STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0952
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: L. A. B. and C. R. L., Parents.
Filed December 8, 2025 Affirmed in part and reversed in part Harris, Judge
Redwood County District Court File No. 64-JV-19-61
Melanie I. Nelson, John M. Jerabek, Tuft, Lach, Jerabek & O’Connell, PLLC, Maplewood, Minnesota (for appellant-mother L.A.B.)
Daniel A. McIntosh, Patrick J. Casey, Knutson+Casey, PC, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent-father C.R.L.)
Amy Marie Busse, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Southwest Health and Human Services)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
SYLLABUS
A court deciding a post-permanency juvenile-protection matter does not have
jurisdiction to address child support.
OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant permanently transferred legal and physical custody of her three minor
children to respondent in a juvenile-protection matter and then moved in that juvenile-
protection matter to modify parenting time. In this appeal from that post-permanency
proceeding, appellant challenges the juvenile court’s order modifying parenting time and child support, arguing that (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion by determining that
the parenting-time schedule was in the best interests of the children, (2) the juvenile court
lacked jurisdiction to modify her child support obligations, and (3) the juvenile court
abused its discretion by denying her request for a downward deviation in child support.1
We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the parenting-
time schedule established in the permanent transfer of legal and physical custody order, as
the court considered all relevant factors required by the applicable statute. But we further
conclude that the juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority by modifying child support
in this post-permanency juvenile-protection proceeding, as it lacked jurisdiction to do so.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
Appellant-mother L.A.B. and respondent-father C.R.L. were married and shared
three children together, L.A.L., L.R.L. and L.W.L.
Dissolution Matter
The marriage was dissolved pursuant to a stipulated judgment and decree in March
2017 in the family division of the Redwood County District Court (family court). 2 The
1 Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her request for a downward deviation in child support. In light of our decision that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to address child support, this issue is moot and we will not address it in this opinion. Winkowski v. Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. 2023) (stating “we will dismiss an appeal as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible”) (quotation omitted). 2 Minnesota law authorizes the district court to establish various divisions within its jurisdiction, including a family court division and a juvenile court division. See Minn. Stat.
2 parties were awarded joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the minor children,
and the parties were granted parenting time. Father was ordered to pay basic child support
in the amount of $1,530 per month.
CHIPS Proceedings
In May 2017, Southwest Health and Human Services (SWHHS) filed a petition in
the juvenile division of the Redwood County District Court (juvenile court), alleging that
the children were in need of protection or services (CHIPS) following a number of
incidents involving mother’s alleged alcohol abuse while the children were in her care. In
August 2017, mother and SWHHS entered into a voluntary-services agreement, which
required mother to complete a treatment plan to address her chemical dependency, alcohol
abuse, and mental health. The parties agreed to dismiss the CHIPS proceeding in exchange
for mother’s completion of the treatment plan.
In July 2018, father filed a petition for an order of protection (OFP) on behalf of the
children, following an incident during which mother allegedly abused one of the children
while mother was under the influence of alcohol. The family court granted an ex parte
OFP of the children.
§ 484.86, subd. 1 (2024). In this case, as is common in many Minnesota counties, the district court does not maintain separately assigned judges for the family and juvenile court divisions. Instead, a single district court judge may hear and decide matters arising in either division. For purposes of this opinion, and to avoid confusion, the family court file in which the parties filed their dissolution action will be referred to as the “family court.” The juvenile-protection matter in which the parties’ transfer of permanent legal and physical custody action arose will be referred to as the “juvenile court.”
3 Shortly thereafter, SWHHS filed a second CHIPS petition in the juvenile court for
concerns relating to mother’s alleged alcohol abuse, chemical abuse, and mental health.
Mother later admitted in a sworn statement that she consumed alcohol to the point that she
was unable to adequately care for the children. The juvenile court granted SWHHS
protective supervision of the children and granted temporary sole physical and legal
custody of the children to father.
Petition and Order Transferring Permanent Legal and Physical Custody to a Relative
In June 2019, father petitioned the juvenile court to transfer permanent sole legal
and physical custody to himself. Mother consented to the petition. By doing so, mother
acknowledged that father would have sole responsibility for the children.
