This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1023
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M. S.-I. and J. J., Parents.
Filed January 22, 2024 Affirmed Gaïtas, Judge
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69DU-JV-22-258
Benjamin Kaasa, Benjamin Kaasa Law Office, PLLC, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant- mother M.S.-I.)
Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Sara Jankofsky, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services)
Kirsten Hambleton, Superior, Wisconsin (guardian ad litem)
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;
and Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In this termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) appeal, appellant-mother M.S.-I. argues
that the record does not support the district court’s determinations that: (1) respondent
St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services (the county) made reasonable efforts
toward reunification, (2) a statutory basis exists to involuntarily terminate her parental
rights, and (3) termination is in the best interests of the children. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating mother’s parental rights, we
affirm.
FACTS
Father J.J. and mother are the parents of two minor children, aged 3 (child 1) and 2
(child 2). Following a TPR trial, the district court terminated father’s and mother’s rights
to the children in June 2023, determining that three statutory bases supported termination,
the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and termination was in the
children’s best interests. Mother challenges each of these determinations on appeal. 1 A
summary of the proceedings follows.
CHIPS Petition
In November 2021, the county received a report that child 2 was in the newborn
intensive care unit (NICU) after a premature birth. The hospital reported that child 2’s cord
blood tested positive for THC and the parents had only visited the NICU four times in a
three-week period. According to the hospital, child 2 would be ready for discharge soon
and medical providers were concerned about mother’s mental health and her ability to care
for the child. The hospital ultimately considered child 2 to be abandoned “due to the lack
of any parental involvement with the child or in learning his cares and how to meet the
special needs related to his prematurity.”
Based on the hospital’s report, social workers for the county located and met with
father and mother, who lived together. They believed that mother was “suffering from
1 Father is not a party to this appeal.
2 severe post-partum depression” and showed “a lack of observable attachment” with child 1,
which, the social workers noted, was “common when mothers are experiencing post-
partum depression.” They also learned that father was using methamphetamine. Based on
concerns about the parents’ ability to care for the children, the county decided that it would
also seek custody of child 1 for placement if mother did not obtain therapy to address her
mental-health and suicidal ideation. Child 1 eventually was placed with a relative, and
child 2 was discharged from the hospital into the care of a different foster parent with
experience caring for premature babies.
The county petitioned the district court in December 2021 to adjudicate the children
as being in need of protection or services (CHIPS). Following a hearing, the children were
placed in emergency protective care. Mother subsequently entered a limited admission to
the CHIPS petition based on her mental health and the district court adjudicated the
children in need of protection or services.
Mother’s Compliance with the County’s Reunification Case Plan
Following the CHIPS adjudication, the county worked with the parents to develop
a case plan designed to address the issues that led to the children’s out-of-home placement.
The case plan required mother to: (1) complete a full psychological evaluation with a
parenting component and follow all recommendations; (2) maintain “absolute sobriety”
and submit to urinalysis tests to monitor sobriety; (3) complete a chemical-use assessment
and follow all recommendations, including aftercare; (4) complete a diagnostic assessment
and follow all recommendations to address concerns of historical trauma, post-partum
depression, and grief; (5) attend visitations with the children; (6) maintain safe and stable
3 housing; (7) attend and complete parenting classes; and (8) maintain contact with the
county and the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL). The district court approved this case
plan and ordered mother to comply with its provisions.
Mother initially “made significant progress” on her case plan. She met with a
psychologist and completed a psychological evaluation. Mother also began participating
in mental-health services, obtained a chemical-use assessment, and successfully completed
parenting classes through the Circles of Security parenting program. Given mother’s
progress, the county agreed to expand the parents’ visits with the children to allow for
unsupervised visitation in mother’s home. However, shortly before the scheduled trial
home visit in June 2022, the county learned that father had stopped following his case plan,
and it could not confirm that the children would be safe in the parents’ home. The home
visit was ultimately canceled, and visits returned to a supervised setting.
After the canceled home visit, the county reported that mother stopped complying
with her case plan.
First, mother failed to engage in services to address her mental-health needs.
