the district court
ordered the out-of-home placement of the children. Shortly after the hearing, the county
developed case plans for the children and mother that included visitation as well as
measures to address the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement. Mother was
involved in the development of the plans.
On October 29, 2024, the district court held a trial on the CHIPS petition. Mother
did not attend the trial. Following the trial, the district court filed an order concluding that
WCHS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of
protection or services. The district court based its decision on evidence that mother “has
struggled with her mental health, chemical use, and homelessness and as a result has been
unable to meet the [c]hildren’s basic needs for food, shelter, education and other required
care.” The district court ordered that WCHS “shall retain custody” of the children and
approved the continued out-of-home placement of the children. The court also ordered
WCHS to develop updated case plans with mother and ordered mother to complete a
comprehensive chemical use assessment (with WCHS and the guardian ad litem (GAL)
listed as collateral contacts), follow all resulting recommendations, and abstain from mood-
altering substances, among other terms.
3 Following the trial, mother agreed to updated versions of the case plans (one for
each child). Mother’s case plans included five goals: address mother’s substance use,
stabilize mother’s mental health, maintain safe and stable independent housing, improve
and maintain mother’s relationship with her children, and ensure the children’s safety and
wellbeing. Both case plans required, among other terms, that mother: (a) complete a
chemical use assessment with WCHS and follow all resulting recommendations,
(b) abstain from substance use unless prescribed, (c) comply with random drug testing,
(d) develop a relapse prevention plan, (e) remain law abiding, (f) sign all necessary releases
to ensure open communication, (g) attend visits with the children as scheduled by WCHS,
(h) complete a parenting education class, (i) participate in family therapy with the
children’s support system, (j) demonstrate a period of at least six months of sobriety and
follow a relapse prevention plan to ensure the safety of her children, (k) complete a
diagnostic mental health assessment and successfully follow the recommendations thereof,
(l) reduce mental health symptoms and demonstrate stability for a period of at least six
months, and (m) address and take care of physical and mental health needs per doctor
recommendations.
On December 13, mother obtained private counsel (Attorney 2) to represent her. A
permanency progress hearing was held on December 17, at which the district court found
that mother had not made substantial progress on her case plan. 1
1 At this time, neither father had any contact with the children.
4 Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) Petition
On January 29, 2025, WCHS filed a TPR petition to involuntarily terminate
mother’s parental rights to both children, citing the following statutory bases: (1) that
mother has abandoned the children, (2) that mother has substantially, continuously, or
repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent
and child relationship, (3) that mother is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship, (4) that mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home
placement despite reasonable efforts by the county, and (5) that the children are neglected
and in foster care. 2 See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1)-(4), (7) (2024). Mother
entered a denial and requested a change of venue, which the district court later denied. On
March 26, the district court approved WCHS’s request to cease reunification efforts with
mother.
On April 30, Attorney 2 requested leave to withdraw as mother’s counsel.
Attorney 2 cited differences with mother about “how this matter should be litigated” and he
noted that, despite Attorney 2’s “numerous” attempts to contact mother, “she has not
returned or accepted [his] phone calls.” Nonetheless, the district court still required
Attorney 2 to attend a pretrial hearing on May 2. At the hearing, mother indicated that she
wished to discharge Attorney 2 and understood that discharge of Attorney 2 would not be
a basis for continuing the TPR trial scheduled for May 5. But, prior to the start of trial,
mother filed a request for a court-appointed attorney, and at the scheduled start of trial,
2 The petition also sought to terminate the parental rights of B.M.P., the father of Child 2. As noted above, the termination of B.M.P.’s parental rights is not at issue in this appeal.
5 WCHS supported a continuance to ensure the protection of mother’s rights. The district
court appointed a new attorney for mother—Attorney 3.
The trial was held on July 16. Mother was represented by Attorney 3. At trial,
WCHS presented testimony from a WCHS child protection social worker and the GAL for
both children. Mother did not testify, but the court admitted a number of exhibits offered
by mother’s attorney and stipulated to by the parties. At the time of trial, the children had
been placed out of the home for 449 days.
At trial, the social worker testified about her work with mother and the children
beginning with the CHIPS case. The social worker testified both children had needs that
were different or more particularized than the average child. According to the social
worker, Child 1 had nightmares and was in “therapy weekly to . . . help
process . . . whatever he’s going through.” The social worker indicated that, while Child 1
had struggled academically and “almost didn’t get to go into 2nd grade” due to serious
deficiencies in his math and reading levels, his academic performance had improved since
his out-of-home placement began. She also testified that Child 2 had behavioral problems,
including sensory issues and emotional outbursts. He also had “quite a few cavities” and
needed eyeglasses.