In a written order (the transfer order), the juvenile court granted father’s petition.
The juvenile court found that it was in the best interests of the children to be placed in the
permanent care, custody, and control of father. The transfer order further established a
gradual parenting-time schedule and a holiday parenting-time schedule, set father’s basic
child-support obligation at $0, and awarded father the tax dependency exemptions for all
three children. The juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction except for purposes of
modifying custody and parenting time. The transfer order directed that any motion to
modify its terms—other than a motion to modify child support—must be filed in the
juvenile court file under Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection Procedure 42.07,
subdivision 4.
4 Mother’s Motion to Modify Parenting Time and Father’s Motion to Modify Child Support
In December 2024, mother filed a motion to modify parenting time and supporting
affidavits in the juvenile court file. Mother requested an increase in her regular parenting-
time schedule to include an additional weekday, to extend the holiday parenting-time
schedule, to reinstate her right of first refusal, and to receive an annual tax exemption for
L.R.L., as well as a biennial tax exemption for L.W.L. Father filed a responsive motion,
countermotion, and supporting affidavits in the juvenile court file requesting that the court
deny mother’s motion in its entirety, modify the holiday parenting-time schedule, and
recalculate mother’s child-support and medical-support obligations.
The matter came before the juvenile court, which conducted two separate motion
hearings on the parents’ motions. Following the hearing, the juvenile court awarded
mother additional time with the children on alternating weekends, increased mother’s
weekday parenting time by an additional hour and a half, denied mother’s request to extend
her weekly parenting time to two days a week, and denied her other requests for the right
of first refusal and tax exemptions. The juvenile court also ordered mother to pay father
$660 per month in basic child support and $68 per month in medical support.
Mother appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion when it determined that the parenting- time schedule was in the best interests of the children applying the best-interest- factors in Minnesota Statutes section 260C.511 and not the best-interest-factors in Minnesota Statutes section 518.175 (2024)?
5 II. Did the juvenile court err by modifying child support in this appeal from a post- permanency proceeding under Minnesota Statutes sections 260C.503-.521 (2024), which does not confer jurisdiction to modify child support?
ANALYSIS
I. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the parenting-time schedule was in the best interests of the children because it considered the relevant factors required by Minnesota Statutes section 260C.511.
Generally, a district court has “broad discretion” to address “parenting-time,” and
an appellate court will not reverse its decision on the point “absent an abuse of that
discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009) (making this statement
in a marital-dissolution appeal). “A [juvenile] court abuses its discretion if it makes
findings of fact that lack evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or resolves discretionary
matters in a manner contrary to logic and the facts on record.” In re Welfare of Child of
T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024).
An appellate court will not set aside a juvenile court’s findings of fact unless the
findings are clearly erroneous. In re Welfare of Children of G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d 222, 239
(Minn. 2023). When addressing whether a district court’s findings of fact are clearly
erroneous, appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings,
(2) do not find their own facts, (3) do not reweigh the evidence, and (4) do not reconcile
conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn.
2021). Thus,
an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the court. Rather, because the factfinder has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues and the
6 advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably supports the decision.
Id. (quotations and citation omitted); see Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472
(Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear error standard of review in a similar fashion). In other
words, when an appellate court reviews findings of fact, the review is not to determine
whether the record could support findings other than those made by the district court—it
almost always can. Instead, our task is to review the record “to confirm that evidence exists
to support the decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222. As such, an appellant who simply
marshals record evidence pointing to alternative findings has not demonstrated clear error.
The appellant must show that the record lacks the evidence necessary to support the
findings the district court actually made. The clear-error standard of review in Kenny
applies to juvenile-protection appeals. T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d at 355; In re Welfare of Child
of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021).
Here, in modifying the parenting-time schedule, the juvenile court did not identify
the statutory standard it applied, and under which it made its findings of fact. Instead, it
stated, “It is important to remember that this is not a typical dissolution matter; this is a
juvenile protection matter.” Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by
misapplying the law because it failed to apply Minnesota Statutes section 518.175. Mother
also challenges the juvenile courts findings of fact.
If, as here, an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody was filed on
or after August 1, 2012, a motion to modify that order must be filed in juvenile court. Minn.