Following mother’s psychological evaluation, the psychologist made specific
recommendations for mother, which were incorporated into mother’s case plan. Although
mother initially complied with these recommendations, she stopped cooperating in June
2022. Mother stopped working with a therapist and did not explore other interventions
recommended by the psychologist, such as eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing, cognitive behavioral therapy, and accelerated resolution therapy, to address
her psychological health. The county social worker assigned to the family testified that, at
4 the time of TPR trial, the psychologist had discharged mother for nonattendance and
mother was no longer receiving therapy. Mother similarly declined to participate in
dialectical behavior therapy or couple’s therapy, as recommended. The county also
referred the family for intensive family-based services, but these services were formally
withdrawn in the summer of 2022 because the parents declined to participate.
Second, mother did not maintain sobriety and abstain from alcohol or nonprescribed
mood-altering chemicals. The case plan required mother to submit to random urinalysis
tests to monitor her sobriety. Mother complied with the urinalysis requirement when the
case plan was first developed. However, mother stopped submitting to urine tests in June
2022 for approximately two-and-one-half months. Mother reengaged with testing in the
fall of 2022 and tested positive for THC from the fall of 2022 until January 2023. She
provided negative samples in January and February 2023. But after February 2023, mother
stopped attending urinalysis appointments. Additionally, mother did not participate in
outpatient treatment, as recommended by her chemical-use evaluator, to address her
diagnosed chemical-use disorder, severe cannabis-use disorder.
Third, and finally, mother did not maintain regular contact with the county and the
GAL. Mother regularly communicated with the family’s social worker until the summer
of 2022. After then, however, mother had only “limited contact” with the social worker.
Mother reengaged briefly in the fall of 2022, but only had “a few” meetings with the social
worker. As of the date of the TPR trial, the social worker testified that she had not heard
from mother in about a month. The GAL also testified that “there was a long period of
time . . . where the parents weren’t in contact with social services.”
5 TPR Proceedings and the District Court’s Order Terminating Parental Rights
In August 2022, the county petitioned to involuntarily terminate the parent’s
parental rights to both children. The petition alleged that the parents: (1) neglected to
comply with the duties imposed by the parent and child relationship, (2) failed to correct
the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement despite reasonable efforts
by the county to reunite the family, and (3) neglected the children in foster care. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (5), (8) (2022). 2
The district court held a two-day trial and heard testimony from mother, father, four
county social workers, the psychologist who evaluated and initially treated mother, the
GAL, and mother’s cousin. Following trial, the district court terminated father’s and
mother’s parental rights to both children. With respect to mother, the district court
concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that she neglected to comply with
the parent and child relationship, failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s
out-of-home placement despite reasonable efforts by the county, and neglected the children
in foster care. See id. The district court further concluded that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family and that termination was in the children’s best interests.
Mother appeals.
2 The county also alleged that termination was warranted on two additional grounds. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a) (permitting termination with the written consent of a parent), (b)(7) (pertaining to an unknown father’s lack of entitlement to notice of TPR) (2022). The district court determined that these bases were not applicable to this case, and therefore we do not address them here.
6 DECISION
Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights. Minnesota courts presume
that “a natural parent is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the care of his or her
child.” In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1995). Thus, parental rights
may only be terminated for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462
N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court may involuntarily terminate parental rights
if: (1) the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification; (2) there is clear and
convincing evidence that a statutory condition exists to support termination under
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b); and (3) the proposed termination
is in the child’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8, .317, subd. 1
(2022); see also In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). The
county bears the burden of proving these grounds for termination, In re Welfare of Child
of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 869-70 (Minn. 2021), and must do so by clear and convincing
evidence, Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a). Evidence supporting TPR “must relate
to conditions that exist at the time of termination and it must appear that the conditions
giving rise to the termination will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re
Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 2011).
Whether to terminate parental rights is discretionary with the district court. In re
Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014). “[An appellate court]
review[s] the termination of parental rights to determine whether the district court’s
findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. In
7 doing so, we “review the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear
error, but we review its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for
involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re
Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012). The appellate court defers to the district court’s decision “because a district
court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F.,
554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). Thus, the appellate court does not engage in fact-
finding, reweigh the evidence, or “reconcile conflicting evidence.” In re Civ. Commitment
of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); see In re Welfare
of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney in a TPR
appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). “Consequently, an appellate court need not go
into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the trial court.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted). Rather, an
appellate court’s “duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all the evidence and
has determined that the evidence reasonably supports the decision.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
I. The county made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the children.
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children. Before terminating parental rights, a
district court must find that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the
parent, or the district court must absolve the county from having to make those efforts.