In addition, the social worker testified to mother’s substance use issues and her
compliance with the requirements of the case plans relating to substance use. The social
worker testified that mother completed a chemical use assessment in accordance with the
case plans but did not list WCHS as a collateral contact as required. Mother also refused
required drug testing on several occasions, tested positive for methamphetamine and
6 amphetamine on multiple occasions, admitted to using THC and methamphetamine, and
was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) on January 4, 2025. Because of her drug
use while on her case plans, mother was required to complete additional chemical
assessments. She completed a second chemical use assessment in November 2024 and
started outpatient treatment for chemical dependency, but she was discharged after two
weeks due to being “unsuccessful” in the program. At that time, she stated that she did not
need to be in treatment. She then completed another chemical use assessment in
February 2025 following her DWI arrest and started a new treatment program in March
but did not attend regularly.
The social worker provided additional testimony about other aspects of mother’s
compliance with her case plans. According to the social worker, as of the time of trial,
mother failed to comply with the following case-plan requirements: (1) remain law abiding,
(2) follow through on the recommendations of her chemical assessments, (3) abstain from
use of all chemical substances except prescribed medication, (4) comply with random drug
testing, (5) develop a relapse prevention plan, (6) obtain a parenting assessment,
(7) develop skills in therapy to manage trauma responses and anger, (8) obtain
employment, (9) complete a parent education class, and (10) attend scheduled visits with
the children. 3
The district court also heard testimony from the GAL about mother and the children.
She testified that she met with mother monthly. According to the GAL, mother would
3 According to the district court, mother later “submitted an Exhibit showing proof of completion of some online parenting course.”
7 often “yell and scream and get upset and lose her cool” and “would show up very dirty and
unclean.” The GAL suspected that mother appeared either ill or “withdrawing” at
meetings. She claimed that mother had a serious problem following through with her
commitments to the children and that, while mother loved the children, “her actions do not
follow . . . her words.” The GAL also testified about the children and stated that they were
doing well in their foster home placement. The court found both the social worker and the
GAL to be credible.
In a thorough and detailed order filed on July 31, 2025, the district court concluded
that WCHS proved by clear and convincing evidence three of the five statutory grounds
alleged in the TPR petition for termination of mother’s parental rights. The three statutory
grounds were: (1) mother is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship,
(2) mother failed to correct the conditions leading to removal of the children, and (3) the
children were neglected and in foster care. The district court also found that WCHS made
reasonable efforts to reunify mother and the children and that termination of mother’s
parental rights is in the best interests of the children. 4 Having found that the statutory
requirements for termination were met, the district court granted WCHS’s petition to
terminate mother’s parental rights to the children.
On August 4, mother then made a motion for a new trial without counsel, arguing
ineffective assistance of counsel and due-process violations. A week later, on August 11,
4 The district court also ordered the involuntarily termination of B.M.P.’s parental rights on the ground that he abandoned his child and granted the voluntary termination of G.J.S.’s parental rights.
8 mother’s counsel moved for a new trial based on the interests of justice and asserting that
the decision was not supported by the evidence or was contrary to the law. The district
court held an evidentiary hearing on mother’s request for a new trial, at which mother
testified after mother waived the attorney-client privilege.
Following the hearing, the district court denied mother’s request for a new trial in a
written order. The district court rejected mother’s ineffective assistance of counsel
argument because mother failed to demonstrate she was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged
errors. The district court also rejected mother’s due-process argument, noting that
“[o]utside of [m]other’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [m]other does not
meaningfully articulate any other violation of her due process rights.” Finally, the court
found there was no legal support for mother’s ongoing contention that venue in Wadena
County was not proper. Based on these determinations, the district court concluded that
mother had not demonstrated that she was entitled to a new trial.
Mother appeals. 5
5 On January 30, 2026, mother filed a motion asking us to remand the case to the district court for that court to address motions mother filed in that court after she filed this appeal. The crux of mother’s motion seems to be that rulings on the motions she filed in district court are necessary for this court to have “a complete record” for purposes of this appeal. Mother cites no authority for the relief sought. Thus, her motion is not properly before us. See State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address inadequately briefed question); Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (noting that inadequately briefed questions are not properly before an appellate court); In re Welfare of Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003) (applying Wintz in a juvenile-protection appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003); In re Welfare of Child of L.M.L., 730 N.W.2d 316, 322 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Melina in a juvenile-protection matter). Further, as this court noted in its order filed on October 23, 2025, in this appeal: Materials not before the district court when it made the decision(s) at issue in the appeal are not part of the record on appeal. Minn. R. Civ. App.