7 R. Juv. Prot. P. 59.02. Mother properly filed her motion to modify the parenting-time
schedule set in the order transferring legal and physical custody to father in juvenile court.
Motions to modify orders granting custody to a relative are governed by Minnesota
Statutes section 260C.521, subdivision 2. While that statute states that an order
transferring permanent legal and permanent physical custody of a child to a relative “may”
be modified using the standards under Minnesota Statutes sections 518.18 and .185 (2024),
“[t]he juvenile protection statute does not give the juvenile court authority to award, much
less modify, visitation under Minn. Stat. § 518.175[.]” In re Welfare of Child of A.H., 879
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. App. 2016). 3 Thus, we reject mother’s assertion that the juvenile court
failed to (properly) apply Minnesota Statutes section 518.175 to her motion to modify the
parenting-time schedule.
When addressing a motion to modify an order transferring permanent custody of a
child, a juvenile court applies the best-interests standard in Minnesota Statutes
section 260C.511(a). Id. That provision requires the juvenile court to consider all
“relevant” factors. The “paramount” consideration in juvenile-protection proceedings is
the “health, safety, and best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260.001, subd. 2(a)
(2024). Because a child’s best interests are a “paramount” consideration, those best
interests are “relevant” under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.511(a). And “[t]he best
interests of the child means all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated,” including
3 Minnesota Statutes section 518.175 provides that the district court in dissolution proceedings “shall, upon the request of either parent, grant such parenting time . . . that will be in the best interests of the child.” See Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subds. 1(a), 5.
8 “the relationship between the child and relatives and the child and other important persons
with whom the child has resided or had significant contact.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a),
(b).
Here, the juvenile court considered all relevant factors when modifying the parties’
parenting-time schedule. The juvenile court’s order discusses, among other things, how
(1) the children have primarily resided with father for the last seven years and were
reportedly doing well, and that making significant changes to the parenting-time schedule
was neither necessary nor advisable, (2) extending mother’s Tuesday parenting time by an
additional hour and a half was appropriate, (3) granting mother’s request to have parenting
time twice a week would create additional transitions for the children, which would not be
in their best interests, (4) extending mother’s alternating weekend parenting time from
Sunday evening to Monday morning was appropriate, as it would not involve any extra
transitions for the children, and (5) awarding mother the right of first refusal regarding care
of the children would lead to unnecessary disagreements and litigation. Accordingly, the
juvenile court determined that the order modifying the parenting-time schedule was in the
best interests of the children. Under the standard for reviewing findings of fact set out
above, this record supports these findings. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (noting that
“an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or
demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the court”); Ewald v. Nedrebo, 999 N.W.2d
546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (applying this aspect of Kenney in a grandparent-visitation
appeal), rev. denied (Feb. 28, 2024); Cook v. Arimitsu, 907 N.W.2d 233, 240 n.3 (Minn.
App. 2018) (applying this notion in custody appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018).
9 Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by failing to (properly) apply
section 518.175, it considered “all relevant factors” as required by section 260C.511, made
sufficient findings to support its parenting-time schedule, and that, on this record, mother
has not shown those findings to be clearly erroneous. Additionally, we conclude that
mother has not shown that the juvenile court’s parenting-time decision was an abuse of its
discretion.
II. The juvenile court erred in modifying child support in this post-permanency proceeding because Chapter 260C does not grant the court jurisdiction to address child-support matters.
Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to hear and decide the types
of cases brought before it. Giersdorf v. A&M Constr., Inc., 820 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Minn.
2012). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction “to hear and determine a particular
class of actions and the particular questions” presented depends on the constitutional and
statutory grant of authority conferred upon the court. McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of
Vadnais Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2016). “Defects in subject-matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be waived or forfeited by a party.” Rued
v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 13 N.W.3d 42, 46 (Minn. 2024) (citing Seehus v. Bor-Son
Constr., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2010)). We review questions of subject-matter
jurisdiction in child-protection matters de novo. A.H., 879 N.W.2d. at 4.