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022). Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere
8 matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W.,
727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2007). Reasonable efforts consist of those that are:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and, if appropriate, the child; (2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s family; (3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well-being of the child; (4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the child and family; (5) culturally appropriate; (6) available and accessible; (7) consistent and timely; and (8) realistic under the circumstances.
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022). The district court also weighs “the length of the time the
county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d
529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).
The district court found that the county provided reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement and promote reunification. As
to mother, these services included: (1) mental-health treatment, (2) cell phones and
payment for service, (3) relative foster care, (4) sobriety testing, (5) psychological
evaluations, (6) public-health nursing, (7) comprehensive assessments, (8) coordination
with mental-health service providers, (9) parenting classes, (10) intensive family-based
services, (11) bus passes, (12) domestic-violence evaluations, (13) coordination with the
NICU, (14) safety planning, (15) letters to the housing authority, (16) child-protection
investigations, (17) offers for voluntary services through the Parent Support Outreach
9 Program, (18) ongoing child-protection case management, (19) supervised visitation,
(20) a trajectory to a trial home visit, and (21) transportation. The district court found that
the social workers documented their “noteworthy efforts to engage both parents throughout
this case, even when the parents were not willing to communicate.” Based on these efforts,
the district court found:
These services have been selected in collaboration with the children’s family and tailored to the individualized needs of the children and children’s family; relevant to the safety, protection, and well-being of the children, adequate to meet the individualized needs of the children and family, culturally appropriate, available and accessible, consistent and timely, and realistic under the circumstances.
Clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the district court’s findings
that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the children. The family’s
primary social worker testified regarding her efforts to provide mother with mental-health
services. The county arranged for a psychological evaluation with a psychologist who
recommended, among other things, that mother explore therapy, therapeutic interventions,
monitoring for borderline personality disorder, and couple’s counseling. Mother either did
not participate in, or fully complete, these services. The county also provided mother with
a chemical-use assessment and attempted to engage her in outpatient treatment services to
address her diagnosed cannabis-use disorder. Mother received parenting classes through
Circles of Security. To assist mother with maintaining sobriety, the county provided
urinalysis tests, transportation, and a phone and paid phone service to help facilitate her
appointments and urinalysis tests. The county also arranged supervised visits with the
children. This evidence supports the district court’s reasonable-efforts determination.
10 Mother argues that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous because the
district court did not adequately address each factor under section 260.012(h). And she
further contends that the county ceased reunification efforts in August and September 2022
and shifted its focus to separating father and mother. We are not persuaded by these
objections. The district court’s 78-page order shows a careful consideration of the family’s
needs and the county’s efforts to offer assistance. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). And, after
reviewing the reasonable-efforts factors, the district court concluded that “[r]easonable
efforts have been made to reunify the family, and those efforts have proved unsuccessful.”
The district court outlined the services offered to the family, including mental-health
services, child-care services, bus passes, offers of transportation, and supervised visitation.
Furthermore, as to mother’s second argument, the record evidence does not support her
contention that the county stopped providing efforts in 2022. When mother stopped
complying with the terms of her case plan in June 2022 by missing urinalysis appointments,
the county attempted to reengage mother. The social worker testified that she told mother
that “it was important to get back on track with [her case plan requirements] to be able to
reunify with her children.” This testimony supports the district court’s finding that the
county attempted to provide services and assistance to the family “throughout this case.”
We recognize that “[t]he nature of the services which constitute ‘reasonable efforts’
depends on the problem presented.” In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn.
1996). As such, “[t]he county’s efforts must be aimed at alleviating the conditions that
gave rise to out-of-home placement, and they must conform to the problems presented.”
In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn.
11 July 17, 2012). Here, the record contains ample evidence that the services provided—
including mental-health services, chemical-dependency programs, and family therapy—
were targeted toward mother’s unique circumstances and conformed to the problems
presented. Thus, given the record evidence, we are satisfied that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify
mother with the children.