9 DECISION
In this appeal, in which mother is self-represented, mother does not challenge the
district court’s order terminating her parental rights. Instead, she limits her appeal to the
district court’s denial of her motion for a new trial. A district court may grant a new trial
in a TPR case for any of the following reasons:
(a) irregularity in the proceedings of the court, referee, or prevailing party, or any order or abuse of discretion whereby the moving party was deprived of a fair trial;
(b) misconduct of counsel;
(c) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of the county attorney, any party, their counsel, or their guardian ad litem;
(d) accident or surprise that could not have been prevented by ordinary prudence;
(e) material evidence, newly discovered, which with reasonable diligence could not have been found and produced at the trial;
(f) errors of law occurring at the trial and objected to at the time, or if no objection need have been made, then plainly assigned in the motion;
P. 110.01; see In re Nelson, 495 N.W.2d 200, 202, 204 (Minn. 1993) (ruling we should not have considered a letter sent to district court after that court made the ruling at issue on appeal). Thus, in this appeal, we could not consider whatever might result from the remand mother seeks. We deny mother’s motion.
10 (g) a finding that the statutory grounds set forth in the petition are proved is not justified by the evidence or is contrary to law; or
(h) if required in the interests of justice.
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 21.04.
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial in a juvenile-protection case for an
abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of V.R., 355 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. App. 1984)
(affirming denial of new trial), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 11, 1985). “A district court abuses
its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). The district court’s
factual findings are reviewed for clear error. V.R., 355 N.W.2d at 430-31. A finding is
clearly erroneous if we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In
re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021).
Mother argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for
a new trial because: (1) she received ineffective assistance of counsel at the TPR trial,
violating her right to a fair trial, (2) she was denied her constitutional right to due process
at the trial, (3) fraud on the court occurred through false testimony and fabricated reports
at the trial by the social worker and GAL, and (4) the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the TPR order due to improper venue. We consider each argument in turn and discern
no abuse of discretion by the district court.
11 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Rule 21.04 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure provides that a
district court may grant a new trial for “misconduct of counsel” but it does not expressly
provide that a new trial may be granted based on a showing of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 21.04. But, as the district court noted, rule 21.04 also
permits a district court to order a new trial “if required in the interests of justice.” Id. We
agree with the district court that the interests of justice may support the grant of a new trial
if mother received ineffective assistance of counsel at the TPR trial. But, for the reasons
explained below, we also agree with the district court that mother is not entitled to a new
trial on this basis because mother failed to meet her burden to demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel.
A parent has “the right to effective assistance of counsel in connection with a
proceeding in juvenile court,” including in connection with a petition to terminate parental
rights. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 3(a) (2024). To determine whether a party received
ineffective assistance of counsel, Minnesota courts typically apply the standard set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), including in juvenile-protection
matters. See In re Welfare of L.B., 404 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn. App. 1987) (applying
Strickland to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a juvenile-protection appeal).
To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under the Strickland standard, the
party alleging ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to demonstrate (1) that
“counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “that
a reasonable probability exists that, but for . . . counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
12 of the proceedings would have been different.” Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 391
(Minn. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694)). A court “may dispose of a claim
on one prong without considering the other.” Lussier v. State, 853 N.W.2d 149, 154 (Minn.
2014) (citation omitted).
We review the district court’s findings of fact made during the course of its
consideration of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for clear error, but we review
de novo the district court’s application of the two Strickland requirements. Pearson v.
State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 600 (Minn. 2017). The district court limited its analysis to the
second prong and concluded that mother did not meet her burden on that prong.
Mother argues the district court erred in denying her motion for a new trial based
on ineffective assistance of counsel because she established both Strickland prongs. More
specifically, she argues that she demonstrated that her counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness because her attorney did not “call [mother] to testify,
introduce material evidence, [or] challenge false reports” of the WCHS witnesses. And
she contends that there would have been a different outcome “had counsel presented the
full defense.” We are not persuaded.
We begin our analysis with the first Strickland prong. “The objective standard of
reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills
and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar
circumstances.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266-67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
“There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of
13 reasonable professional assistance.” Pierson v. State, 637 N.W.2d 571, 579 (Minn. 2002)
(quotation omitted).