Under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.101, subdivision 2(2) (2024), the “juvenile
court” has “original and exclusive jurisdiction” over “permanency matters under
[Minnesota Statutes] sections 260C.503 to 260C.521[.]” Mother argues that the juvenile
10 court lacked “authority” 4 to modify child support in these post-permanency proceedings
under sections 260C.503-521. She notes that, under section 260C.521, subdivision 2(a),
modifications of permanent custody orders are governed by sections 518.18 and .185,
and—with an exception not relevant here—those provisions do not permit modification of
child support. See Minn. Stat. § 518.18(f). We agree.
We start by analyzing whether the applicable statutory language is ambiguous on
its face. In re Welfare of Child of S.B.G., 991 N.W.2d 874, 884 (Minn. 2023) (quotation
omitted). A statute is ambiguous if its language is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation. Id.; In re Welfare of Child of J.D.T, 946 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn. 2020).
When addressing whether statutory language is ambiguous, we give words and phrases
their plain and ordinary meaning. Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 931
N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2019) (“We construe words and phrases ‘according to rules of
grammar and according to their common and approved usage.’”) (quoting State v. Riggs,
865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015)). If a statute is unambiguous, we apply the statutory
language. J.D.T., 946 N.W.2d at 327. If the statute is ambiguous, “then we may apply the
canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432,
435 (Minn. 2017).
We cannot add words to an unambiguous statute under the guise of statutory
interpretation. County of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 709 (Minn. 2013); see also
4 Mother uses “authority” to refer to what Minnesota Statutes section 260C.101, subdivisions 1 and 2 call the juvenile court’s “original and exclusive jurisdiction.” Because the governing statute refers to the juvenile court’s “original and exclusive jurisdiction,” we refer to the juvenile court’s “jurisdiction.”
11 Great River Energy v. Swedzinski, 860 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Minn. 2015) (stating that we
cannot add words to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted). “[W]hen a
question of statutory construction involves a failure of expression rather than an ambiguity
of expression, courts are not free to substitute amendment for construction and thereby
supply the omissions of the legislature.” In re E.M.B., 987 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn. App.
2023) (quotation omitted); Reiter v. Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 2006) (“[W]e
will not read into a statute a provision that the legislature has omitted, either purposely or
inadvertently.”).
This matter is a permanency proceeding. Thus, it is governed by sections 260C.503-
.521. 5 The juvenile court has “original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings
concerning . . . permanency matters under sections 260C.503 to 260C.521.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.101, subd. 2(2). Minnesota Statutes sections 260C.503-.521 create a framework
for permanency dispositions, including the transfer of permanent legal and physical
custody. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4.
When, as here, there is a prior transfer of physical and legal custody of a child to a
relative, the court “may” retain jurisdiction “over . . . the parents or guardian of the child
[and] the child . . . for purposes of ensuring appropriate services are delivered to the child
. . . [and] for the purpose of ensuring conditions ordered by the court related to the care and
custody of the child are met.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4(e)(3). Father filed his
5 Under section 260C.515, subdivision 4(b), the juvenile court must “follow the standards applicable under this chapter and chapter 260, and the procedures in the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4(b).
12 motion under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.521, subdivision 2(a). Under that
provision, “[a]n order for a relative to have permanent legal and physical custody of a child
may be modified using standards under sections 518.18 and 518.185.” Section 518.18
governs motions to modify custody. The only references to child support in section 518.18
are not relevant here. 6 And section 518.185 does not mention child support. Thus, the
relevant statutes are sufficiently clear for us to conclude that the grant of original and
exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court over proceedings concerning permanency
matters under sections 260C.503 to .521 does not include jurisdiction to address child
support when the conditions described in section 518.18(f) are not satisfied.
Nothing in chapter 518A, which governs child support, alters this conclusion.
Chapter 518A mentions chapter 260C three times. None of those references are relevant
here. 7 And Minnesota Statutes section 518A.39, subdivision 2, which addresses
6 Section 518.18(f) states:
If a parent has been granted sole physical custody of a minor and the child subsequently lives with the other parent, and temporary sole physical custody has been approved by the court or by a court-appointed referee, the court may suspend the obligor’s child support obligation pending the final custody determination. The court’s order denying the suspension of child support must include a written explanation of the reasons why continuation of the child support obligation would be in the best interests of the child.