II. A statutory basis exists to support termination of mother’s parental rights.
Having determined that the county provided reasonable efforts to reunify mother
and the children, we next review the district court’s decision to terminate her parental rights
for clear and convincing evidence. See In re Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656,
661 (Minn. 2008). The district court determined that the county proved three statutory
bases for termination because: (1) mother failed to comply with the parent and child
relationship, (2) mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-
home placement, and (3) the children were neglected and in foster care. Mother challenges
each of these conclusions. We determine that clear and convincing evidence in the record
demonstrates that mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-
home placement under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(5). Based
on this determination, we need not address the remaining two statutory bases for
termination. See J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (recognizing that a reviewing court “need only
one properly supported statutory ground in order to affirm a termination order”).
Under section 260C.301, a district court may terminate a parent’s rights if
“reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions
12 leading to the child’s placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). A reviewing
court presumes that reasonable efforts have failed if: (1) the “child has resided out of the
parental home under court order for a cumulative period of 12 months,” (2) “the court has
approved the out-of-home placement plan,” (3) the “conditions leading to the out-of-home
placement have not been corrected” as shown by the parent “substantially [complying] with
the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan,” and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made
by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id., subd.
1(b)(5)(i)-(iv).
Mother does not contest—and the record supports—that the first and second factors
are satisfied because the children had been in out-of-home placement for 560 days as of
the time of trial, and the district court approved a case plan designed to reunite the family.
Moreover, as discussed above, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite mother with the children.
Therefore, we need only address whether mother failed to correct the conditions leading to
the children’s placement out of the home. Upon review, we determine that the record
supports the district court’s findings that mother failed to correct the conditions leading to
the children’s removal, and those findings support the district court’s ultimate conclusion
that a statutory basis supports termination.
The district court found that “[t]he conditions that [led] to the out-of-home
placement have not been corrected because neither parent has substantially complied with
the Court’s Orders or their respective reasonable case plans.” It acknowledged that mother
made initial progress at the beginning of the case. But the district court found that mother
13 was not complying with her case plan at the time of trial. It noted that, although the “case
was initiated due to significant and serious concerns” about mother’s mental health, she
had not “demonstrated sobriety or engaged in any of the mental health services required to
be stable enough to parent her children.”
The record supports these findings. The county became involved with the family
after learning that child 2 was born prematurely and was in the NICU and the parents were
not visiting the child. After meeting with the family, social workers believed that mother
was suffering from post-partum depression. The county worked with mother to develop a
case plan to address the issues that led to the children’s placement out of the home
following the CHIPS adjudication. This plan required mother to participate in mental-
health treatment, attain sobriety, submit to urinalysis tests, and maintain contact with the
county. The psychologist who conducted mother’s psychological evaluation diagnosed
mother with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and provisionally,
borderline personality disorder. To address these concerns, the psychologist recommended
that mother work with a psychotherapist, explore interventions to address her
psychological heath, attend couple’s counseling, and create a safety plan, among other
interventions.
Despite these recommendations, mother failed to comply with her court-ordered
case plan to address her mental-health issues. During the TPR trial, the family’s primary
social worker testified that mother was discharged from therapy when she missed too many
appointments and was not in therapy at the time of trial. Mother also declined to explore
14 other interventions to address her psychological health. She also declined to participate in
couple’s counseling or monitoring for borderline personality disorder.
Mother also failed to follow the requirement to remain sober and abstain from
alcohol or nonprescribed mood-altering chemicals. Although mother initially complied
with urine testing, she stopped participating in June 2022 and did not reengage for several
months. Mother took her last test in February 2023 and did not submit to urine testing
thereafter. Additionally, the case plan required mother to complete a chemical-use
assessment and follow recommendations. The evaluator recommended that mother
participate in an intensive outpatient treatment program, and the social worker discussed
community-based options with mother to assist her in completing this treatment. The
social worker testified that mother did not enter a treatment program. The witness
testimony supports the district court’s findings that mother has not corrected the conditions
that led to the children’s out-of-home placement.
On appeal, mother argues that she substantially complied with her case plan. Like
the district court, we commend mother for her initial progress toward meeting her case plan
requirements. But sufficient evidence in the record supports the district court’s
determination that mother did not substantially comply with her case plan or remedy the
conditions that led to the children’s removal. As previously noted, at the time of the TPR
trial, mother was not in compliance with her case plan because she had not followed
through with the recommendations of her psychological evaluation, was not receiving
therapy to address her mental-health needs, had not demonstrated sobriety, and was not
maintaining regular contact with the county.