Mother’s claims relate to her counsel’s decisions about which witnesses to call,
which exhibits to offer, and how to cross-examine the WCHS witnesses. These are matters
of trial strategy. See State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009) (“What evidence
to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object are part of an attorney’s
trial strategy which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will generally not
be reviewed later for competence.”); State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 689 (Minn. 2001)
(noting trial counsel’s alleged failure to vigorously cross-examine a witness and object to
certain testimony are matters of trial strategy). Appellate courts generally do not
consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial strategy. See, e.g.,
Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that claims of an attorney’s
alleged failure to “investigate the case” and to “call exculpatory witnesses or impeach
adverse witnesses” were not reviewable because “the conduct at issue arguably falls within
trial strategy”).
Even so, mother has not demonstrated that her counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. First, regarding trial counsel’s decision to not call
mother as a witness at trial, mother claims that her attorney told her that she did not need
to testify because the WCHS social worker had discredited herself. While we acknowledge
that the district court did find the social worker to be credible, mother has not shown, based
on the testimony at trial, that her counsel’s advice that mother refrain from testifying was
objectively unreasonable. Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based
14 on a failure to call a particular witness—as mother argues here—“are of the type we have
repeatedly declined to recognize as amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel.”
State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 717 (Minn. 2003).
Similarly unpersuasive are her claims that her counsel did not “introduce material
evidence, [or] challenge false reports.” The trial record reflects otherwise. The record
shows that mother’s counsel offered a number of exhibits at trial pursuant to a stipulation
with WCHS. And, as the district court noted in its order denying mother’s motion for a
new trial, many of the other documents that mother thought should have been offered by
her counsel were offered by WCHS and admitted by the district court. Others were
irrelevant. In sum, there is no basis to conclude that counsel was ineffective for failing to
offer material evidence.
Likewise, mother has not demonstrated that her counsel was ineffective for failure
to challenge “false reports” by the social worker and GAL. As the district court noted in
its order, the record reflects that mother’s counsel cross-examined both witnesses
extensively. And “failure to conduct cross-examination in a certain manner and failure to
investigate certain witnesses” are matters of trial tactics and “do not demonstrate
ineffective counsel.” State v. Irwin, 379 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Minn. App. 1985), rev.
denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1986).
Consequently, we conclude that mother did not demonstrate that her trial counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and therefore she did not
meet the first Strickland prong. This conclusion is sufficient to reject mother’s argument
based on ineffective assistance of counsel. But because the district court focused its
15 analysis on the second Strickland prong, we also consider this prong and agree with the
district court that mother failed to meet this prong as well.
Mother claims that the outcome at trial would have been different if her counsel had
“presented the full defense.” Mother does not specify what she means by a “full defense”
but we interpret her argument to include efforts by counsel to introduce additional exhibits,
challenge the “false reports,” and call her as a witness to testify. We agree with the district
court’s finding that mother has failed to demonstrate that this additional evidence would
have changed the result in the TPR proceeding. At the hearing on her motion for a new
trial, mother told the district court that, if she had testified at trial, she would have testified
to the reasons that she missed some of her scheduled visits with the children and her
concerns about the social worker and GAL. But the district court’s decision to terminate
mother’s parental rights relied heavily on her failure to maintain sobriety and the impact of
that failure on her ability to parent. Mother fails to show how her testimony would have
altered the district court’s finding that she failed to maintain her sobriety or its decision to
terminate her parental rights. Similarly, mother has not pointed to any potential exhibits
that would have changed the outcome. Lastly, there is no basis to conclude that the
outcome would have been different if her counsel had engaged in additional
cross-examination of the WCHS witnesses. Accordingly, mother has not shown that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the outcome of the TPR
petition would have been different. Where an appellant fails to show prejudicial error, the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 376
(Minn. 2005).
16 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined that mother’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim does not provide
a basis for a new trial.
Due Process
Mother also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
request for a new trial based on due process concerns. Specifically, she claims that she
was denied her constitutional right to due process “when the trial court silenced her
testimony and excluded her exhibits” and thereby deprived her of “a fair opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence.”
In the context of a TPR proceeding, “[d]ue process requires reasonable notice, a
timely opportunity for a hearing, the right to counsel, the opportunity to present evidence,
the right to an impartial decision-maker, and the right to a reasonable decision based solely
on the record.” In re Welfare of Child. of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008).
“Although the amount of process due in a particular case varies with the unique
circumstances of that case, prejudice as a result of the alleged violation is an essential
component of the due process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d
669, 673 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted).
In its order denying mother’s motion for a new trial, the district court concluded that
mother had not demonstrated due-process violations at trial. The district court noted that
aside from her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, mother did “not meaningfully
articulate any other violation of her due process rights.” The court further explained that,
because mother had the opportunity to present evidence favorable to her case, there was no
17 basis upon which to grant her a new trial. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s decision.