Here, because permanent legal and physical custody was granted to father, and the children continue to reside with him, Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(f) does not apply. 7 Chapter 518A mentions chapter 260C regarding: (1) the ability of a public authority to take the action of redirection of basic support, medical support, and childcare support to
13 modification of support, does not mention or incorporate the permanency provisions under
Minnesota Statutes sections 260C.503-.521. Similarly, the permanency provisions do not
mention or incorporate Minnesota Statutes section 518A.39, subdivision 2 (2024). 8 Thus,
these statutes do not alter our conclusion that jurisdiction to address child support is not
part of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over permanency proceedings under the
permanency provisions.
Here, the juvenile court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the permanency
matter pursuant to the applicable authorities. The 2019 order transferring permanent legal
and physical custody—which is not before us—set child support at $0. 9 Under Minnesota
Statutes section 260C.515, subdivision 4(e)(3), the juvenile court retained jurisdiction
caregiver under a voluntary placement agreement without the necessity of obtaining an order from any judicial or administrative tribunal pursuant to section 260C.227 (2024), (2) administrative redirection of support under an out-of-home placement plan pursuant to section 260C.212, subdivision 1a (2024), and (3) redirection of support determined not to be in the best interests of the child under section 260C.331, subdivision 1 (2024). See Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 18 (defining “public authority”); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.46, subd. 5(a)(9), 7. This case does not involve a redirection of child support. Thus, these provisions are not relevant here. 8 Minnesota Statutes section 518A.39, subdivision 2, provides that, following the issuance of a child support order under chapter 518A (child support) or chapter 518 (marriage dissolution), “the court may from time to time, on motion of either of the parties . . . modify the order respecting the amount of support money or medical support, and the payment of it . . . and may make an order respecting these matters which it might have made in the original proceeding, except as herein otherwise provided.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2 (emphasis added). 9 There was no appeal of that order. See Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co., 147 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn. 1966) (stating that “[e]ven though the decision of the trial court in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order it is still final after the time for appeal has expired”); T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d at 360 (citing Dieseth in an appeal involving a transfer of permanent legal and physical custody).
14 solely “for purposes of ensuring appropriate services are delivered to the child” and for
ensuring compliance with conditions related to the child’s care and custody. Under the
express terms of the 2019 order, the juvenile court retained jurisdiction only to modify
custody and parenting time and explicitly stated that juvenile jurisdiction was otherwise
terminated. The order further provided that “[a]ny motion to modify this Order, other than
a motion to modify child support, shall be filed in this file in juvenile court pursuant to
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.07, subd. 4.”
When the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction in the October 2019 order, father
could have sought a modification of child support in the family court case, as the juvenile
court no longer retained exclusive jurisdiction following the transfer of permanent legal
and physical custody to a relative. This conclusion is supported by the order transferring
permanent legal and physical custody to a relative, which expressly provided that “[a]ny
motion to modify this Order, other than a motion to modify child support, shall be filed in
this file in juvenile court pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 42.07, subd. 4.” (Emphasis
added). Child support was originally established in the parties’ judgment and decree in the
family court action, and that court’s jurisdiction was suspended during the pendency of the
juvenile-protection proceedings. Once the juvenile court expressly terminated its
jurisdiction in the order transferring permanent legal and physical custody, jurisdiction over
child support reverted to the family court. Accordingly, father’s request to modify child
support should have been brought in the family court case, not in the juvenile court case,
and the juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified child support in this post-
15 permanency proceeding. We therefore reverse the portion of the district court’s order
modifying child support.
DECISION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the parenting-time
provision of the transfer of custody order. The juvenile court properly considered all
relevant factors in determining that the modified parenting-time schedule was in the best
interests of the children, as required by Minnesota Statutes section 260C.511. Moreover,
the juvenile court’s findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.
However, the juvenile court erred in modifying child support in this post-permanency
proceeding. Chapter 260C does not grant the juvenile court jurisdiction over child support,
there are no provisions in Chapter 518 (marriage dissolution) or Chapter 518A (child
support) that grant the juvenile court jurisdiction. Therefore, because district court did not
abuse its discretion in modifying the parenting-time, and a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction
to address child support in a post-permanency proceeding we affirm in part and reverse in
part.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.