15 Moreover, a parent’s compliance with a case plan does not invalidate a district
court’s termination of parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b)(5). In J.K.T., the appellant-mother asserted that, because she completed
her case plan, clear and convincing evidence did not support termination under section
260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(5). 814 N.W.2d at 89. We rejected this argument, reasoning
that while certain conditions can generate a statutory presumption that reasonable efforts
failed to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement, “there is no converse
presumption that completion of [a] case plan amounts to a correction of those conditions.”
Id. Thus, “[t]he critical issue is not whether the parent formally complied with the case
plan, but rather whether the parent is presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring
for the child.” Id. Here, as noted, the district court identified numerous services offered
to mother. But the district court found that, despite these efforts, mother failed to correct
the conditions leading to the children’s removal from the home by the time of the TPR
trial. The record amply supports these findings. Thus, even if mother complied with some
of the conditions of her case plan, that does not compel reversal of the district court’s
termination decision, which is otherwise supported by the record.
Our scope of review on appeal is “limited to determining whether the findings
address the statutory criteria, whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence,
and whether they are clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 484
(Minn. 1997). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings,
which are not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
16 discretion in determining that reasonable efforts by the county failed to correct the
conditions leading to the children’s placement out of the home.
III. The children’s best interests support termination.
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that termination is in the best
interests of the children. Even if a statutory basis for termination exists, the child’s best
interests are the “paramount consideration” in a termination proceeding. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2022) (stating that the
“paramount consideration” in all juvenile proceedings is the best interests of the child).
The district court must explain its rationale “for concluding why the termination is in the
best interests of the children.” In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003). In
determining a child’s best interests, the district court balances: (1) the child’s interest in
preserving the parent and child relationship, (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the
parent and child relationship, and (3) any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests include such things as a stable environment,
health considerations, and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d
1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). We review a district court’s best-interests determination for an
abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. Because this analysis requires credibility
determinations, a reviewing court gives “considerable deference to the district court’s
findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92. Thus, a “determination of a child’s best interests is
generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a record, and . . . an
appellate court’s combing through the record to determine best interests is inappropriate
17 because it involves credibility determinations.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771
N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted).
Here, after considering the best-interests factors, the district court determined that
“the balance overwhelmingly favors termination.” It acknowledged the testimony from
the social workers, father, and mother “that the parents deeply love their children and that
their visits go well.” The district court then considered the competing interests of the
children. It noted that the children are placed together in the same foster home, where they
are “receiving all needed services” including “mental health services, numerous NICU
follow-up appointments, and physical therapy.” The district court found that “[t]he
children deserve safety and stability.” On balance, the district court concluded that the
children’s “interests in severing the parent-child relationship distinctly outweigh the
parents and children’s [interests] in preserving the relationship.”
We find ample support for these findings in the record. The social worker testified
about the children’s placement and noted that the children are together in the same foster
home. The foster parents are committed to being a permanency option for the children.
The social worker described the children as “excelling” and “doing wonderful,” and noted
that they have “bonded with their . . . foster family.” Further, the evidence supports the
finding that the children are receiving the care and services they need. Child 1 is receiving
ongoing services for his mental health. And child 2, who was born prematurely, is
developmentally on track.
The social worker testified that she believes the parents love their children and want
to parent them. However, she testified that she does not believe the children would be safe
18 in their care at this time. The social worker confirmed that, in her belief, it is in the
children’s best interests that parental rights be terminated. The GAL echoed the social
worker’s opinion. She testified that she believes TPR is in the children’s best interests. In
forming that opinion, the GAL testified about her observations of the supervised visits and
the children’s progress in their current foster placement. She testified that there were often
long gaps between the visits when the parents were not in contact with the county. The
GAL stated that the parents did not seem to be “looking out for the best interests of their
children long term.” She testified that, by contrast, the children were doing well in their
foster placement. According to her, the foster parents are helping the children with
behavioral concerns, special needs, and mental-health needs. Based on the testimony
presented, which the district court credited, it concluded that the children’s needs are being
met in their current placement.
The record demonstrates that the district court balanced the children’s interests in a
safe, sober, and stable living environment against mother’s interest in maintaining the
parent and child relationship. Considering all the factors together, the district court
concluded that the interests weighed in favor of terminating mother’s parental rights. We
conclude that the district court’s decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion because
the court carefully weighed the competing interests of mother and the children, and the
testimony supports these best-interests findings.
Affirmed.