Here, the record reflects that the district court afforded mother due process and took
great efforts to ensure mother’s rights were protected throughout the trial. Indeed, when
mother requested a new attorney on the day trial was scheduled to begin, the district court
granted mother a continuance to ensure her rights would be protected. Additionally, the
record reflects that mother received timely notice of the trial, had an opportunity to present
evidence, had an impartial trial judge, and a decision based solely on the record.
We also note that there is no support for mother’s contention that the district “court
silenced [mother’s] testimony.” Rather, as mother acknowledges elsewhere in her own
brief, her counsel made a strategic decision to not call her as a witness and mother agreed.
The district court did not preclude mother from testifying. And due process does not
require mother to testify at trial. In fact, due process does not compel the physical
attendance of a parent at a termination proceeding, particularly in cases where the parent
is represented by counsel—as was the case here. See In re Welfare of A.Y.-J., 558 N.W.2d
757, 759 (Minn. App. 1997) (holding that “due process does not compel the physical
attendance of a parent at termination proceedings”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1997).
Furthermore, the district court permitted mother to offer exhibits at trial even without
mother’s testimony. In short, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined that mother failed to demonstrate a due-process violation entitling her
to a new trial.
18 Claims of False Testimony
Mother also argues that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering a new
trial based on fraud on the court. Specifically, mother contends that the “district court erred
by relying on demonstrably false statements—such as falsified test results and
contradictory GAL summaries” and therefore she is entitled to a new trial based on fraud.
The district court did not rule on this matter because mother raised the issue only in an
affidavit submitted after filing her motion for a new trial. Given that mother did not allege
to the district court that she was entitled to a new trial because of fraud, the issue is not
properly before this court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (holding
that we generally do not entertain arguments that were not “presented and considered by”
the district court).
But even if the issue was timely raised, it is not adequately briefed. Mother only
makes passing reference to the court’s reliance on “demonstrably false statements—such
as falsified test results and contradictory GAL summaries.” And while her supplemental
briefing, which was deemed part of her principal brief by this court, makes reference to
over twenty allegedly fraudulent statements made by the GAL and the social worker at
trial, she fails to demonstrate how the statements were fraudulent beyond conclusory
statements. 6 This court declines to “consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported
by either arguments or citations to legal authority.” State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22
6 An order of this court allowed mother to supplement her principal brief with additional arguments made in a motion filed with this court. We deemed pages 7-13 of the motion to be part of mother’s principal brief.
19 (Minn. 2008). Lastly, to the extent that mother is challenging the district court’s
determination that both the GAL and the social worker testified credibly, we defer to the
district court’s credibility determinations. Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn.
App. 2022) (“We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations and do not reconcile
conflicting evidence.” (quotation omitted)).
Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to
decline to grant mother a new trial based on her assertions of fraud on the court.
Venue
Mother also appears to argue that venue in Wadena County, where the trial was
held, was improper and that the district court “lacked jurisdiction.” The district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s request for a new trial on this basis. 7
The legislature has specified the venue for child protection matters. “When it is
alleged that a child is in need of protection or services, venue may be in the county where
the child is found, in the county of residence, or in the county where the alleged conditions
causing the child’s need for protection or services occurred.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.121,
subd. 1 (2024) (emphasis added). Here, it is undisputed that the children were found in
Wadena County. And WCHS brought its CHIPS petition and the TPR petition in Wadena
7 For purposes of this appeal, we assume both that (a) mother uses the word “jurisdiction” to refer to subject-matter jurisdiction; and (b) what mother asserts is that erroneous venue for the case could deprive the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. We note, however, that venue is “the proper or a possible place for a lawsuit to proceed[,]” Black’s Law Dictionary 1876 (12th ed. 2024), and that, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, venue is not jurisdictional, Peterson v. Holiday Recreational Indus., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2007).
20 County. Therefore, venue in Wadena County was proper and the district court had
jurisdiction over the proceeding.
Furthermore, as the district court noted in its order denying the motion for a new
trial, mother’s challenge to venue was untimely. Failure to timely object to improper venue
may constitute a waiver of the objection. Rosnow v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 444 N.W.2d
591, 592 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 13, 1989).
For these reasons, the district court properly rejected mother’s argument based on
improper venue.
Conclusion
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s request for
a new trial. Mother’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, due-process violations,
fraud on the court, and improper venue do not establish an adequate basis for reversal.
Affirmed; motion denied.